Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) UPDATE 1.1

TIME: 2025-12-11 1100Z SUBJECT: RF Mechanized Assaults Exploiting Fog on Pokrovsk Axis; Confirmed Consolidation of Northern Flank; Escalation of UAF Deep Strike Capabilities

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The operational center of gravity (COG) remains the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk), now characterized by high-tempo, low-visibility mechanized assaults.

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): RF forces are executing major mechanized assaults under the cover of dense fog, attempting to drive heavy armor into the UAF defense lines around Pokrovsk city. UAF elements (68th Jaeger Brigade) are actively repelling these attacks utilizing FPV drones. The fate of UAF elements exfiltrating from Dimitrov remains precarious. UAF SKELYA Regiment claims successful operations within Pokrovsk, likely referencing successful localized defense actions.
• Northern Axis (Kharkiv): The Russian Ministry of Defence (RF MoD) formally confirms the "complete liberation of Liman in Kharkov region" (distinct from Lyman, Donetsk). This confirms the operational success of RF forces in consolidating the Vovchansk salient’s southern flank. RF forces will likely shift priority to hardening these gains.
• Deep Battle/Strategic Rear: A confirmed drone strike, likely executed by UAF or associated elements, damaged the strategic Lukoil-Nizhnevolzhskneft platform in the Northern Caspian Sea. This represents a significant extension of UAF deep strike capability against RF strategic economic infrastructure.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Dense fog is reported near the Pokrovsk contact line. This severely restricts traditional UAF optical/drone reconnaissance and air support, but RF is actively attempting to exploit this condition for mechanized infiltration.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF: UAF ground units are relying heavily on autonomous and drone-based targeting and denial-of-access maneuvers (e.g., 68th Jaeger FPV teams) to counter RF mechanized columns in the low-visibility environment. Air Defense Command reports a lifting of the ballistic threat but continued low-altitude UAV threat in the Southern operational zone (Mykolaiv).
• RF: RF forces prioritize armored assault under adverse weather. RF IO/Diplomatic C2 remains highly active, synchronously pushing maximum casualty claims (Lavrov) and undermining Western political unity.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions

• Capability: RF maintains HIGH capability for armored penetration when coupled with environmental cover (fog). Demonstrated ability to rapidly consolidate gains on secondary fronts (Liman, Kharkiv).
• Intention (Tactical): Immediate operational breakthrough toward Pokrovsk city center, bypassing the secondary UAF defensive lines by utilizing the fog to minimize exposure to UAF FPV/artillery correction assets.
• Intention (Strategic Coercion): Sustain the aggressive Information Warfare (IO) campaign to erode Western political will and UAF troop morale by amplifying claims of catastrophic UAF losses (1M) and suggesting imminent political failure of the Western coalition (G7 alternative, Trump’s statements).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Weather Exploitation: RF is actively leveraging dense fog (a constraint on UAF air superiority) to facilitate large-scale, close-range mechanized assaults near Pokrovsk.
• Logistical Stress Confirmed: UAF StratCom footage confirms tactical logistics stress within RF forward units (soldiers drinking puddle water). This validates the effect of ongoing UAF interdiction efforts (against the 260th GRAU and Novoazovsk corridor) despite the high operational tempo.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY) The high volume of traffic reported near Novoazovsk combined with confirmed tactical logistical failures (water/food shortages) means the RF logistical backbone is highly stressed and vulnerable. The 260th GRAU and the Novoazovsk corridor remain the single most critical interdiction HVTs. (HIGH Confidence).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness RF Strategic C2 (IO/Diplomatic) is highly synchronized. However, the confirmed drone strike on the Caspian platform and the disruption of high-level Russian travel (Pashinyan incident in Moscow) indicates significant C2 vulnerabilities in the RF deep rear, likely related to strategic air defense coverage gaps.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF maintains a flexible, decentralized defense near Pokrovsk, effectively utilizing drone warfare (FPV/recon) to negate the RF advantage conferred by the fog. The 68th Jaeger Brigade's success in blunting mechanized assaults under these conditions is a HIGH value tactical success.
• Readiness: UAF is demonstrating improved tactical adaptability against combined arms threats in zero-visibility conditions.
• Domestic Support: The UAF government announcement allowing "Winter Support" funds to be spent on food provides a crucial morale and stability signal to the civilian population amidst intense fighting.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setbacks: Confirmed loss of Liman (Kharkiv region) represents a consolidation of RF gains on the Northern front.
• Successes:
  • Successful deep kinetic action against the Caspian Sea energy platform.
  • Successful repulsion of mechanized assaults under dense fog near Pokrovsk.
  • Confirmed logistical degradation impacting RF forward tactical units.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Requirement: Continued supply of FPV drones and counter-EW assets to maintain tactical effectiveness in low-visibility environments against mechanized forces.
• Constraint: The environmental factors (fog) severely constrain fixed-wing CAS and high-altitude ISTAR support on the critical Pokrovsk axis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns RF IO is maintaining maximum saturation:

1. Mass Casualty Inflation (Lavrov): Repeat claim of over 1 million UAF casualties, designed to paralyze Western policy and demoralize troops. (HIGH Confidence in IO intent).
2. Ally Deterrence: Amplification of US political narratives (Alternative to G7, Trump/EU friction) aimed at convincing EU leaders that the US commitment is dissolving, encouraging unilateral peace pressure on Kyiv.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• UAF Morale: The successful defense actions near Pokrovsk (68th Brigade) and the demonstration of deep strike capability (Caspian) provide necessary counter-narratives to the loss of Liman (Kharkiv).
• RF Domestic Morale Opportunity: UAF StratCom should immediately leverage confirmed RF domestic failures: the food safety scandal (Cherkizovo) and evidence of financial strain (mortgage difficulty) to counter state narratives of stability and prosperity.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The core diplomatic front remains RF efforts to fracture Western unity through strategic leaks and amplification of political friction (Trump claims). UAF counter-messaging must remain sharp and focused on the 20-point peace plan.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

RF will execute a two-pronged kinetic and non-kinetic strategy over the next 48-72 hours:

1. Fog Exploitation Continuation: RF forces will continue to launch small-scale, decentralized mechanized assaults near Pokrovsk, prioritizing operations during periods of low visibility (fog, night) to test and penetrate UAF defensive lines west of Grishino.
2. Northern Holding Operation: Following the confirmed seizure of Liman (Kharkiv), RF will transition to hardening defenses and limited spoiling attacks on this axis, likely freeing up high-mobility reserves for reassignment toward the Donbas or Zaporizhzhia fronts.
3. Diplomatic-IO Blitz: Lavrov and official sources will maintain the high-tempo information attack regarding UAF casualties and Western fracturing, coinciding with maximum pressure on the battlefield.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (MEDIUM Confidence)

The convergence of successful RF armored penetration and unconstrained logistical support:

1. Pokrovsk Breach: A massed RF mechanized breakthrough succeeds in the fog, isolating the UAF 68th Brigade and seizing a key road junction, forcing a disorganized UAF retreat from the immediate defense perimeter of Pokrovsk city.
2. Novoazovsk Delivery: The Novoazovsk logistical surge successfully bypasses UAF deep interdiction, resulting in a doubling of artillery and fuel supply rates to the Southern Axis, allowing the RF 37th GMRB to launch a decisive attack against the UAF Plan PHOENIX retrograde, capturing significant UAF materiel.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS