INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)
TIME: 2025-12-11 1100Z
SUBJECT: Critical Degradation on Pokrovsk Axis and Confirmed Consolidation of Northern Flank Gains
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The operational center of gravity (COG) remains the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk), where UAF forces are executing a high-risk exfiltration under intense pressure.
- Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): UAF elements in Dimitrov are functionally isolated following the confirmed loss of Svetloe and Grishino. RF forces are actively pressing west toward Krasnoarmiysk/Pokrovsk city center. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSZSU) reports intense clashes across the Pokrovsk direction, including near Rodynske and Myrnohrad.
- Northern Axis (Kharkiv/Lyman): Multiple RF military correspondents and the Russian Ministry of Defence (MO RF) officially claim the seizure of Lyman (Kharkiv Oblast), a settlement south of Vovchansk. If confirmed by UAF, this signifies successful RF consolidation of the Vovchansk salient’s southern flank. GSZSU reports simultaneous intense clashes near the strategically vital Lyman (Donetsk Oblast), including near Novoyehorivka and Zarichne, indicating dual operational pressure on the Northern Front.
- Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia): Controlled retrograde (Plan PHOENIX) is ongoing around Stepnohorsk. RF air assets are active, with KAB (Guided Aerial Bomb) strikes reported on Zaporizhzhia Oblast. GSZSU confirms clashes near Stepnohirsk and Huliaipole.
- Deep Rear: UAF Air Force reports continued threat of ballistic missile usage from the East, suggesting an ongoing RF high-tempo deep strike campaign.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors
No new environmental factors affecting tactical ground maneuver were reported in the last six hours.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
- UAF: Maximizing resources for the controlled exit from Dimitrov and prioritizing air defense assets in the face of persistent KAB/ballistic threats. UAF forces successfully repelled 8 assaults on the Kursk/North Slobozhansky border sector.
- RF: High concentration of ground forces in Donetsk (Pokrovsk). Apparent major logistical surge detected on the Southern/Eastern GLOCs (Novoazovsk corridor traffic). RF air assets continue sustained low-cost tactical air superiority using KABs.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions
- Capability: RF maintains HIGH capability for localized operational breakthrough (Pokrovsk) and strategic deterrence/coercion (Lavrov statements). They are able to synchronize battlefield operations with coordinated Information Warfare (IO) narratives.
- Intention (Tactical): Immediate elimination of UAF resistance in Dimitrov and deep penetration towards Pokrovsk city. Simultaneously, RF intends to solidify and expand the Vovchansk gains by exploiting the Lyman (Kharkiv) seizure.
- Intention (Logistical): Sustain the high rate of artillery and mechanized attrition along the Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhia axes, evidenced by the logistical movement near Novoazovsk and the previously identified 260th GRAU surge.
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
- Operational Validation: The massive RF media claim regarding the seizure of Lyman (Kharkiv Oblast) confirms the previously flagged risk of a dangerous operational expansion on the Northern axis. (HIGH Confidence in RF intent to exploit this sector).
- Logistical Indicators: Visual confirmation of massive traffic congestion near Novoazovsk on the route toward the contact line suggests a significant, potentially reinforcing, flow of RF military logistics (materiel, fuel, or personnel) to support Southern/Eastern operations.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
- The 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base surge remains critical.
- The congestion near Novoazovsk suggests high operational tempo requirements are stressing RF main supply routes (MSRs) in the occupied rear. This congested corridor now presents a High-Value Target (HVT) for deep interdiction, second only to the 260th GRAU. (MEDIUM Confidence in specific cargo, HIGH Confidence in logistical vulnerability).
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF Strategic C2 (IO/Diplomatic) is robust, using synchronized statements by Lavrov and Peskov to achieve maximum coercive effect (e.g., casualty inflation, denial of Ukrainian legal actions, explicit threat of war with Europe).
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
- Posture: UAF is engaged in critical operational maneuver while maintaining rigid defense on other axes (e.g., repelling assaults near Kursk). Focus is on preserving combat power through controlled retrograde (PHOENIX) and exfiltration (Dimitrov).
- Readiness Constraint: Continued KAB and ballistic threats necessitate the dispersal of C2 elements and the maintenance of a high state of air defense readiness, diverting resources from maneuver formations.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Setbacks: The operational crisis in Dimitrov continues. RF claim of Lyman (Kharkiv) seizure, if confirmed, is a significant setback on the Northern flank.
- Successes: Effective use of international legal mechanisms to secure the detention of a Russian figure in Poland (Hermitage archaeologist), countering the RF narrative of institutional decay. Successful repulsion of border assaults (Kursk/Sumy).
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
- Priority Requirement: Immediate deep strike capability to interdict the detected logistical surge (260th GRAU and Novoazovsk corridor).
- Operational Constraint: Increased threat of KAB/ballistic strikes places an unmanageable demand on remaining strategic SAM assets.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
- RF Coercion Strategy: Lavrov is executing a major coercive campaign:
- Casualty Inflation: Claiming UAF losses exceed 1 million (aimed at eroding Western political will).
- Military Coercion: Explicit public threat that Russia is ready to fight Europe "right now," designed to deter direct intervention or arms shipments.
- Legal Counter-Narrative: Peskov frames the legitimate UAF-requested detention of the Russian archaeologist in Poland as "legal arbitrary rule," aiming to delegitimize Ukrainian international judicial actions.
- Financial Coercion: Basrykin's claim of seeking 600 billion rubles in damages from Ukraine establishes a legal basis for future RF financial claims.
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
- Domestic RF morale benefits from the claimed capture of Lyman (Kharkiv) and the aggressive diplomatic posture.
- The reported detention of the Russian figure, if effectively broadcasted by UAF StratCom, serves as a limited morale boost, emphasizing Ukraine’s enduring legal and diplomatic reach.
- Political uncertainty regarding the US stance (Trump/European leader meeting) presents an immediate opportunity for RF IO to suggest Allied friction.
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
- Pro-UAF Action: The detention in Poland on a UAF warrant highlights successful international cooperation in addressing Russian cultural appropriation/war crimes allegations.
- RF Internal Instability: Incidents in Russia (Perm accident, Moscow drone attack disrupting PM Pashinyan's travel) provide minor IO value for UAF, suggesting operational insecurity in the RF deep rear.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)
RF will exploit tactical success and logistical capability over the next 72 hours:
- Pokrovsk Operational Depth: RF forces will finalize the liquidation of UAF resistance in Dimitrov NLT 111800Z DEC and use the secured flank to rapidly advance on key road intersections leading directly to Pokrovsk city.
- Northern Front Consolidation and Pressure: RF will attempt to consolidate gains around the claimed Lyman (Kharkiv) settlement while simultaneously increasing pressure (KAB strikes and ground assaults) on the Siversk-Slovyansk line (Lyman, Donetsk).
- Sustained Deep Strike and GLOC Interdiction: RF will continue to leverage KABs and potential ballistic systems against C2/CI targets in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia, coupled with persistent UAV swarm threats along the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka corridor.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (MEDIUM Confidence)
The enemy achieves a decisive operational rupture on two fronts, facilitated by unconstrained logistics:
- PHOENIX Failure: The 37th GMRB successfully achieves a decisive interdiction of the Plan PHOENIX retrograde, capturing substantial UAF armor/equipment and forcing an emergency withdrawal, opening the axis toward Zaporizhzhia city.
- Siversk Collapse: RF forces achieve a localized breakthrough near the strategic Lyman (Donetsk), compelling UAF to dedicate irreplaceable strategic reserves to stabilize the Siversk-Slovyansk defense group, weakening resistance on the Pokrovsk axis.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Estimated Timeline | Decision Point |
|---|
| Dimitrov Pocket Complete Liquidation | NLT 111800Z DEC | Initiate high-readiness posture for defense of Pokrovsk city main defense lines. |
| Novoazovsk Logistical Surge Peak | 111200Z to 121200Z DEC | Trigger high-priority deep strike interdiction on the Novoazovsk corridor traffic. |
| Validation of Lyman (Kharkiv) Seizure | NLT 120000Z DEC | If confirmed, adjust reserve deployment protocols for the Northern Operational Command to harden flanks. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence Assessment |
|---|
| P1 (TACTICAL) | Verification of physical RF control over Lyman (Kharkiv Oblast) settlement and depth of penetration south of Vovchansk. | IMMEDIATE IMINT/HUMINT: Confirm physical RF presence and intent for further exploitation on this axis. | LOW |
| P2 (LOGISTICS) | Nature and composition of the heavy traffic congestion observed near Novoazovsk (Personnel, ammunition, or fuel). | IMINT/ELINT: Identify vehicle types (trucks, APCs, fuel tankers) to determine the type of incoming material support. | MEDIUM |
| P3 (MANEUVER) | Current status of UAF main GLOCs into/out of Dimitrov—fully severed, or only under direct fire control? | HUMINT/SIGINT: Acquire unit reports regarding final exfiltration route viability. | MEDIUM |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
| Priority | Domain | Action | Commander/Staff |
|---|
| 1. IMMEDIATE DEEP INTERDICTION | J3/J2 | DOUBLE-TASK LOGISTICAL TARGETING: Target both the 260th GRAU Base and the detected logistical congestion near Novoazovsk simultaneously using long-range assets. The Novoazovsk congestion is a vulnerable chokepoint. | Long-Range Strike Command |
| 2. DEFENSE OF POKROVSK | J3 | PRIORITIZE FIRES FOR EXFILTRATION: Commit maximum available artillery/drone support to maintain fire superiority west of Grishino until all surviving Dimitrov elements are safely behind the designated secondary defensive line. | Eastern Operational Command |
| 3. STRATCOM COUNTER-COERCION | P7 | ISSUE COUNTER-NARRATIVE ON RF THREATS: National Command Authority must issue a statement immediately rejecting Lavrov’s claims of 1M casualties and his threats against Europe. Reiterate Ukrainian commitment to the 20-point peace plan and highlight the international legal success (Poland detention). | General Staff / Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| 4. AIR DEFENSE SHIFT | J3/J4 | COUNTER-KAB DEPLOYMENT: Immediately review existing SHORAD/Medium-range SAM battery deployment in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts to harden infrastructure against continued KAB and ballistic threats. Focus on defending key logistics hubs. | Air Force Command / Logistics Command |