Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 2025-12-11 1000Z SUBJECT: Operational Status, Pokrovsk Axis Degradation, and Coordinated Information Warfare Surge

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The primary kinetic focus remains the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast), where RF forces have successfully exploited a breach, isolating UAF elements.

• Pokrovsk Axis: The loss of Svetloe and Grishino (Confirmed, HIGH Confidence) means UAF forces in Dimitrov are functionally isolated, currently under heavy fire control if not physically encircled. The terrain west of Grishino is the immediate target for UAF retrograde maneuver.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis: UAF forces are executing Contingency Plan PHOENIX (Controlled retrograde in Stepnohorsk). RF pressure from the 37th GMRB is critical.
• Northern Axis (NEW/UNVERIFIED): The Russian Ministry of Defence (MO RF) publicly claimed seizure of Lyman (Kharkiv Oblast). If verified, this signifies a catastrophic failure along the Siversk-Slovyansk defense line and opens a major new axis of operational pressure against the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
• Deep Rear: RF air operations targeted critical infrastructure (CI) across multiple oblasts, including Odesa and Dnipropetrovsk (154 air targets reported by UAF AF).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

• No significant weather changes reported to impede or favor either side's ground maneuver at the tactical contact line.
• RF C2 nodes in Northern Russia (St. Petersburg/Moscow) are reporting heavy winter weather (snow/wind), which may marginally affect deep RF logistical flow by rail or air. (LOW Confidence in operational impact).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• UAF Control Measures: Implementation of emergency exfiltration protocols for Dimitrov is now paramount. PHOENIX retrograde is currently underway. UAF Air Force is maintaining high-tempo air defense operations against persistent RF deep strikes.
• RF Control Measures: RF is sustaining a massive, combined attrition campaign combining ground maneuver (Pokrovsk), massed artillery (260th GRAU surge), and combined deep strike packages (154 targets).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions

• Capability: RF maintains HIGH capability for massed, sustained deep strikes on CI and C2 nodes. Their confirmed exploitation of the Pokrovsk breach demonstrates effective combined arms capability at the tactical-operational level.
• Intention (Operational): Immediate liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket (MLCOA). Maximize operational depth gains in Pokrovsk. Simultaneously, prevent the successful completion of UAF retrograde (Plan PHOENIX) in Stepnohorsk.
• Intention (Strategic/Hybrid): RF is executing a coordinated Information Warfare (IO) blitz aimed at eroding Western resolve and domestic Ukrainian morale by manufacturing an image of Russian diplomatic reasonableness ("collective security guarantees") while simultaneously issuing explicit military threats (European peacekeepers are "legitimate military targets").

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

• Deep Strike Focus: RF shifted from primarily energy infrastructure attrition to simultaneous targeting of energy and fuel complexes (MO RF claim) alongside C2 nodes, likely leveraging intelligence from the potential "Kuzmuk" CI breach.
• New Front Claim: The unverified claim of seizing Lyman is a significant escalation of the narrative and, if true, represents a high-risk operational shift requiring immediate UAF reassessment of the Siversk-Slovyansk defense group stability. (MEDIUM Confidence in RF intent to exploit this axis).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

• The 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base logistical surge (SAR Score 24.96, CRITICAL) remains the highest kinetic priority for deep interdiction. (HIGH Confidence).
• Public appeals for drone procurement for RF VDV units suggest persistent reliance on decentralized procurement for key tactical technologies (FPVs, small UAS). This reflects a systemic gap in high-tech tactical logistics, though heavy munitions supply appears unconstrained (260th GRAU data).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

• RF C2 remains robust, demonstrated by the coordination of 154 air targets in the overnight strike package.
• The continued targeting of UAF C2 centers (Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk) suggests RF is actively exploiting relocated command posts, confirming the severity of the suspected CI breach. (HIGH Confidence).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

• Posture: UAF is engaged in critical defensive and retrograde maneuvers. Readiness is maximized in the 132nd DShV holding actions.
• Readiness Constraint: High tempo of RF attrition strikes against CI and C2 introduces cumulative stress on organizational cohesion and national resilience.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setbacks: Territorial losses in Pokrovsk Axis (Svetloe, Grishino). Increased vulnerability of C2.
• Successes (Strategic Depth): SBU claim of striking a Russian oil/gas platform in the Caspian Sea demonstrates significant strategic depth strike capability, which must be leveraged for deterrence and international signaling.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Priority Requirement: Immediate need for increased SHORAD/C-UAS capacity along critical GLOCs, particularly the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka rail/road corridor, to counter UAV swarm tactics.
• Operational Constraint: The requirement to maintain combat power while executing Plan PHOENIX puts severe stress on operational reserves ("BRAVO-BLOCK").

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF IO Blitz (Strategic Denial/Coercion): Foreign Minister Lavrov is leading a massive, coordinated campaign with three key messages:
  1. Casualty Inflation: Claiming UAF losses exceed 1 million (Factually false, but aimed at domestic Russian mobilization and international deterrence). (HIGH Confidence in persistent RF use of this narrative).
  2. Peace Offer Framing: Publicly stating Russia transmitted "additional proposals for collective security guarantees" to the US, designed to preempt the UAF 20-point peace plan and make the West appear intransigent.
  3. Explicit Threat: Direct threat that any "European peacekeepers" entering Ukraine will become legitimate RF military targets.
• UAF Counter-Narrative: UAF media is maintaining high transparency (Air Force reporting on strikes) and focusing on democratic continuity (Rada discussing wartime elections). The successful extradition of a crime figure from Moldova demonstrates effective international cooperation in law enforcement, countering RF narratives of Ukrainian institutional collapse.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

• Morale is being heavily tested by the loss of settlements near Pokrovsk and the intensity of the overnight combined strikes.
• The ongoing dispute within the EU regarding frozen Russian assets (Belgium risk/EU alternatives) creates a perception of friction among allies, which RF IO will exploit to suggest Western unity is fracturing.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• The detention of a Russian scientist in Poland (based on a UAF request regarding illegal Crimean excavations) highlights Ukraine's continued effective use of international legal mechanisms.
• Reports of US plans to potentially re-integrate Russia into the global economy (WSJ, cited by UAF media) suggest internal Western disagreements on long-term policy, complicating support messaging.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

RF forces will prioritize tactical consolidation and strategic signaling over the next 48 hours:

1. Dimitrov Pocket Liquidation: RF will commit VDV or mechanized reserves to finalize the seizure of Dimitrov NLT 2025-12-11T1600Z, securing the flank for the eventual push on Pokrovsk city.
2. Sustained Attrition and Logistical Interdiction: RF deep strikes will continue against high-value C2/CI targets in Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa, coupled with continued UAV pressure on the Shyriaieve corridor GLOCs.
3. Diplomatic-IO Saturation: Lavrov's aggressive narrative regarding peace offers, casualty figures, and threats against peacekeepers will intensify, aiming to dominate the upcoming UNSC cycle and delegitimize UAF diplomatic efforts.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (MEDIUM Confidence)

The enemy achieves a simultaneous operational breakthrough on two critical axes, exploiting deep intelligence:

1. Kharkiv/Donetsk Front Breakthrough (Lyman Verification): The RF claim of seizing Lyman is validated, leading to a rapid RF exploitation toward Slovyansk from the North, forcing a critical realignment of UAF reserves currently focused on Pokrovsk.
2. Stepnohorsk Rout: The 37th GMRB successfully interdicts the PHOENIX retrograde, turning a controlled UAF withdrawal into a rout and capturing significant UAF combat materiel, opening the axis toward Zaporizhzhia city.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS