Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 110645Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: SITREP 110630Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is characterized by simultaneous RF pressure to accelerate the liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket (Pokrovsk Axis) and sustained deep kinetic strikes designed to fix UAF air defense (AD) assets.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Critical): Internal reports indicate official UAF General Staff (GSh) maps grossly underestimate the current RF penetration depth in the Pokrovsk direction. This suggests UAF maneuver units are operating in a significantly more constrained and vulnerable environment than previously acknowledged, placing the 110800Z Dimitrov exfiltration deadline under extreme jeopardy. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Northeast Axis (Krasny Liman): Confirmed activity by RF VDV (Airborne Forces) elements in the Krasnolymanske direction (06:30Z), maintaining secondary pressure on UAF defensive positions north of Slovyansk/Siversk. This prevents full reserve reallocation to the critical Southern/Eastern sectors. (Confidence: MEDIUM)
• Deep Rear Area: RF deep strikes continue against Kharkiv Oblast settlements (06:39Z), confirming the intent to exploit established AD vulnerabilities across the northern logistics lines, complementing the strategic attacks on Poltava/Kremenchuk.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant change since 110630Z. Geomagnetic Storm (GMS) effects continue to degrade unassisted GPS navigation.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are critically stressed by the need to execute the Dimitrov exfiltration and secure the Stepnohorsk (Plan PHOENIX) maneuver corridors simultaneously. The information environment is degrading due to internal criticism of official reporting.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): RF intends to achieve operational collapse in the Pokrovsk sector NLT 110800Z while initiating a synchronized information operation campaign to fracture UAF external military aid cooperation (Poland/EU focus).

CAPABILITIES:

• Sustained Deep Strike (UAS/Missile): RF maintains the capability to conduct synchronized, multi-domain strikes (Kremenchuk, Dnipropetrovsk UAV track, Kharkiv strikes) designed to dilute UAF AD coverage. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Strategic Logistics Diversification: Russian Defence Minister Shoigu’s visit to Vietnam to observe military engineering repair facilities (06:13Z) indicates RF is pursuing long-term, diverse sustainment lines and military-technical cooperation to offset reliance on domestic production or vulnerable rear areas. (Confidence: MEDIUM)
• Mobilization Potential: Intelligence suggests RF is preparing for a hidden mobilization of inactive reservists (06:33Z) to replenish manpower reserves, indicating long-term intent to sustain high-attrition warfare despite current losses. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The high probability of the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base strike failure (estimated in 110630Z SITREP) remains the dominant logistics threat, enabling the anticipated artillery saturation surge NLT 110800Z.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective in integrating kinetic operations (Deep Strikes) with associated Information Operations (IO), immediately framing significant UAF deep strikes (e.g., recent Moscow drone attacks) as politically motivated 'symbolic sallies' for external consumption, rather than acknowledging tactical vulnerability. (Confidence: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is high but severely constrained by the AD fixations and the imminent threat of overwhelming RF artillery fire. Force posture is shifting toward damage control and information stability management due to internal friction.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• UAF executed one of the most massive drone attacks against targets within Russia (Moscow and other regions) recently (06:20Z), confirming robust deep-strike capability and potentially forcing RF AD asset redeployment internally. Setbacks:
• Confirmed widespread discrepancy between official General Staff maps and the actual tactical situation in Pokrovsk (06:31Z). This severely damages credibility and operational trust during a critical maneuver phase. (Confidence: HIGH)
• The immediate approach of the 110800Z deadline for Dimitrov exfiltration coinciding with anticipated artillery surge puts the maneuver force preservation strategy at maximum risk.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. Time Constraint: Only 75 minutes remain until the 110800Z Dimitrov exfiltration deadline.
2. Information Constraint: The GSh mapping controversy requires immediate resolution to maintain operational morale and domestic stability.
3. AD Constraint: Mobile AD assets remain critically strained by the concurrent demands of protecting strategic infrastructure (Kremenchuk) and active maneuver corridors (Stepnohorsk).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO has escalated its cohesion-fracturing strategy, moving beyond US-EU friction to target bilateral aid relationships:

• Poland/EU Aid Integrity: RF sources are actively circulating narratives alleging mass corruption in Polish military aid procurement for Ukraine and claiming internal political disagreement within Poland regarding promised MiG-29 transfers (06:25Z, 06:31Z).
• Strategic Distraction/Normalization: RF messaging focuses on long-term diplomatic maneuverings (EU alternative funding plans, Shoigu's Vietnam visit) and domestic non-military issues (Hong Kong Flu outbreak) to project an image of strategic stability and deflect attention from UAF deep strikes.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal criticism regarding the Pokrovsk map accuracy poses an immediate, localized threat to unit morale on the Eastern front, feeding narratives of official deception. StratCom must prioritize addressing this specific tactical information gap to prevent broader operational distrust.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

EU countries are reportedly discussing an alternative funding plan for Kyiv (06:34Z) if frozen Russian assets cannot be seized. This indicates ongoing strategic commitment but highlights the complexity and potential delays in long-term financial support mechanisms, which RF IO will exploit.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

1. Artillery Maximum Effort (East): RF will initiate the anticipated artillery saturation surge NLT 110800Z to prevent the successful exfiltration of the Dimitrov pocket, maximizing casualties and equipment abandonment. (Confidence: HIGH)
2. IO Escalation: RF IO will maximize synchronization with the kinetic surge, exploiting the internal UAF map controversy to amplify narratives of tactical disaster and official deceit on the Pokrovsk axis. (Confidence: HIGH)
3. Sustained Pressure (Northeast): RF forces will increase probe and fire missions in the Krasnolymanske direction to fix UAF 1st Line reserves and prevent their movement south or west to reinforce critical maneuvers. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The operational integrity of the Eastern Front breaks down under the weight of the massive RF artillery surge (GRAU effect). This causes the failure of the Dimitrov exfiltration (NLT 110800Z), leading to fragmentation of the 132nd DShV holding elements. Concurrently, the information environment collapse (driven by the map controversy) prevents orderly reinforcement, leading to localized routs and accelerating RF seizure of key terrain West of Pokrovsk. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Refined)

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE FIRE ADJUSTMENT, STRATCOM DAMAGE CONTROL, AND EXPEDITED DIMITROV EXFILTRATION.

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)