Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 110515Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: SITREP 110445Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Pokrovsk Axis, specifically the critical emergency exfiltration of forces from the Dimitrov pocket.

• Eastern Front (Pokrovsk Axis): RF forces are actively engaging elements attempting to stabilize or cover the withdrawal. An RF claim (TASS via Kimakovsky, 04:57Z) reports the destruction of an RDK group attempting a counter-attack near Krasnoarmeysk (Soviet-era name for Pokrovsk). This indicates RF attention is fixed on the western exfiltration corridors, confirming the necessity of immediate, targeted fire support.
• Southern Front (Zaporizhzhia): The Plan PHOENIX retrograde (Stepnohorsk) is under escalating kinetic pressure. UAF Air Force confirms new UAV tracks detected moving from the south toward Zaporizhzhia (04:51Z), aligning with prior intelligence regarding RF intent to interdict the Shyriaieve logistical corridor. Civilian casualties were reported in the adjacent Polohivskyi District (05:10Z).
• Deep Battle: UAF strategic reach remains confirmed. RF PVO forces reported destroying 40 UAVs over Kaluga Oblast (05:00Z). This constitutes a major deep strike attempt, fixing RF AD assets and diverting attention from the front lines. Moscow airports resumed operations (05:03Z), confirming immediate threat cessation.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Geomagnetic Storm (GMS) effects continue to complicate precision navigation and high-bandwidth tactical communications. The successful deployment of 40 UAVs to Kaluga suggests successful mitigation strategies (e.g., inertial navigation or EW bypasses) are being employed by UAF deep strike assets. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF is simultaneously executing two critical retrograde maneuvers (Dimitrov and Stepnohorsk). The lack of Bila Tserkva BDA (CRITICAL GAP) continues to prevent the optimal reallocation of AD assets required to secure both fronts. RF forces are leveraging AD effectiveness in the deep rear to maintain domestic security while applying maximum indirect fire and UAV saturation on UAF maneuver elements in the East and South.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): RF primary intent is the rapid collapse and liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket (Pokrovsk axis) before 110800Z, followed by the exploitation of the Stepnohorsk retrograde (Plan PHOENIX) in the South.

TACTICAL CAPABILITIES:

• Massed AD Response: Demonstrated capacity to detect and neutralize large-scale UAV swarms (40 UAVs over Kaluga), validating the efficacy of strategic AD layers. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Targeted Interdiction: RF is utilizing maneuver elements (potentially RDK hunter-killer teams or advanced Spetsnaz) to actively engage forces covering the Dimitrov withdrawal routes (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk area claim). (Confidence: MEDIUM)

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The high-priority intelligence gap concerning the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base surge (SAR Score 24.96) remains unresolved. The kinetic threat of exponential increase in artillery saturation NLT 110800Z remains the single greatest physical threat to the Dimitrov exfiltration.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF Strategic C2 maintains effectiveness, synchronizing IO messaging (Kaluga AD success) with tactical maneuver attempts in the East. Tactical C2, despite the recognized weakness necessitating the KPO-A solution, is sufficiently robust to coordinate rapid pursuit and interdiction along key axes. (Confidence: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness remains HIGH, focused on executing the sensitive withdrawal protocols while maintaining operational tempo. The reported high RF attrition rate (claimed 1460 personnel) indicates forward elements are executing effective delaying actions despite operational pressure.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed projection of a massed UAV strike into RF strategic territory (Kaluga).
• The time window for the Chernihiv UAV Track has closed (110515Z) without BDA of a kinetic strike, increasing the probability that AD assets dedicated to this area can now be reallocated. Setbacks:
• The failure to acquire BDA on the Bila Tserkva C2 node (NLT 110445Z) continues to inhibit critical AD reallocation decisions, forcing J3 to maintain a suboptimal force posture. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Confirmed civilian casualties in Polohivskyi district compound the complexity of fire control and maneuver in the Southern theater.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL Requirements: Definitive BDA on Bila Tserkva C2 node. Execution authorization for the 260th GRAU strike NLT 110600Z. Constraints: Operational constraints due to time-sensitive concurrent withdrawals; risk to non-combatants; persistent C2 friction due to AD uncertainty.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is actively pursuing a multi-domain strategy:

1. Domestic Normalization: RF media (TASS, Moscow News) is saturated with reports of domestic triviality (word of the year, student rights) and non-conflict news (foreign worker law, historical commemoration) to divert attention from battlefield losses and the Kaluga deep strike. (Confidence: HIGH)
2. Projection of Security: Rapid and prominent reporting of the successful interception of 40 UAVs over Kaluga is intended to reassure the RF domestic population and military about AD integrity.
3. Localized Victory Claim: The Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) claim attempts to psychologically reinforce the RF narrative of inevitable UAF operational collapse in the East.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF StratCom is effectively countering RF narratives by maintaining aggressive reporting of high enemy attrition rates (1460 losses), reinforcing the narrative of high UAF combat effectiveness despite operational withdrawals.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The operational success of launching a massed UAV strike on Kaluga must be immediately leveraged to secure expedited delivery of high-end Western EW and deep strike systems capable of overwhelming RF AD C2 networks.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

1. Pocket Closure and Pursuit: RF will commit light mechanized and specialized forces to aggressively pursue exfiltrating UAF units west of Dimitrov/Pokrovsk, utilizing high volumes of indirect fire (further reinforced by GRAU assets NLT 110800Z). (Confidence: HIGH)
2. Southern Interdiction Focus: RF UAV swarms detected near Zaporizhzhia (04:51Z) will precede concentrated strikes on the Stepnohorsk retrograde routes (Plan PHOENIX) and critical logistics nodes (Shyriaieve corridor). (Confidence: HIGH)
3. Information Exploitation: RF IO will continue promoting narratives focused on domestic stability and RF military resilience (citing Kaluga PVO success) while suppressing mention of RF casualties. (Confidence: HIGH)

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The 260th GRAU strike fails (NLT 110600Z), while the concurrent lack of Bila Tserkva BDA prevents AD reallocation. This lethal combination grants RF temporary operational fire superiority across the Eastern front, allowing RF reserves (e.g., 37th GMRB in the South, or breakthrough forces in the East) to accelerate the UAF retrograde into a rout, resulting in significant loss of combat power and materiel in the Pokrovsk sector. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: BILA TSERKVA BDA RESOLUTION, GRAU STRIKE EXECUTION, IMMEDIATE AD REALLOCATION SOUTH.

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)