Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 110445Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: SITREP 110412Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational gravity remains centered on the imminent liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket (Pokrovsk Axis). The time window for the emergency exfiltration (NLT 110445Z) has been reached, placing maximum kinetic and C2 stress on UAF Central/Eastern commands.

• Eastern Front (Dimitrov/Pokrovsk): The 132nd DShV holding actions are CRITICAL to cover the withdrawal. The presence of significant civilian populations in Pokrovsk and Kostiantynivka (Source: RBK) severely restricts UAF use of deep artillery/saturation fire for cover.
• Central AD Axes (Bila Tserkva/Chernihiv): The Bila Tserkva BDA gap persists, paralyzing the reallocation of AD assets previously dedicated to Kremenchuk. The Chernihiv UAV track remains an unconfirmed feint/secondary threat.
• Deep Battle (Moscow): Confirmed RF AD activity (Source: TASS) indicates the interception of another hostile UAV directed at the Moscow region (04:17Z). This confirms continued UAF strategic reach but demonstrates RF AD effectiveness in the capital zone. (Confidence: HIGH)

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Geomagnetic Storm (GMS) effects continue to degrade precision targeting (GPS/GNSS) and high-bandwidth communications, complicating the precise timing and route-finding required for the Dimitrov exfiltration and the planned 260th GRAU strike. (Confidence: HIGH)

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Units are executing emergency withdrawal protocols in Dimitrov (Plan PHOENIX). AD reserves remain critically constrained and misaligned due to the lack of BDA confirmation at Bila Tserkva. RF: RF is utilizing persistent UAV probing/saturation strikes to fix UAF AD assets while simultaneously preparing for high-intensity artillery saturation in the East, indicated by the 260th GRAU logistical surge (SAR Score 24.96).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF primary intent is the rapid collapse of the Dimitrov pocket to stabilize the Pokrovsk approach, coupled with sustained strategic pressure via IO and disruptive deep strikes.

TACTICAL CAPABILITIES:

• Deep AD: Demonstrated capacity to successfully intercept strategic UAV threats aimed at Moscow (Source: TASS). This reduces the immediate kinetic success rate of long-range UAF strikes, but the political and psychological impact of persistent attacks remains high. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Decentralized C2 (KPO-A): The ongoing public push for the KPO-A tactical software confirms RF intent to rapidly improve battlefield SA and target-to-shooter timelines at the unit level, bypassing bureaucratic delay. This is an accelerating, long-term threat. (Confidence: MEDIUM)
• Internal Focus: RF media is concurrently promoting narratives focused on internal stability (e.g., Moscow real estate inflation, Khabarovsk fraud warnings), potentially indicating an effort to normalize the conflict and shift domestic focus away from war losses. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The anticipated artillery surge from the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base remains the most significant kinetic logistics threat. If the planned UAF strike (NLT 110600Z) is delayed or fails, the intensity of fire around Dimitrov will increase exponentially NLT 110800Z, making successful exfiltration highly improbable. (Confidence: HIGH)

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF Strategic C2 remains effective in synchronizing deep strikes (Bila Tserkva/Chernihiv) with global IO narratives ("Kyiv Blackout"). The adaptation via KPO-A suggests a recognized weakness in tactical C2 that RF is actively attempting to address through decentralized software solutions. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is at maximum alert status, specifically in the AD and Eastern maneuver domains. The success of the 132nd DShV holding action at Dimitrov is contingent upon timely AD reallocation from the Center and successful interdiction of the 260th GRAU logistics flow.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Confirmed continued deep strike capability targeting the RF capital region (Moscow UAV intercept).
• Confirmed localized tactical dominance using drone technology by specialized units (e.g., Підрозділ Shadow confirmed successful FPV/UAV operations against enemy targets). (Confidence: HIGH)
• High morale is being sustained across the force (AFU Day and Volunteer tributes).

Setbacks:

• The C2 resource allocation crisis remains due to the Bila Tserkva BDA gap.
• The immediate requirement to conduct the Dimitrov exfiltration while constrained by civilian presence (Pokrovsk/Kostiantynivka) increases troop vulnerability and requires more stringent fire control protocols.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL Requirements: Immediate BDA confirmation (Bila Tserkva), reliable EW/Counter-UAV coverage for exfiltration routes, and uninterrupted resupply for the 132nd DShV holding element. Constraints: Civilian presence in key maneuver/fire corridors; limited AD pool; ongoing GMS effects.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is maintaining a complex, multi-layered assault:

1. Strategic Denial/Distraction: Focusing on internal issues (housing costs, financial crime) to project normalcy and resilience to the domestic audience while ignoring battlefield losses.
2. Technological Superiority: Promoting the rapid deployment of KPO-A to portray institutional agility.
3. Morale Posing: Use of generic military morale posts (Fighterbomber) to reinforce internal nationalist narratives.
4. Strategic Fragmentation: Continued leveraging of the "Korean Model" leak to fracture Allied resolve.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF public morale is being actively bolstered by StratCom highlighting national unity and military successes (Volunteers, AFU Day, Shadow unit strikes). Counter-messaging against the "Kyiv Blackout" and "Siversk BDA" claims remains the immediate requirement to maintain public trust in the Center and East.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The persistent UAF deep strike capability (Moscow UAV) and demonstrated tactical agility (Shadow unit success) should be immediately highlighted in diplomatic channels to justify urgent requests for more advanced AD (especially counter-C2/EW capabilities to neutralize KPO-A and drone threats).

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will proceed with sequenced operations aimed at achieving operational consolidation in the East and maintaining C2 pressure on the Center.

1. Dimitrov Exfiltration Interdiction: RF will intensify localized indirect fire and drone swarms against the known/suspected exfiltration corridors immediately. Artillery saturation (using 260th GRAU assets) will commence NLT 110800Z if the UAF deep strike fails. (Confidence: HIGH)
2. Bila Tserkva Exploitation: RF IO will release pre-prepared statements exaggerating the success of the Bila Tserkva strike, regardless of the BDA, specifically targeting civilian morale in Kyiv region. (Confidence: HIGH)
3. KPO-A Tactical Test: RF volunteer/elite units will attempt real-time integration and deployment of early KPO-A versions in the Pokrovsk sector to gain tactical advantage over the retreating UAF units. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The Bila Tserkva BDA is negative (critical UAF C2/logistical hub destroyed), leading to localized C2 fragmentation. Concurrently, the Chernihiv UAV track proves kinetic, resulting in successful destruction of a high-value AD or logistics node in the North. This combined C2/kinetic success allows RF aviation (CAS/Rotary Wing) to achieve tactical superiority over the Dimitrov/Pokrovsk envelope, resulting in the rout of the 132nd DShV covering force and the wholesale capture/destruction of the Dimitrov garrison. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: BDA RESOLUTION, PROTECTING EXFILTRATION UNDER CIVILIAN CONSTRAINTS, COUNTER-C2/EW TASKING.

---

INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)