Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 110412Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: SITREP 110345Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational tempo remains critical across three primary axes, focused on disrupting UAF logistical and command networks (Bila Tserkva/Shyriaieve) and securing tactical encirclements (Dimitrov/Pokrovsk).

• Axis 3 (Bila Tserkva/Kyiv SW): The UAV track interception is OVERDUE (Target interception window NLT 110345Z DEC 25). The status of the critical logistical/C2 hub remains unknown, posing the immediate highest risk.
• Axis 4 (Chernihiv/Northern): The new high-priority UAV track continues its trajectory. It is assessed as a deliberate resource magnet intended to draw AD assets from Central Ukraine.
• Eastern Front (Dimitrov): Encirclement pressure is acute. Emergency exfiltration commencement (NLT 110345Z) is the critical maneuver determinant for the entire Pokrovsk sector.
• Eastern Front (Siversk): Confirmed heavy kinetic strikes (likely KABs and high-caliber artillery) accompanied by immediate RF IO claim of neutralizing UAF basing/ammunition depots. This indicates RF forces are exploiting existing attrition by synchronizing deep strikes with immediate cognitive warfare objectives. (Confidence: HIGH)

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The G2.3 Geomagnetic Storm (GMS) effects persist. The resulting GPS/GNSS degradation continues to impede precision targeting for UAF deep strike assets and complicates the precision movement required for mobile AD relocation in response to the Chernihiv track. (Confidence: HIGH)

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF AD: Assets previously dedicated to Kremenchuk (now 100% neutralized) must be immediately reallocated. The uncertainty at Bila Tserkva requires maximum restraint on moving resources until BDA is confirmed. Northern AD reserves are currently tasked to track the Chernihiv threat. RF Forces: RF continues high-rate consumption of kinetic assets (UAVs, KABs) and has demonstrated a willingness to utilize volunteer/private sector IT expertise to rapidly deploy tactical C2 technology (KPO-A).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (STRATEGIC): RF intent is to sustain continuous kinetic pressure (Dimitrov, Siversk) while simultaneously executing strategic strikes (Bila Tserkva, Shyriaieve) and accelerating battlefield digitalization to improve tactical synchronization.

CAPABILITY (C2 ADAPTATION - NEW): RF is rapidly developing and publicly releasing early-stage tactical Command and Control (C2) software, КПО-А (KPO-A). This system aims to improve situational awareness (SA) and decision-making at the unit level, driven by lessons learned regarding poor SA. While currently in early development ("not yet alpha"), its public release suggests an attempt to bypass traditional military acquisition bureaucracy and harness civilian IT expertise for rapid deployment among volunteer or elite units. This represents a significant long-term threat to UAF tactical parity. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

TACTICAL ADAPTATION (Siversk): The immediate IO capitalization on the Siversk strikes confirms the enemy's ability to synchronize kinetic effects with propaganda dissemination within minutes, reinforcing battlefield narratives locally and internationally. (Confidence: HIGH)

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The massive logistical surge at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (SAR Score 24.96) remains the primary indicator of forthcoming high-intensity artillery operations, likely supporting the critical envelope reduction around Dimitrov/Pokrovsk. The anticipated saturation fire will complicate UAF exfiltration efforts NLT 110800Z. (Confidence: HIGH)

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness is assessed as high in two domains:

1. Strategic Synchronization: Demonstrated ability to coordinate complex, multi-axis UAV strikes with immediate, specific IO campaigns (Kyiv blackouts, Siversk claims).
2. Technological Agility (Development): The rapid external development and public testing of KPO-A signal an unprecedented focus on decentralized, resilient tactical C2, which could improve data integration and target-to-shooter timelines in the medium term. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture remains resilient in the AD domain but is critically constrained by resource allocation across multiple kinetic threats (Bila Tserkva, Chernihiv, Shyriaieve). The necessity of executing the Dimitrov exfiltration under continuous enemy air/artillery fire presents the immediate operational hazard.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes: 100% target denial at Kremenchuk. Confirmed successful expansion of strategic reach with strikes on Veliky Novgorod. Setbacks: The operational requirement to manage the high-threat Bila Tserkva axis while simultaneously addressing the likely feint at Chernihiv and the acute crisis at Dimitrov has consumed available AD and maneuver reserves.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the AD resource pool, specifically in the Kyiv/Northern corridor, exacerbated by the potential C2 paralysis resulting from the unknown BDA at Bila Tserkva.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is operating at maximum intensity, executing a four-pronged psychological assault:

1. Immediate Shock (Kyiv Blackout): Fabricated claims of massive Kyiv energy outages designed to degrade urban morale and create political pressure.
2. Attrition Narrative (Siversk): Immediate claims of destroying UAF staging areas (Siversk) to undermine confidence in the Eastern defense line and exaggerate RF gains.
3. Strategic Division (Korean Model): Continued pushing of the "Washington Post Leak" narrative to fracture allied consensus on long-term support.
4. Technological Superiority (KPO-A): Use of public channels to advocate for RF military digitalization, aiming to portray the RF as technologically superior and institutionally adaptable. (Confidence: HIGH)

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is under immediate threat due to the high synchronization of specific, alarming IO regarding Kyiv and the visible kinetic pressure in the East. Rapid, authoritative counter-messaging is CRITICAL to maintaining trust and operational security.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF's projection of technological agility (KPO-A development) and long-term commitment (inactive reserve mobilization) must be leveraged to pressure allies for faster delivery of counter-C2 capabilities (EW) and defensive systems (AD platforms).

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will maintain maximum operational tempo focused on pocket liquidation and logistical preemption.

1. Dimitrov Pocket Liquidation: RF will initiate the saturation artillery phase (sourced from 260th GRAU assets) NLT 110800Z to deny UAF exfiltration routes and consolidate control around Pokrovsk.
2. Bila Tserkva Outcome Exploitation: Regardless of BDA outcome, RF IO will immediately leverage the strike narrative (either successful destruction or UAF failure to intercept) to amplify the "Kyiv blackout" claims.
3. C2 System Expansion (KPO-A): RF will continue to promote and push early versions of KPO-A to front-line volunteer/special units to gather operational data and accelerate system refinement. This is a crucial early-stage deployment. (Confidence: HIGH)

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The Bila Tserkva strike successfully cripples a major UAF logistical or C2 node, resulting in local command degradation. Concurrently, the Chernihiv track is revealed as a secondary kinetic strike, overwhelming the limited Northern AD coverage. This dual success (C2 disruption and kinetic breakthrough) allows for RF aviation to exploit the C2 gap and inflict heavy casualties on the exposed Dimitrov exfiltration corridors. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE BDA/AD REALLOCATION, DIMITROV EXTRACTION SUPPORT, COUNTER-C2 FOCUS.

---

INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)