Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE (AXIS CONFIRMATION & GROUND ATTRITION)

TIME: 110245Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous SITREP 110215Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25; New Messages 110215Z - 110239Z

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The multi-axis kinetic operation targeting deep logistical and energy infrastructure is confirmed and intensifying. The critical Western/Kyiv axis has narrowed its vector.

• Axis 3 (Kyiv SW Approach): The re-vectoring toward the capital region (previously Fastiv) is confirmed. New tracking indicates UAVs southwest of Kyiv Oblast are currently tracking North toward Bila Tserkva (110220Z). This confirms sustained RF intent to strike the logistical and C2 infrastructure adjacent to the capital. Key Terrain: Bila Tserkva military and logistical hubs.
• Axis 4 (Northeast Diversion): A new UAV group originating from Kursk Oblast is confirmed tracking toward the Sumy region (110215Z). Assessment: Potential diversionary strike or secondary targeting of critical energy infrastructure, potentially stretching UAF AD coverage currently focused on Kremenchuk (Axis 2).
• Frontline Attrition: RF tactical aviation continues to employ KABs against targets in the Donetsk region (110221Z), supporting the ground encirclement effort around Dimitrov.
• Other Axes: Axis 1 (Shyriaieve/Odesa) and Axis 2 (Kremenchuk) status remains critical as detailed in SITREP 110215Z.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The G2.3 Geomagnetic Storm (GMS) effects persist, complicating high-speed, precision interception and GPS-dependent C4ISR for UAF redeploying AD assets, particularly those tasked with the Bila Tserkva corridor. (Confidence: HIGH)

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF AD: Must now integrate the new Sumy track into air defense planning while maintaining the CRITICAL prioritization of the Bila Tserkva (Fastiv corridor) and Kremenchuk engagements.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF intent is to achieve simultaneous systemic logistical and energy disruption across Central Ukraine, synchronized with the liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket in Donetsk. The new Bila Tserkva vector shows deliberate targeting refinement on the capital's periphery.

RECENT TACTICAL ADAPTATION (TARGET REFINEMENT): The confirmation of a UAV track directly toward Bila Tserkva (within the Fastiv/Kyiv SW corridor) suggests highly precise targeting based on exploitation of previous intelligence (Kuzmuk CI breach). This demonstrates an exploitation of high-value targets outside the immediate capital defenses but within operational striking distance. (Confidence: HIGH)

COURSES OF ACTION (GROUND/AIR): RF is executing: (1) Complex multi-axis kinetic strikes (Fastiv/Bila Tserkva, Kremenchuk, Shyriaieve, Sumy); (2) Sustained air superiority application via KAB use against UAF fixed defenses (Donetsk/Dimitrov); (3) Continued ground attrition to complete the Pokrovsk-Dimitrov encirclement.

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

Logistical pressure remains high. The confirmed ability to sustain simultaneous, coordinated kinetic strikes across four axes, combined with heavy KAB usage, reinforces the assessment that the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base is functioning at surge capacity (SAR Score 24.96).

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective (HIGH confidence), demonstrated by the ability to manage the trajectory shift (Vinnytsia $\rightarrow$ Fastiv) and further refine the targeting vector (Fastiv $\rightarrow$ Bila Tserkva corridor) in real-time.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is at maximum capacity but faces simultaneous pressure across multiple operational and strategic domains (AD, IO, Ground Maneuver). The speed of redeployment for mobile AD assets to the Bila Tserkva approach remains the single most critical factor in preserving central logistics.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (Operational): UAF ground forces in the Dimitrov region continue to face overwhelming attrition and potential isolation due to sustained RF KAB strikes and the consolidation of RF gains in Svetloe/Grishino. Exfiltration of the Dimitrov garrison is overdue.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

Immediate requirement for dynamic C4ISR/EW assets to disrupt incoming UAV communications in the Bila Tserkva and Kremenchuk corridors. The new Sumy threat potentially draws resources from the already strained Central AD theater.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign continues to focus on strategic fracture ("Korean Model" narrative) and tactical demoralization.

NEW IO FOCUS (Accountability Juxtaposition): A simultaneous release highlighting UAF accountability efforts (185k recorded war crimes) coupled with an image of RF/aligned forces (110239Z) is assessed as a subtle, high-impact Information Operation designed to achieve cognitive dissonance. It acknowledges Ukrainian documentation efforts but juxtaposes them with the physical reality of the conflict, potentially emphasizing the overwhelming scale of the war and eroding public confidence in judicial victory over kinetic reality. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The immediate determinant of public morale hinges on the success of AD engagements NLT 110330Z DEC 25. Successful penetration of the Bila Tserkva/Fastiv area would have a disproportionately negative impact on national resolve compared to strikes elsewhere.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The need for immediate, high-level counter-IO against the "Korean Model" leak remains paramount to reassure partners and maintain the consensus around the UAF 20-point peace formula.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will maximize the current kinetic advantage provided by the GMS and C2 effectiveness to achieve simultaneous operational strikes:

1. Axis 3 (Bila Tserkva Strike): The re-vectorized group will target the Bila Tserkva logistical hub or associated C2 node, exploiting the confusion generated by the previous Fastiv feint NLT 110345Z DEC 25.
2. Axis 2 (Kremenchuk Strike): The 12-UAV wave executes a concentrated strike on critical energy infrastructure NLT 110330Z DEC 25.
3. Ground Operation: RF will secure the operational isolation of UAF forces in Dimitrov NLT 110800Z DEC 25, leveraging KAB support to prevent effective retrograde/exfiltration.
4. Axis 4 (Sumy Strike): The new group targets rail or energy distribution in the Sumy region NLT 110430Z DEC 25. (Confidence: HIGH - based on confirmed trajectories and synchronized efforts)

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Failure of UAF AD to intercept the focused Bila Tserkva group results in a catastrophic strike on a high-value C2 center adjacent to Bila Tserkva. This simultaneously forces the relocation of the strategic reserve command, creating temporary command paralysis (C2 delay), exactly when the Dimitrov garrison attempts its breakout, leading to its functional destruction. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE AD RESPONSE TO BILA TSERKVA AXIS

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)