Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE (MULTIPLE DEEP STRIKE AXES)

TIME: 110150Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous SITREP 110130Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25; GEOINT/ELINT Update 110111Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF deep strike complexity has increased significantly, now operating across three major, simultaneous axes designed to achieve maximum dispersion and degradation of UAF Air Defense (AD) assets.

• Axis 1: Southern Corridor (Odesa/Mykolaiv): Threat remains CRITICAL for the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka rail nexus.
• Axis 2: Central Corridor (Kremenchuk/Poltava): Residual threat persists (one confirmed Shahed tracking Kremenchuk). The previous W. Dnipropetrovsk group likely continues its trajectory north/east toward Poltava.
• Axis 3: Western Deep Strike (NEW AXIS): A third, high-mobility UAV group is confirmed transiting the border of Cherkasy/Kyiv Oblasts, tracking WEST towards Vinnytsia Oblast. This vector threatens logistical staging areas or C2 nodes deep in Western Central Ukraine, forcing a critical reallocation of assets previously earmarked for the Central or Southern sectors. Key terrain is the Vinnytsia rail/road network.
• Ground Maneuver: Operational isolation of the Dimitrov pocket remains imminent.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The G2.3 Geomagnetic Storm (GMS) remains active. Low visibility favors low-altitude RF penetration tactics.

• Impact Assessment: Continued GMS activity critically impairs GPS-reliant systems, specifically affecting precision guidance for AD munitions and potentially degrading the effectiveness of UAF mobile electronic warfare (EW) platforms tasked with interdicting the new western UAV axis. (Confidence: HIGH)

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF maintains a high operational tempo, exploiting the GMS to test UAF C4ISR resilience. The rapid generation of the new Western strike vector confirms RF operational flexibility and layered targeting strategy. UAF Dispositions: UAF AD is operating under maximal resource allocation stress. Assets must immediately be pulled from Central reserves to address the new Vinnytsia threat, delaying necessary reinforcement for the Odesa or Poltava corridors.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF intent is to force a systemic UAF AD failure by overwhelming the system with three spatially and temporally distinct strike groups while simultaneously leveraging C4ISR degradation caused by the GMS. The new Western axis is intended to strike high-value, previously secure logistical or reinforcement hubs.

RECENT TACTICAL ADAPTATION (GENERATION OF THIRD AXIS): The movement towards Vinnytsia suggests RF has identified either a new, unprioritized AD gap or is leveraging exploited Kuzmuk breach data to target a previously relocated high-value C2/logistical node in the West. (Confidence: HIGH)

COURSES OF ACTION (DEEP STRIKE): RF is executing a simultaneous, multi-domain attack: Kinetic strikes (UAVs, 3 axes), Physical breakthrough (Dimitrov), and Environmental exploitation (GMS). The complexity confirms robust C2 systems.

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The logistical enabler remains the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (SAR Score 24.96 - CRITICAL). Successful interdiction NLT 110600Z DEC 25 is required to slow the ground offensive tempo in the East/South.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness is assessed as HIGH. The ability to rapidly launch and manage three simultaneous, geographically disparate strike groups in adverse space weather conditions (GMS) demonstrates superior tactical flexibility and centralized planning.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is critically strained by the emergence of the third (Western) axis. Readiness is hampered by the immediate requirement to divert high-mobility AD/EW assets over significant distances to intercept the Vinnytsia-bound group.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SETBACK (OPERATIONAL): The RF establishment of a third, deep-penetrating UAV axis dramatically increases the operational risk profile for Central/Western Ukraine logistics.
• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC/DIPLOMATIC): Confirmation of the UK visa-free travel extension (110140Z) signals continued strong bilateral ties, providing a necessary morale boost and countering RF narratives of diplomatic isolation.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint is the immediate operational scarcity of Mobile V-SHORAD (e.g., Gepard/Avenger) and high-power EW platforms capable of rapid deployment to Vinnytsia Oblast while maintaining acceptable coverage for Odesa and the residual Kremenchuk threat. Personnel must prioritize GMS mitigation procedures across all tasked AD/EW systems.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) are actively attempting to generate internal fissure and demoralization using the "blame-the-victim" tactic.

• NEW CAMPAIGN (BLAME/RELIGION): RF military correspondent channels (110128Z) are disseminating claims, backed by visual media, of UAF forces burning a religious site (UOC Monastery) in Zakarpattia. (Confidence: HIGH that this is an RF IO Tactic; MEDIUM that the incident itself occurred as claimed.) This narrative is designed to damage UAF credibility domestically and internationally, alleging targeting of historical/cultural sites far from the front.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale in Central and Western regions will be directly linked to the success of AD operations against the new Vinnytsia threat. Successful defense against deep strikes counters RF kinetic and IO narratives simultaneously.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The UK visa extension (110140Z) serves as crucial counter-programming against the ongoing RF "Korean Model/DMZ" narrative, reinforcing the UAF position of continued sovereign alignment with Western partners.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will maximize pressure across all three deep strike axes to achieve a simultaneous, cascading logistical failure:

1. Southern Strike: Kinetic strike against the Odesa corridor (Shyriaieve/Ivanivka) NLT 110230Z DEC 25.
2. Central Strike: Residual forces target the Kremenchuk area, while the Poltava-bound group strikes its designated C2/logistics node NLT 110330Z DEC 25.
3. Western Strike (NEW): The Cherkasy/Kyiv group will strike a high-value logistics hub (fuel or rail junction) or a C2 center in Vinnytsia Oblast NLT 110430Z DEC 25, leveraging the forced dispersal of UAF AD and GMS effects.
4. Ground Operation: RF will finalize the operational isolation of Dimitrov NLT 110800Z DEC 25. (Confidence: HIGH)

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

Simultaneous, multi-axis kinetic strikes combined with the G2.3 GMS succeed in achieving deep logistical paralysis. The GMS critically disables UAF EW/GPS precision capabilities, allowing all three UAV waves (Odesa, Poltava, Vinnytsia) to strike successfully. This logistical victory enables the immediate conversion of the Dimitrov pocket liquidation into a wider operational breakthrough toward Pokrovsk NLT 111200Z DEC 25, followed by the secondary exploitation of the Stepnohorsk (Plan PHOENIX) retrograde line. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE AD RESPONSE TO WESTERN AXIS AND GMS MITIGATION

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)