Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE (DEEP STRIKE AXIS SHIFT)

TIME: 110145Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous SITREP 110130Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25; GEOINT/ELINT Update 110111Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF continues a highly complex, multi-axis deep strike campaign aimed at fragmenting the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs). Operational focus remains interdiction of the Central and Southern logistical corridors simultaneous with the ground crisis on the Pokrovsk/Dimitrov axis.

• Southern Corridor (Odesa/Mykolaiv): High-confidence threat remains for imminent kinetic impact on logistical targets NLT 110230Z DEC 25. Key terrain is the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka rail nexus.
• Central Corridor (Kremenchuk/Poltava): Engagement against the prior UAV wave is ongoing. Intelligence now indicates a shift in the reinforcement vector.
• New Deep Strike Axis (WEST/NORTH): A new Group of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) has been confirmed in Western Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, tracking North. This development demands immediate reallocation of Air Defense (AD) assets, potentially threatening Poltava or secondary C2 nodes near Dnipro, representing a tactical shift away from the previously identified Sumy axis.
• Dimitrov Pocket: UAF forces remain under critical threat of operational isolation following RF consolidation of Grishino and Svetloe.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Visibility remains low, favoring low-altitude penetration.

• NEW THREAT: RF state media (TASS) reports a G2.3 Geomagnetic Storm (GMS) commencing (110046Z).
  • Impact Assessment: GMS activity poses a significant threat to C4ISR systems, specifically degrading Global Positioning System (GPS) accuracy, high-frequency (HF) radio communications, and potentially disrupting certain electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. This factor must be considered when executing precision strikes and maneuvering AD assets. (Confidence: HIGH)

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF maintains high deep strike operational tempo, demonstrating resilience despite the GMS. The shift in the UAV vector from Sumy to W. Dnipropetrovsk confirms RF flexibility in exploiting perceived AD gaps. UAF Dispositions: UAF AD is operating under maximal stress. The previous directive to prioritize Odesa defense must be immediately adjusted to accommodate the threat from the W. Dnipropetrovsk group, creating a critical decision point for asset allocation in the Central/Southern overlap zone. Control measures for Contingency Plan PHOENIX (Stepnohorsk retrograde) appear temporally stable, with the air alert in Zaporizhzhia having been stood down.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF intent is to achieve critical, cascading logistical paralysis across Southern and Central Ukraine within the next 6 hours, capitalizing on UAF stress points (Dimitrov) and potential GMS-induced C4ISR degradation.

RECENT TACTICAL ADAPTATION (SHIFT IN AXIS): The movement of the UAV group from Western Dnipropetrovsk tracking North (110111Z) suggests RF is actively monitoring UAF AD dispersal based on the previous wave (Kremenchuk) and exploiting a gap to strike the Central Corridor from a new, unexpected direction.

CAPABILITIES (IMPACT OF GMS): The ability of RF forces to maintain simultaneous, complex strike missions during a G2.3 GMS indicates robust C2 redundancy and potentially reliance on alternative navigation systems less affected by the space weather event. (Confidence: HIGH)

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The kinetic enabling factor for RF deep strikes remains the massive logistical surge observed at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (SAR Score 24.96 - CRITICAL). Failure to interdict this base NLT 110600Z DEC 25 guarantees sustained high RF strike tempo.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness remains assessed as HIGH. The rapid, simultaneous, and geographically dispersed tasking (Kremenchuk, Odesa, and now W. Dnipropetrovsk) indicates robust, centralized control mechanisms capable of managing complex kinetic operations during adverse environmental conditions (GMS).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is sufficient, but asset prioritization is reaching a critical point. The immediate requirement is to prevent the operational isolation of the Dimitrov pocket while simultaneously neutralizing the two primary deep strike threats (Odesa and the new W. Dnipropetrovsk North axis).

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC): UAF deep strikes against Moscow continue to exert strategic pressure, requiring RF domestic media attention (TASS reports on the attack remain prominent).
• SETBACK (OPERATIONAL): The emergence of the new W. Dnipropetrovsk threat necessitates an immediate, resource-intensive re-tasking cycle, delaying necessary AD reinforcement for the Odesa corridor.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint is the operational scarcity of Mobile V-SHORAD and EW platforms capable of simultaneous deployment to the Odesa, Kremenchuk, and the new Dnipropetrovsk sectors.

• New Constraint (GMS): UAF C4ISR/EW personnel must immediately implement protocols designed to mitigate the effects of the G2.3 GMS on precision systems and satellite communications, ensuring mission continuity.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF continues to prioritize internal stability signaling (LDRP social reforms) while simultaneously downplaying the military significance of UAF deep strikes on Moscow. The strategic disinformation campaign regarding the "Korean Model/DMZ" peace proposal remains active, aimed at complicating UAF diplomatic efforts regarding the 20-point peace plan.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is immediately tied to the success of AD operations, particularly in the South (Mykolaiv/Odesa). Successes reported by local channels (e.g., Nikolaevsky Vanek) are critical for maintaining local confidence.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The announced audit of Ukraine’s defense industrial base (110049Z) is a domestic administrative move but must be framed internationally as a step toward greater procurement transparency and efficiency, preempting any RF attempts to frame it as a sign of internal resource mismanagement.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will execute the Odesa strike NLT 110230Z DEC 25 while the W. Dnipropetrovsk UAV group (tracking North) is utilized to kinetically exploit UAF AD resource displacement, targeting the Poltava rail nexus or a pre-identified UAF C2 node (per Kuzmuk breach data) NLT 110330Z DEC 25. Simultaneously, RF will prioritize the liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket NLT 110800Z DEC 25. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Odesa Strike Execution: High probability of kinetic impact on port infrastructure or the Shyriaieve rail spur.
2. Poltava Targeting: The W. Dnipropetrovsk group will target high-value logistics or C2 in the Central Corridor.
3. Dimitrov Consolidation: RF forces will finalize tactical encirclement/liquidation operations by morning hours.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

The G2.3 Geomagnetic Storm causes critical degradation of UAF GPS-reliant AD assets and EW performance during the Odesa and W. Dnipropetrovsk strikes, allowing RF to achieve severe, simultaneous logistical fragmentation across both Southern and Central GLOCs. This logistical success enables RF ground forces to rapidly convert the Dimitrov pocket liquidation into a wider operational breakthrough towards Pokrovsk NLT 111200Z DEC 25. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE AD RESPONSE TO SHIFTING CENTRAL AXIS AND GMS MITIGATION

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)