Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE (DEEP STRIKE & GLOC INTERDICTION)

TIME: 110130Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: ISR 110100Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains the RF attempt to achieve cascading logistical disruption by simultaneously interdicting Central and Southern Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs).

• Central Corridor (Kremenchuk): Active engagement continues against the second UAV wave. Unconfirmed reports (OSINT) suggest approximately 16 UAV platforms remain inbound or orbiting the target area (Kremenchuk industrial/rail nexus). The GLOC remains degraded, not fully severed (BDA Pending).
• Southern Corridor (Odesa/Mykolaiv): The imminent threat is confirmed and intensifying. Multiple UAF Air Force reports confirm UAV groups converging on the Odesa region, placing critical Black Sea ports and the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka logistical backbone at immediate risk NLT 110230Z DEC 25.
• Eastern Deep Strike Axis (NEW): A new UAV group has been detected transiting Sumy Oblast, tracking South. This opens a potential third axis of deep strike threat, likely targeting Dnipro or potentially reinforcing the Poltava/Kremenchuk operation.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Low visibility and sub-zero temperatures persist. These conditions continue to favor low-altitude UAV penetration and limit UAF high-resolution GEOINT collection capacity for post-strike Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF operational tempo is sustained and high-risk tolerant, demonstrated by the immediate activation of sequential UAV waves and multiple geographical strike axes. The confirmed logistical surge at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base is the kinetic enabler for this tempo. UAF Dispositions: UAF AD/EW assets are dispersed and currently operating at maximum capacity. Resources previously protecting Kyiv are now available, but the immediate crisis requires the rapid prioritization of V-SHORAD assets to the Odesa corridor, creating vulnerability in the Central region against potential subsequent ballistic strikes.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RF THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF intent is to achieve kinetic and psychological paralysis of UAF logistics across two main GLOCs (Central and Southern) within a 12-hour window, thereby delaying materiel delivery to the critical Pokrovsk axis. The new Sumy group suggests RF is prepared to strike a third node if BDA confirms logistical resilience at the first two targets. (Confidence: HIGH)

CAPABILITIES (CONFIRMED):

• Sequential Saturation: Confirmed capability to launch follow-on UAV groups (e.g., 16 platforms toward Kremenchuk) within minutes of the initial mixed attack (Ballistic + UAV). (Confidence: HIGH)
• Strategic Distraction: Confirmed ability to operate complex deep strike campaigns while UAF continues to successfully interdict RF strategic C2/Logistics (Moscow flight diversions confirmed via TASS).

Recent Tactical Changes: The activation of the Sumy axis UAV group represents an expansion of the operational deep strike geography, demanding UAF AD resources be stretched further south and west, away from the immediate frontline near Pokrovsk.

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF deep strike momentum is directly linked to the output of the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base. The confirmed logistics surge (SAR Score 24.96) validates the HIGH confidence assessment that RF kinetic sustainability will remain high unless the UAF executes the recommended counter-strike.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness remains HIGH. The rapid, simultaneous, and geographically dispersed tasking of deep strike assets (Kremenchuk, Odesa, Sumy) indicates robust, centralized, and secure control mechanisms, despite UAF kinetic pressure on Moscow C2 nodes.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF STATUS)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Overall readiness is sufficient, but the decision-making cycle regarding mobile AD asset allocation is now operating under extreme time pressure. The necessity to defend Odesa (a strategic port) simultaneously with Kremenchuk (a primary rail hub) stresses doctrine on asset prioritization.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC): UAF deep strike campaigns against Moscow forced the diversion of commercial air traffic (TASS confirmed), demonstrating sustained pressure on RF strategic command and airspace control.
• SETBACK (OPERATIONAL): The ongoing nature of the Kremenchuk engagement confirms that the initial AD protective bubble was breached, and high-value infrastructure remains exposed to the currently circling UAV group.
• SETBACK (TACTICAL): The tactical crisis in the Pokrovsk/Dimitrov sector is critical, necessitating immediate exfiltration planning to prevent the operational loss of a motorized infantry brigade.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains the density of Mobile V-SHORAD and EW platforms capable of rapidly moving to interdict the Sumy-South axis while maintaining high defense levels in Odesa and Kremenchuk. Failure to acquire specific BDA in Kremenchuk constrains logistics planners (J4) from rapidly activating necessary alternative GLOCs.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is operating a highly coordinated diplomatic and financial disinformation campaign designed to erode Western commitment:

1. Financial Destabilization: TASS reports regarding the illegality of seizing frozen RF assets (Euroclear) are aimed at increasing risk perception among EU financial authorities, complicating the use of immobilized funds for UAF materiel procurement.
2. Strategic Peace Push: The continued promotion of the "Korean Model/DMZ" leak (via previous reports) aims to frame UAF peace initiatives (the 20-point plan) as unrealistic.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is immediately tied to the success of AD operations. Visible interception of the Odesa UAV group is necessary to maintain confidence in the South. The strategic success of the Moscow strikes must be rapidly amplified to offset the localized fear generated by the Kremenchuk saturation strikes.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF campaign against frozen assets complicates diplomatic efforts to secure long-term funding streams. Diplomatic communication must aggressively deny the financial risk narrative and preempt the "Korean Model" narrative.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will prioritize the immediate kinetic disruption of the Odesa corridor (Shyriaieve/Fontanka) NLT 110230Z DEC 25, while simultaneously confirming BDA from the Kremenchuk attack. The UAV group detected on the Sumy axis will be re-tasked to exploit a perceived weakness in the Dnipro rail hub or reinforce the Kremenchuk operation NLT 110430Z DEC 25. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Odesa Strike Execution: High probability of kinetic impact on rail transfer points or port infrastructure.
2. Kremenchuk Third Wave: If BDA confirms GLOC function remains viable, RF will activate the remaining 16 UAVs for a localized re-attack NLT 110330Z DEC 25.
3. Dimitrov Consolidation: RF forces will finalize tactical encirclement/liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket NLT 110800Z DEC 25.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF successfully interdicts three critical logistical nodes (Kremenchuk, Odesa, Dnipro) within 12 hours, leading to severe fragmentation of UAF logistical flow to the Pokrovsk axis. Simultaneously, the successful liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket frees the RF 37th GMRB for a rapid pivot north to exploit the disruption. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE AD PROTECTION OF SOUTHERN GLOC AND COUNTER-LOGISTICS STRIKE

---

INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)