Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 110100Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 110045Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Central Logistical Corridor remains the enemy's primary operational focus, specifically the infrastructure nodes in Poltava and Odesa Oblasts.

• Kremenchuk (POLTAVA): Confirmed active engagement against a second wave of RF UAVs approaching from the East NLT 110006Z DEC 25, following the confirmed initial mixed ballistic/UAV saturation strike. The immediate tactical crisis is sustained, not resolved.
• Odesa/Southern Corridor: An inbound UAV group (estimated 8 platforms) has been detected converging on the Fontanka/Odesa region from the North NLT 110006Z DEC 25, placing critical Black Sea ports and the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka GLOCs at imminent risk.
• Lyman Sector: Persistent RF pressure confirmed near Dibrova, indicating enemy intent to maintain kinetic activity on multiple fronts, drawing UAF reserves away from the main Pokrovsk axis.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No material change. Low visibility and freezing temperatures continue to facilitate low-altitude drone operations and limit high-resolution ISR capability across the deep battle space.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF forces are demonstrating high operational tempo and flexibility, immediately launching follow-on UAV attacks to exploit UAF AD saturation near Kremenchuk and initiating diversionary strikes toward the Odesa corridor. UAF Dispositions: UAF AD/EW assets are critically stressed. Air defense assets previously defending Kyiv have been stood down (all clear NLT 102351Z DEC 25), but resources are currently split between sustaining defense in the Central region and rapidly deploying to intercept the imminent threat to the Southern corridor (Odesa).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF intention is confirmed to maximize the cascading failure effect in UAF logistics by executing sequential, layered strikes across multiple critical transportation nodes (Kremenchuk, Dnipro, Odesa) while sustaining high deep strike pressure on RF C2 (Moscow). (Confidence: HIGH)

CAPABILITIES (CONFIRMED):

• Layered Saturation Strikes: RF is capable of launching follow-on strike waves (UAVs) within minutes of the initial mixed attack (Ballistic + UAV), preventing UAF AD systems from successfully reloading or repositioning. (Confidence: HIGH - Confirmed by two separate UAV groups targeting Kremenchuk within 24 minutes.)
• Strategic Distraction: RF C2 successfully coordinates complex, offensive deep strikes in Ukraine while simultaneously absorbing and defending against sustained UAF deep strikes on Moscow (30+ targets neutralized reported by TASS). This confirms RF willingness to absorb strategic losses to achieve operational goals in Ukraine. (Confidence: HIGH)

Recent Tactical Changes: The focus on Fontanka/Odesa confirms the immediate threat to the Black Sea corridor and the logistics backbone supplying the Southern grouping. This represents an attempt to paralyze both the Central and Southern GLOCs simultaneously.

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The persistent heavy use of complex strike packages (Ballistic/UAV) confirms the necessity of the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base surge. RF kinetic sustainability is directly linked to the volume of output from this site.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness remains HIGH. The rapid, sequential re-tasking of UAV groups toward Kremenchuk and the coordination of a simultaneous strike on the Odesa corridor suggests centralized, effective control over deep strike assets despite strategic pressure on Moscow C2 nodes.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Overall UAF readiness remains high, but mobile AD/EW asset prioritization is now a critical, immediate dilemma. The necessity to commit resources to the Odesa threat while the Central corridor (Kremenchuk) is still under active attack necessitates rapid decision-making regarding resource conservation (e.g., using low-cost systems against UAVs vs. preserving high-value interceptors).

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC): UAF deep strikes against Moscow are sustained (30+ targets reported neutralized by RF sources), diverting significant RF strategic AD assets and C2 attention.
• SETBACK (OPERATIONAL): Confirmed ongoing, active combat in the Kremenchuk area following penetration by the initial strike package suggests degradation of local defense capability and imminent infrastructure damage (BDA Pending).

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint is the lack of redundancy in mobile SHORAD/V-SHORAD systems necessary to simultaneously defend critical GLOCs across multiple oblasts from low-flying UAV saturation tactics.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO continues a multi-faceted approach:

1. Normalization of Escalation: Highlighting the defense of Moscow (30+ drones) for internal consumption, framing it as necessary defense against "Ukrainian aggression."
2. Strategic Discredit: Utilizing political disinformation (targeting President Zelenskyy during diplomatic meetings) to undermine high-level UAF engagements.
3. Local Gains Amplification: Rapid reporting of minor tactical advances (e.g., Dibrova/Lyman sector) to maintain the narrative of continuous forward momentum.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is stressed in Central Ukraine due to the confirmed shift to ballistic strikes on industrial centers. Successful and visible interception of the incoming Odesa UAV group is critical to maintaining public confidence in the Southern regions.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

No new diplomatic developments. The previous assessment regarding the risk of RF leveraging the 'British troop' information for Black Sea escalation remains a viable MDCOA, demanding proactive diplomatic counter-messaging.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will maximize the current central strike opportunity by initiating follow-on deep strikes on rail nodes near Dnipro NLT 110400Z DEC 25, while simultaneously confirming BDA from the Kremenchuk attack. The immediate priority is the sustained strike against the Odesa corridor via the confirmed UAV group. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Odesa Strike Execution: The incoming UAV group will attempt to target the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka logistical arteries or Black Sea port infrastructure NLT 110230Z DEC 25.
2. Kremenchuk BDA & Re-Attack: RF ISR will prioritize confirming the damage level to Kremenchuk (POL, rail spurs) to prepare a potential third wave of strikes.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF forces successfully achieve kinetic disruption of two critical GLOCs (Central/Kremenchuk and Southern/Odesa) within 24 hours, leading to immediate UAF inability to sustain high-tempo resupply for the Pokrovsk axis. Simultaneously, the liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket is finalized, freeing up RF mechanized reserves for a rapid operational pivot aimed at Zaporizhzhia. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE DEFENSE OF SOUTHERN LOGISTICS (ODESA) & STRIKE BACK AGAINST RF LOGISTICS

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)