Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 110045Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 110030Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity has shifted from the localized tactical crisis on the Pokrovsk axis to the defense of the Central Ukrainian logistical depth, specifically the Kremenchuk/Dnipro corridor.

• Kremenchuk (CRITICAL): Confirmed simultaneous utilization of high-speed ballistic missiles and saturating UAV swarms against this critical logistics and industrial node. The immediate threat level is EXTREME.
• Deep Battle Area (RF Rear): UAF deep strike persistence remains confirmed, with up to 37 RF UAV neutralization claims over Moscow, continuing to stress RF strategic AD resources and forcing local C2 friction (airport closures).
• Southern Logistical Spine (NEW THREAT): A new UAV group has been detected moving from Southern Mykolaiv Oblast toward the Odesa region, indicating a continuation of the multi-axis logistical interdiction campaign.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Freezing conditions and low visibility persist in the East and Central regions, facilitating deep kinetic operations by both sides.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF forces are maximizing the use of combined strike packages (Ballistic Missile + UAV) to overwhelm key UAF AD assets defending critical infrastructure in Central Ukraine. Kinetic pressure remains high on the Dimitrov axis. UAF Dispositions: UAF AD/EW assets are currently over-stressed, having been forced to engage ballistic threats over Kyiv (temporary alert) and Kremenchuk, alongside continuous UAV swarms targeting multiple axes (Kremenchuk, Dnipro, Poltava, Odesa).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF intention is confirmed to achieve kinetic success against Central Ukraine’s logistics spine via a complex saturation attack, forcing tactical disruption of UAF retrograde and replenishment efforts before the Pokrovsk pocket is fully liquidated. (Confidence: HIGH)

CAPABILITIES (ESCALATED):

• Mixed Strike Packaging (Confirmed): RF is now demonstrably capable of integrating high-speed, precision ballistic strikes (likely Iskander/Kinzhal variants) with low-speed, high-volume UAV swarms (Shahed variants). This tactic is designed to maximize interception difficulty and force UAF to expend high-value AD interceptors against low-cost threats. (Confidence: HIGH - Confirmed by live threat reporting on Kremenchuk.)
• Simultaneous Multi-Domain Pressure: RF maintains the capability to prosecute active ground engagements (Dimitrov EEP), deep ballistic strikes (Kremenchuk), and widespread UAV interdiction (Odesa/Dnipro/Poltava) concurrently.

Recent Tactical Changes: The direct and confirmed use of ballistic missiles on a key logistical hub (Kremenchuk) marks a clear escalation in targeting value and complexity, validating the immediate threat assessment from the previous report.

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The logistical surge at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (SAR Score 24.96) remains the critical enabler for RF kinetic success in the East. Successful defense of this base allows RF to maintain the current tempo, despite persistent UAF deep strikes against the RF rear (Moscow).

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness is assessed as HIGH in coordinating the complex mixed-strike operation across multiple domains (Ballistic, UAV, Ground Maneuver). However, internal friction caused by persistent UAF deep strikes on Moscow indicates a significant resource drain on strategic C2 assets focused on internal defense. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high but is severely constrained by AD/EW capacity. The confirmed ballistic strikes on Kremenchuk and the simultaneous AD engagement over Kyiv highlight the critical requirement for rapid AD asset relocation and prioritization. The Dimitrov EEP remains primary but must now compete directly with critical infrastructure defense.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC): UAF deep strike persistence continues to neutralize RF AD assets over Moscow, forcing RF C2 to divert defense resources strategically.
• SETBACK (OPERATIONAL): Confirmed explosions in the Kremenchuk area following ballistic and UAV strikes suggest successful enemy penetration of local defenses, indicating imminent or actual infrastructure damage (BDA pending).

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains the shortage of mobile SHORAD/EW packages capable of addressing both high-velocity ballistic threats and saturating UAV swarms. The resource allocation dilemma is now confirmed and acute.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

1. Narrative of Collapse (RF External/Internal): RF military bloggers are amplifying footage of UAF withdrawal (Dimitrov) and claiming high enemy demoralization and civilian reluctance to evacuate, framing the capture of these settlements as a necessary "liberation."
2. Normalization of Escalation (RF Internal): RF media continues to minimize the impact of UAF deep strikes on Moscow, while rapidly attempting to leverage the acknowledged presence of British personnel to justify future offensive actions (MDCOA) or military escalation.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale requires immediate reinforcement. The shift from UAV harassment to confirmed ballistic strikes on major industrial centers (Kremenchuk) significantly increases public anxiety. Rapid, visible, and successful interception of the new Odesa-bound UAV swarm is required.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The potential for RF to leverage the 'British troop' information (previously reported) as justification for maritime escalation in the Black Sea remains a critical diplomatic vulnerability. Coordinated messaging is required NLT 111000Z DEC 25.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces, having utilized the complex strike package against Kremenchuk, will maximize exploitation by initiating secondary strikes on rail and energy infrastructure near Dnipro and Kropyvnytskyi NLT 110600Z DEC 25, utilizing the proven mixed Ballistic/UAV tactic. Simultaneously, RF ground forces will finalize the liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Strike Exploitation: RF will prioritize follow-on strikes based on BDA from the Kremenchuk attack to ensure maximum logistical disruption.
2. Southern Re-Tasking: The confirmed UAV swarm moving toward Odesa indicates RF will immediately pressure the southern logistical corridor (Shyriaieve/Ivanivka) to prevent rapid rerouting of supplies away from the central axis.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF forces exploit the systemic AD stress caused by the mixed-strike central campaign, achieving a mechanized breakthrough west of Pokrovsk (e.g., Ivanivka bypass). Simultaneously, RF initiates overt maritime action in the Black Sea (e.g., sinking or forcibly boarding commercial vessels), citing the 'British troop' confirmation as final justification for "full-spectrum response" against NATO support, leading to catastrophic disruption of grain/export corridors. (Confidence: MEDIUM - Increased target complexity (ballistics) validates RF willingness to escalate means.)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: MITIGATE CENTRAL STRIKE DAMAGE & MAINTAIN AD FLEXIBILITY

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)