Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 110030Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 102300Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis is defined by a strategic shift toward maximum deep logistical interdiction coinciding with the tactical liquidation phase on the Pokrovsk axis.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Dimitrov): The Emergency Exfiltration Protocol (E.E.P.) remains the tactical priority. RF forces retain fire control over egress corridors from Svetloe/Grishino, ensuring high friction for UAF retrograde maneuver.
• Central Logistical Spine (CRITICAL): RF is executing a multi-axis deep strike operation targeting vital central infrastructure. UAV groups detected moving from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast are now confirmed to be targeting multiple high-value nodes simultaneously: Poltava, Kremenchuk, Kropyvnytskyi, and Dnipro City. This saturation attack model aims to paralyze the logistical network supporting the Eastern and Southern fronts.
• Deep Battle Area (RF Rear): UAF deep strike capability is confirmed persistent and effective. Multiple drones were intercepted over Moscow, forcing the temporary closure of Zhukovsky Airport (102256Z). This forces RF C2 to divert defense assets away from frontline protection.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Freezing conditions and low visibility continue in the East, supporting both kinetic armor maneuver and deep drone ingress across the deep battle space.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF maintains overwhelming kinetic focus on Dimitrov and increased saturation bombing efforts against the UAF logistical depth. RF AD is stressed by continuous deep strikes into the Moscow region. UAF Dispositions: UAF AD/EW assets are severely stressed and are currently executing a complex reallocation maneuver to intercept confirmed drone flights threatening four separate, critical infrastructure hubs across Central Ukraine. The successful completion of the Dimitrov EEP must still be prioritized alongside this new deep strike threat mitigation.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF intention is to trigger simultaneous, widespread logistical paralysis across Central Ukraine (Poltava/Kremenchuk/Dnipro axis) to disrupt UAF preparation for defensive operations west of Pokrovsk and slow the replenishment of southern axes (PHOENIX retrograde). (Confidence: HIGH)

CAPABILITIES:

• Multi-Directional UAV Saturation: RF demonstrates the capability to split a single UAV wave into multiple vectors targeting separate cities/infrastructure nodes simultaneously (Poltava, Kremenchuk, Dnipro, Kropyvnytskyi). This significantly challenges limited UAF SHORAD/EW resources. (Confidence: HIGH - Confirmed by UAF Air Force reports.)
• C2 Resilience: Despite successful UAF deep strikes forcing local defensive responses (Moscow airport closure), RF C2 maintains the ability to coordinate complex simultaneous operations (Dimitrov offensive + Central Ukraine deep strikes).

Recent Tactical Changes: The confirmed targeting of major industrial/transportation centers (Kremenchuk, Dnipro) validates the intelligence judgment that RF is adapting trajectories to strike farther inland and higher-value targets than previously observed in the Mykolaiv/Odesa area.

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The logistical surge identified at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (SAR Score 24.96) remains critical. This surge directly supports the kinetic pressure being applied on the Pokrovsk axis and the Stepnohorsk retrograde maneuver. Disrupting this base remains the highest-value targeting opportunity to slow RF momentum.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness is moderate. While they coordinate complex offensive maneuvers, the necessity to frequently close major civil aviation infrastructure (Zhukovsky) due to UAF deep strikes indicates significant internal security friction and resource drain in the strategic rear. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high but constrained by critical resource allocation decisions regarding SHORAD/EW systems. The simultaneous management of the Dimitrov EEP and the new, high-tempo deep AD engagement requires meticulous J3/J4 synchronization.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC): UAF deep strike assets maintain persistent access to the RF strategic rear, forcing disruptions and defensive reallocations (Moscow airport closures).
• SETBACK (TACTICAL): The complexity and immediacy of the new multi-directional UAV threat across Central Ukraine force immediate, high-risk AD reallocation, potentially creating temporary vulnerabilities in lower-priority sectors.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The absolute critical constraint remains the scarcity of mobile SHORAD/EW packages. The requirement to defend four separate, high-value nodes (Poltava, Kremenchuk, Dnipro, Kropyvnytskyi) simultaneously is unsustainable with current resources. Prioritization is mandatory.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

1. Normalization of Attacks (RF Internal): RF media is attempting to dilute the impact of successful UAF deep strikes on Moscow by immediately shifting attention to trivial social issues (Pushkin cards, funny photos). This attempts to maintain domestic morale and minimize perception of threat to the capital.
2. Escalation Justification (CRITICAL/NEW): The unclassified confirmation (102245Z) by a British source regarding the deployment of British paratroopers to Ukraine, even if historical or non-combat, will be immediately seized upon by RF IO to justify previously signaled escalation (e.g., the maritime interdiction threat). RF narrative will shift to "preemptive defense against NATO escalation." (Confidence: HIGH)
3. Negotiation Sabotage: The core narrative blaming Kyiv for peace talk failures persists, aiming to isolate the NCA.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is supported by successful deep strikes but potentially stressed by the widespread, simultaneous UAV threat to major Central Ukrainian cities (Kremenchuk/Dnipro). Clear, rapid UAF AD response is required to maintain domestic confidence.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmation of British troop deployment necessitates immediate, coordinated diplomatic messaging from NATO/UK/Kyiv to frame the information correctly (e.g., non-combat, training, advisory) and preempt RF attempts to leverage this into justification for a casus belli for MDCOA actions (Black Sea escalation).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will maximize the current deep strike UAV window NLT 110600Z DEC 25, successfully striking critical power generation or rail infrastructure in the Kremenchuk/Dnipro axis. Simultaneously, kinetic pressure will force the bulk of UAF forces to complete the Dimitrov EEP under severe operational degradation. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Kinetic Success: At least two of the four targeted central nodes (Poltava, Kremenchuk, Kropyvnytskyi, Dnipro) will experience successful RF strikes, resulting in temporary logistical or energy disruption.
2. IO Amplification: RF will utilize the deep strike success and the British troop confirmation to amplify narratives of Kyiv’s corruption and NATO's direct involvement.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF forces exploit operational gaps created by AD reallocation, achieving a mechanized breakthrough on the Pokrovsk axis (e.g., bypassing Ivanivka). Simultaneously, RF initiates aggressive, overt military action against civilian maritime vessels in the Black Sea, citing the British troop confirmation as final justification for "full-spectrum response" against NATO support, leading to a catastrophic collapse of Ukraine's export economy and fracturing of the allied coalition's unified stance. (Confidence: MEDIUM - MDCOA remains relevant, boosted by new IO trigger.)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: DEFEND CENTRAL LOGISTICS SPINE AND PREEMPT ESCALATION

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)