Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 102300Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 102230Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis is dominated by the simultaneous requirement for defensive maneuver (Dimitrov EEP) and urgent logistics defense (Southern Corridor). RF Information Operations (IO) are now focusing strategically on justifying aggressive maritime interdiction.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): UAF elements in Dimitrov remain under extreme pressure as the Emergency Exfiltration Protocol (E.E.P.) proceeds. RF units are maximizing fire control on potential egress corridors from Svetloe and Grishino.
• Southern Axis (Critical Logistics Interdiction): Confirmed movement of a UAV group from Kherson Oblast, traveling north-east (2239Z). This trajectory threatens logistical nodes supporting Kryvyi Rih and Dnipropetrovsk, in addition to the previously identified Shyriaieve rail corridor. This validates RF intent to create deep logistical chaos.
• Deep Battle Area: UAF deep strikes against Russian Federation (RF) strategic targets persist. One additional UAV shootdown confirmed near Moscow (2222Z). RF forces issued and subsequently canceled a ballistic missile threat alert from the East (2216Z-2222Z).

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Freezing conditions and low visibility continue to accelerate operational timelines in the East, providing cover for both RF armor penetration attempts and UAF drone ingress in deep battle areas.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF maintains overwhelming kinetic focus on liquidating the Dimitrov pocket. Dedicated UAV assets are being utilized to probe the entire UAF Southern logistics spine. Logistical readiness remains HIGH, driven by the surge at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base. UAF Dispositions: UAF AD/EW assets must be rapidly prioritized and reallocated to intercept the confirmed north-eastern UAV threat path, potentially diverting assets from the Eastern front where they cover the PHOENIX retrograde.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (STRATEGIC SHIFT): RF intention is shifting toward a comprehensive economic strangulation model, specifically targeting Ukrainian maritime logistics. High-confidence IO signaling (Vietnam analogy, 2214Z) indicates preparation for potential aggressive military action against civilian shipping or port infrastructure (Odesa/Mykolaiv) NLT 72 hours. (Confidence: HIGH - Based on synchronized IO targeting and established RF doctrine for pre-justification of escalation.)

CAPABILITIES:

• Synchronized Multi-Domain Assault: RF demonstrates the capability to maintain high kinetic pressure (Dimitrov) while forcing UAF AD reallocation (UAV swarms) and simultaneously launching coordinated strategic IO campaigns (NCA discreditation and maritime interdiction justification). (Confidence: HIGH)
• Ballistic Threat Readiness: The issuance of a ballistic alert, even if aborted, confirms RF maintains the readiness posture to employ high-velocity assets in response to UAF deep strikes.

Recent Tactical Changes: The movement of the latest UAV group in a north-eastern direction suggests RF is actively adapting its deep strike trajectory to bypass initial UAF AD positions identified around Mykolaiv city, aiming deeper inland toward critical rail infrastructure or industrial centers (Kryvyi Rih/Dnipropetrovsk).

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The logistical surge at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (SAR Score 24.96) remains the primary indicator of RF intent to maintain and potentially increase the rate of offensive operations across the Eastern and Southern axes. Disruption remains a CRITICAL objective.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains capable of coordinating complex kinetic and information maneuvers. However, continued UAF deep strike success forces RF C2 to dedicate significant resources (AD systems, internal security forces) to strategic rear protection, demonstrating C2 stress and diverting focus from the frontline fight. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness remains high but severely constrained by the need to manage simultaneous crisis points: high-risk EEP (Dimitrov), controlled retrograde (PHOENIX), and immediate AD reallocation to cover deep logistical nodes now threatened by the confirmed north-eastern UAV ingress.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (OPERATIONAL): Sustained deep strike capability confirmed by the 6th Moscow UAV shootdown. This continues to generate strategic friction within the RF defense apparatus.
• SUCCESS (STRATCOM): Continued effective response to previous NCA discreditation attempts (previous report).
• SETBACK (TACTICAL): The complexity and risk inherent in the Dimitrov E.E.P. under direct fire.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint is the scarcity of mobile SHORAD/EW packages. The confirmed north-eastern trajectory of the UAV group necessitates prioritizing coverage for the major rail hub/industrial centers (potentially Dnipro) or key rail lines (Shyriaieve), potentially leaving AD gaps in static defense sectors.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO synchronization is at a critical strategic phase, preparing the information space for major escalation:

1. Maritime Interdiction Pre-Justification (CRITICAL): The Vietnam War analogy (2214Z) explicitly argues that RF military restraint regarding Ukrainian civilian sea lanes is a strategic error that must be corrected. This is a clear signal that the targeting of civilian port infrastructure or commercial vessels in the Black Sea is imminent. (Confidence: HIGH)
2. Negotiation Sabotage: RF state media (TASS, 2234Z) is preemptively blaming Kyiv for peace talk failure by claiming "unacceptable conditions" are set. This narrative is intended to delegitimize the UAF 20-point peace plan and isolate Kyiv internationally.
3. Kinetic Justification: Continued amplification of power outage narratives in Kyiv (2231Z) links current energy strikes to historical grievances, maintaining high domestic RF morale and justifying the targeting of civilian infrastructure.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is stressed by simultaneous tactical setbacks (Dimitrov) and high-tempo IO designed to erode trust in the NCA and the feasibility of continued resistance (Korean Model leak, passports, negotiation sabotage).

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The new maritime IO campaign requires immediate diplomatic intervention. Allies must be briefed on the high risk of RF escalation in the Black Sea to preempt the narrative that RF is simply correcting a "strategic error" and ensure continued insurance/shipping support.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will successfully eliminate the combat capability of UAF forces in the Dimitrov pocket NLT 111200Z DEC 25, securing the Pokrovsk approach. Simultaneously, the Northern/North-Eastern UAV group will achieve operational disruption of a major rail junction or POL depot along the central logistical spine, forcing a 12-24 hour logistics traffic halt. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Dimitrov Elimination: Continued high-intensity kinetic attacks force the remaining UAF elements to break out or surrender.
2. Deep Strike Success: The adjusted UAV trajectory (Kherson -> NE) will target key rail assets in the Shyriaieve/Pervomaisk/Kryvyi Rih logistics triangle, forcing UAF J4 to reroute assets across already saturated roads.
3. IO Blitz: RF media will celebrate the kinetic success and intensify the narrative that Kyiv's leadership is corrupt and negotiations are futile.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF forces achieve significant operational exploitation following the Dimitrov success, bypassing secondary UAF lines (Ivanivka). Simultaneously, RF initiates aggressive, overt military action against civilian maritime vessels or port infrastructure in the Black Sea, citing the historical analogies used in recent IO. This action triggers a collapse of global maritime insurance and international shipping to Ukraine, crippling export capacity and creating acute internal resource shortages, while Western political unity fractures over the perceived escalation. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: DIMITROV EEP COMPLETION AND MARITIME THREAT MITIGATION

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)