Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 102230Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 102200Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Operational Crisis remains defined by the imminent collapse of the UAF defensive perimeter in the Pokrovsk Axis and the sustained pressure on UAF strategic logistics by renewed deep strikes.

• Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk): UAF elements in Dimitrov are confirmed to be isolated or under heavy fire control from RF forces holding Svetloe and Grishino. The critical maneuver is the execution of the Emergency Exfiltration Protocol (E.E.P.) to avoid operational destruction.
• Southern Axis (New Threat Vector Confirmation): New UAF Air Force reports confirm a UAV group moving north from Kherson Oblast (2154Z). This movement validates the previous assessment that RF is expanding deep interdiction capabilities toward the Mykolaiv/Shyriaieve logistics backbone.
• Deep Battle Area (UAF Offensive): UAF deep strike tempo is sustained and highly disruptive. Confirmed RF shootdowns of multiple UAVs targeting Moscow (2143Z, 2208Z) have led to temporary closures of Vnukovo and Domodedovo airports (2200Z, 2211Z). (Confidence: HIGH - Confirmed by Russian state media and air traffic authorities). A concurrent missile threat alert was issued for Bryansk Oblast (2143Z).

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Freezing conditions and low ceiling/visibility persist, favoring both rapid RF armor penetration (Pokrovsk) and UAF deep strike penetration (Moscow/Bryansk).

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF units are maintaining maximum pressure on the Pokrovsk and Siversk axes while dedicating significant air assets (UAV swarms) to the Southern logistics interdiction campaign. The ongoing logistical surge at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base continues to be the primary indicator of RF intent to sustain high-tempo kinetic operations NLT 48 hours.

UAF Dispositions: UAF reserves (132nd DShV) are committed to maximizing suppressive fire support for the Dimitrov exfiltration. The priority operational maneuver is securing the logistics GLOCs in the South (Mykolaiv/Odesa region) against the confirmed UAV threat.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF intent is twofold: 1) Secure the Pokrovsk approach by eliminating the Dimitrov pocket NLT 111200Z DEC 25. 2) Achieve strategic-level disruption of UAF logistics and governance via coordinated deep strikes and Information Warfare (IO). (Confidence: HIGH)

CAPABILITIES:

• Air Traffic Denial: RF Air Defense stress and command confusion resulting from UAF deep strikes is sufficient to force the closure of major civilian airports near Moscow, impacting RF domestic morale and governance symbolism. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Aggressive Information Discreditation: RF IO is actively attempting to fully delegitimize the National Command Authority (NCA) by fabricating evidence of UAF Presidential corruption ("foreign passports") and leveraging security incidents (drone near aircraft) to sow doubt among allies. (Confidence: HIGH)

Recent Tactical Changes: RF has begun framing domestic internet restrictions (under the guise of fighting drones) as a necessity, possibly preparing the information space for broader communication denial measures or leveraging the deep strikes to justify stricter internal security.

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The high volume of materiel indicated by the 260th GRAU SAR score (24.96) is designated to support offensive exploitation following the predicted Dimitrov breakthrough and to sustain the attrition warfare on the Stepnohorsk axis. Disruption of this base is operationally critical.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains capable of coordinating multi-domain attacks but is showing vulnerabilities in protecting critical strategic assets (Moscow airspace) and civilian infrastructure. UAF C2 must rapidly allocate mobile AD assets to the Mykolaiv threat axis, potentially requiring priority reallocation from less-stressed sectors.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is high but stressed due to simultaneous requirements: executing E.E.P. (Dimitrov), controlled retrograde (PHOENIX), holding actions (Kupiansk, Ivanivka), and now urgent AD/EW deployment to the newly confirmed Southern threat corridor.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (OPERATIONAL): Successful deep strike mission execution resulting in confirmed operational disruption of Moscow civilian air traffic (D-S belief 0.335). This demonstrates persistent deep strike capability despite RF IADS.
• SUCCESS (STRATCOM): Rapid debunking of the RF fabricated "foreign passport" IO attack (SPRAVDI alert).
• SETBACK (TACTICAL/OPERATIONAL): Imminent loss of the Dimitrov pocket, forcing high-risk E.E.P. under heavy fire.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

The confirmed UAV group ingress from Kherson towards the North necessitates the immediate diversion of SHORAD/EW packages originally intended for sector defense or reserve holding to the Mykolaiv logistics centers. This diversion represents a constraint on other axes, particularly the defensive sectors around Kryvyi Rih/Dnipropetrovsk.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO synchronization is at a critical operational tempo:

1. NCA Discreditation: Immediate dissemination of the "Zelenskyy foreign passport" fabrication (2152Z) and leveraging the drone security incident near his aircraft (2155Z). Primary objective: Undermine domestic and international trust in the leadership structure ahead of critical operational setbacks.
2. External Division: Amplification of claims regarding covert UK paratrooper deployment (2155Z) to support the narrative of NATO direct conflict and preemptively justify the targeting of alleged NATO C2 nodes.
3. Digital Control Justification: Russian internal channels are actively framing UAF drone strikes as justification for domestic digital restrictions (WhatsApp/Telegram call blocking) and increased surveillance, signaling potential future large-scale communication disruption capabilities.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is under fire from the synchronized IO attack (NCA discreditation and "Korean Model" leak). UAF StratCom counter-narratives (debunking, mocking RF claims of Kupyansk seizure) must be amplified to maintain confidence in the front lines and the political leadership.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The IO campaign is clearly aimed at undermining high-value materiel commitments (e.g., Polish MiG-29s) by questioning NCA stability and presenting the 'Korean Model' as the only viable alternative. Immediate diplomatic engagement is required to counter the "foreign passport" lie before scheduled high-level meetings.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will successfully liquidate the UAF pocket in Dimitrov NLT 111200Z DEC 25, securing the Pokrovsk approach. Simultaneously, the newly confirmed UAV groups moving from Kherson will successfully penetrate the Mykolaiv logistical corridor, forcing temporary closure of critical rail lines. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Dimitrov Elimination: Focused kinetic attacks will destroy or force the surrender of remaining UAF elements, freeing RF units for exploitation toward Ivanivka.
2. Logistics Severance: High-volume UAV strikes will target the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka rail corridors and associated infrastructure in Mykolaiv, forcing a shift of UAF Southern logistics to less efficient road networks.
3. Sustained IO: RF will flood the global information space with celebratory narratives of Dimitrov's fall and continue NCA discreditation campaigns, exploiting global media fatigue.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF forces achieve a complete operational victory in Dimitrov (minimal UAF E.E.P. success). The resulting gap allows RF exploitation units to bypass the Ivanivka line and simultaneously outflank the PHOENIX retrograde operation in Stepnohorsk. This dual kinetic success triggers a political failure in Western capitals, leading to a public diplomatic shift toward enforced cease-fire negotiations based on current RF occupation lines. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: DIMITROV EXFILTRATION AND LOGISTICS AIR DEFENSE

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)