Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 102130Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 102245Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk Oblast). RF maneuver forces are exploiting depth, supported by high-volume unguided glide bomb (KAB) strikes targeting UAF rear areas and critical logistics nodes.

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): UAF forces successfully engaged RF elements near Ivanivka (vic. 48°05′N 36°59′E), confirming UAF intent to hold the secondary defensive line covering the Myrnohrad rail hub and the logistical depth of the Dnipropetrovsk region. The successful defense of Ivanivka is temporally critical given the confirmed RF KAB strikes now targeting the Dnipropetrovsk region. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Siversk Axis (Secondary Front): RF media reports claim decisive advances west/northwest of Seversk, framing this axis as the preparatory move for capturing Sloviansk. This suggests RF intent to maintain pressure across multiple axes to fragment UAF reserve commitment. (Confidence: MEDIUM)
• RF Deep Battle Area: UAF deep strike operations continue at a high tempo. Confirmed civil defense alerts for missile threats in Bryansk Oblast and UAV threats in Lipetsk Oblast. Confirmed collateral damage/BDA: A fire at an enterprise in a Voronezh municipality due to UAV debris, validating effective interdiction of industrial targets. (Confidence: HIGH)

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Freezing conditions persist. Low visibility and freezing fog in key RF logistics hubs (e.g., Sheremetyevo airport closure due to AD alerts) are marginally disrupting RF air domain operations but enhancing UAF deep strike opportunities due to stretched RF IADS.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF forces are maintaining kinetic superiority on the ground, supported by massed artillery fire (260th GRAU surge) and increased use of KABs to shape the battlefield ahead of ground maneuver. RF IADS are demonstrably stressed across the depth of the Russian Federation (Bryansk, Lipetsk, Moscow, Voronezh).

UAF Dispositions: UAF forces are executing a decentralized deep strike strategy alongside hardened tactical defense (Ivanivka success). Focus is on preserving combat power (PHOENIX retrograde) and preparing anti-armor reserves to capitalize on the tactical delay achieved by the 7th DShV. UAF Air Force confirms multiple UAV groups moving north from Kherson, potentially targeting Kryvyi Rih.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF intent remains the seizure of Pokrovsk logistics nodes, the operational isolation and subsequent destruction/liquidation of the Dimitrov pocket, and the fixing of UAF reserves via secondary fronts (Siversk, Stepnohorsk). (Confidence: HIGH)

CAPABILITIES:

• Persistent Deep Strike Vulnerability: RF IADS are unable to prevent large-scale UAF UAV strikes targeting strategic depth and high-value industrial/military targets (Voronezh BDA). The necessity to close civilian airports (Sheremetyevo) is a key indicator of IADS strain. (Confidence: HIGH)
• KAB Reliance: Increased use of KABs against Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk axes suggests RF is willing to expend high-value air assets to compensate for localized tactical resistance (Ivanivka) and degrade UAF C2/Logistics in the deep rear. (Confidence: HIGH)

Recent Tactical Changes: RF IO has achieved full synchronization with external political events (Trump statements) to create strategic uncertainty and undermine UAF command credibility (see Section 4). This aggressive IO posture is highly effective and represents an immediate threat to sustained Western military support.

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The high volume of UAF deep strikes against targets in the RF rear area is intended to degrade the 260th GRAU surge capability. However, kinetic operations on the frontline (Pokrovsk) remain high-tempo, indicating the forward echelon still has sufficient materiel.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing kinetic operations with adaptive IO. Centralized messaging immediately leveraged Donald Trump’s comments regarding Ukrainian elections and peace realism, demonstrating the speed and precision of RF Information Warfare against UAF strategic objectives.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Force posture is defensively engaged and adapting to the multi-domain threat. The tactical success at Ivanivka confirms the ability to contest RF penetration on the secondary line. However, the presence of UAF-confirmed KABs targeting the Dnipropetrovsk region indicates a critical vulnerability in air defense protection for operational concentration areas and logistics.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (TACTICAL): Successful defense and engagement against RF maneuver forces near Ivanivka, delaying RF penetration toward the strategic rail axis.

• SUCCESS (OPERATIONAL/DEEP BATTLE): Confirmed BDA/impact in Voronezh due to UAV attack, verifying UAF capacity to sustain pressure on RF military-industrial complexes and rear logistics.

• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC/DOMESTIC): Announcement of the "Zero Course" university entry program signals governmental commitment to long-term national resilience and education continuity despite the war.

• SETBACK (OPERATIONAL): Confirmed KAB strikes transitioning from Donetsk to the deeper Dnipropetrovsk region, signifying a critical threat escalation to C2 nodes and reserve assembly areas.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Mobile Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) and Counter-UAV/Electronic Warfare (EW) assets must be rapidly deployed to the Dnipropetrovsk operational depth to counter the escalating KAB/UAV threat against logistics and command structure.

CONSTRAINT: The immediate requirement for enhanced ground-level FPV saturation is highlighted by the public calls for drone procurement, indicating a tactical materiel shortfall compared to operational needs.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO machine is currently executing a high-leverage strategic influence operation by amplifying statements attributed to Donald Trump (via TASS, Colonelcassad, etc.).

• Key Themes:
  1. Peace Impediment: Framing President Zelenskyy and the UAF NCA as "unrealistic" and the primary obstacle to peace, contrasting UAF command with alleged public sentiment ("82% want peace").
  2. Diplomatic Bypass: Suggesting European leaders are seeking diplomatic engagement that excludes the established UAF negotiating framework, bypassing Kyiv.
  3. Domestic Division: Re-amplifying the election topic to suggest internal political weakness and vulnerability in UAF governance.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is being tested by the high-stakes kinetic environment (Pokrovsk crisis) and the immediate diplomatic pressure. The domestic focus on institutional resilience (education, veteran support efforts) provides a necessary counter-narrative to the external political attacks. The FPV procurement call indicates robust grassroots support but also a critical need for centralized resource fulfillment.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The IO focus has shifted from the "Korean Model" leak to the potential US political intervention. The key diplomatic challenge for the NCA is navigating the potential "Trump Meeting" claims while ensuring the recently submitted UAF 20-point peace plan remains the only credible framework for resolution.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will maximize the use of KABs and high-tempo artillery fire to suppress the Ivanivka/Myrnohrad line while forcing the immediate exfiltration or destruction of the Dimitrov pocket NLT 111200Z DEC 25. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Siversk Exploitation: RF will increase pressure on the Siversk axis to force UAF GFC to commit reserves intended for the Pokrovsk defense.
2. Cognitive Attack Synchronization: RF state media will flood channels with highly critical reporting (based on external political commentary) just prior to the Coalition meeting to undermine UAF leadership, hoping to fragment Western aid commitments.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves a rapid breakthrough on the Pokrovsk axis (failure to harden the Ivanivka line) while simultaneously achieving deep interdiction success (KAB/UAV) against a primary UAF C2 node in the Dnipropetrovsk region. This operational success coincides with a unified international political demand for immediate, unconditional cease-fire based on the "Korean Model" boundary, forcing a strategic retreat under duress. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE COUNTER-KAB DEPLOYMENT AND DIPLOMATIC COUNTER-STRIKE

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)