Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 102245Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 102200Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis remains centered on the Pokrovsk (Myrnohrad) Axis. UAF counter-action is confirmed, slowing the RF armored advance but not mitigating the risk of operational isolation for forces in Dimitrov.

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): Tactical reports confirm the 7th Air Assault Corps (DShV) successfully repelled a mechanized assault on the Pokrovsk approach (vic. 48°17'N 37°20'E). This localized success grants a narrow window for defensive positioning, but the key settlements of Svetloe and Grishino remain under RF control, maintaining the high threat level to the Myrnohrad rail hub.
• Deep Battle/Cross-Border: High-volume UAF Deep Strike operations confirmed against RF rear areas. RF claims the interception of 37+ UAVs over Bryansk Oblast (25 claimed), Kursk Oblast, and Moscow. This represents a significant, multi-vector effort to stress RF integrated air defense systems (IADS).
• Black Sea Security: Confirmed maritime strike/interdiction operation targeting the commercial tanker "Dashan" (Comoros flag) en route to Novorossiysk. This demonstrates continued UAF capacity to impose costs on RF maritime trade and security.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Freezing conditions restrict rotary-wing operations. The current combat environment (high RF armor concentration, restricted air observation) requires maximum commitment of UAF ground-based sensor and counter-armor capabilities.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF forces are attempting to maintain the momentum gained from the Pokrovsk breach. The high rate of UAV engagement over RF territory suggests a commitment of mobile AD units to rear-area defense, potentially pulling resources from the immediate frontline AD umbrella.

UAF Dispositions: The GFC is executing a coordinated kinetic and diplomatic defense. The 7th DShV action is tactically critical. Strategically, the National Command Authority (NCA) has countered the "Korean Model" leak by submitting the updated UAF peace plan response to US stakeholders.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF intent remains the seizure of the Pokrovsk rail/road network to facilitate the operational envelopment of UAF forces in the Dimitrov pocket NLT 111200Z DEC 25. (Confidence: HIGH)

CAPABILITIES:

• Strained IADS: The necessity for RF PVO units to engage 37+ UAVs over geographically dispersed regions (Moscow, Bryansk, Kursk) confirms that UAF deep strike capacity is successfully overmatching RF IADS coverage capabilities. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Recruitment Drive: Promotional IO for the Yaroslavl Higher Military School of Air Defense suggests RF is actively attempting to mitigate high AD personnel and asset attrition sustained during recent months. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

Courses of Action (COA) confirmed in progress:

1. Pokrovsk Fix and Exploit: RF forces will leverage overwhelming artillery support (based on the 260th GRAU surge) to suppress UAF counter-attacks (7th DShV) and resume armored penetration toward Myrnohrad.
2. Maritime Counter-IO: RF will utilize state media and proxies to amplify the maritime tanker attack as "Ukrainian terrorism," seeking to internationalize the conflict and justify future attacks on Black Sea infrastructure.

2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The logistical surge detected at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base is validated by the sustained high-tempo kinetic operations at Pokrovsk and Huliaipole. No intelligence indicates effective UAF interdiction of this main logistical axis yet.

2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing kinetic advances with IO campaigns. The rapid pivot from the "Korean Model" leak to attacking UAF diplomatic efforts regarding elections (Zelenskyy quote) confirms adaptive, centralized messaging.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Force posture is engaged and adapting. The tactical success of the 7th DShV is a critical stabilizing factor. Readiness requires the immediate commitment of remaining anti-armor reserves to convert the localized defense into a hardened operational line west of the RF breakthrough area.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (TACTICAL): 7th DShV successfully repelled a RF mechanized assault near Pokrovsk, slowing the enemy's projected timeline for exploitation.
• SUCCESS (OPERATIONAL/DEEP BATTLE): UAF deep strikes forced RF IADS to engage a high volume of assets (37+ UAVs) over key strategic depth targets, including Moscow. Strike confirmation in Rylsk, Kursk Oblast, validates the strategy.
• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC/IO): UAF submitted its official response to the US peace proposal, effectively pre-empting the full impact of the "Korean Model" leak by confirming UAF negotiation objectives are independent of the rumored DMZ plan.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Mobile Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) units must be deployed to protect high-value rail choke points (Shyriaieve/Ivanivka) and the concentration areas for the newly arriving anti-armor reserve.

CONSTRAINT: The continuous requirement to respond to RF IO regarding elections (CEC statement), religious tensions (Zakarpattia fire), and diplomatic leaks is diverting StratCom capacity from focusing solely on the Pokrovsk crisis.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO has shifted focus based on UAF countermeasures:

1. Diplomatic Factionalism: RF is exploiting the Ukrainian CEC statement on election prerequisites and using quotes from Zelenskyy to suggest domestic political fracture over long-term governance and election timing, attempting to undermine the NCA’s credibility ahead of the Coalition meeting.
2. Black Sea "Terrorism": Intensified narrative framing UAF maritime interdiction efforts against commercial vessels as "terrorism" to generate international pressure on Ukraine regarding Black Sea safety.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is supported by the visible tactical success (7th DShV video) and the diplomatic action (submission of the UAF peace plan). The petition for annual financial rewards for long-serving military personnel (20:20:01) reflects domestic pressure for recognition and long-term support, which the NCA should address.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The environment is stabilizing slightly following the UAF counter-submission of its peace plan (Confirmed by multiple sources). The core focus for the upcoming Coalition meeting must shift from rejecting the US proposal to championing the newly submitted UAF response as the basis for future political support.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will maximize kinetic pressure on the Dimitrov pocket through sustained fire from the 260th GRAU surge, aiming to achieve full operational isolation of Dimitrov NLT 111200Z DEC 25. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. IO Diversion: RF will amplify reporting on UAF deep strike BDA (e.g., claimed 37 UAV shoot-downs) to demonstrate resilience while simultaneously leveraging the "maritime terrorism" narrative to distract international focus from the Pokrovsk crisis.
2. Increased Huliaipole Pressure: RF units (37th/38th GMRB) will increase pressure on the Stepnohorsk retrograde (PHOENIX) line to fix UAF Southern reserves and prevent their redeployment north to Pokrovsk.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF armor breaches the secondary defense line west of Myrnohrad before UAF anti-armor reserves are fully deployed, resulting in a rapid, uncontested advance towards the major logistics hub of Krasnoarmiisk. This kinetic collapse coincides with the Coalition of the Willing meeting, leading to the public suspension of multi-year aid packages by key European partners. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: CONVERTING POKROVSK TACTICAL STABILIZATION INTO OPERATIONAL DEFENSE

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)