Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 102200Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 102100Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Pokrovsk (Myrnohrad) Axis, where RF mechanized forces are attempting to convert a tactical breach into operational encirclement.

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): The high-intensity threat to the Pokrovsk logistics hub persists. Previous reports indicated the seizure of Svetloe and Grishino, placing UAF elements in Dimitrov under likely operational isolation. RF is prioritizing the seizure of Myrnohrad's rail intersection.
• Siversk Axis (Escalation): RF sources (Colonelcassad, 20:05Z) have escalated their claims from "cleanup" to confirmed video evidence of the 6th Cossack Brigade seizing Siversk. This requires immediate collection confirmation but must be treated as a potentially successful secondary deception/attrition objective.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (PHOENIX): UAF controlled withdrawal (PHOENIX) continues. Kinetic activity remains high, confirmed by a short-duration air raid alarm in Zaporizhzhia City and environs (19:46Z - 19:57Z).

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Freezing conditions and low visibility continue to restrict UAF Close Air Support (CAS) and complicate personnel recovery (PR) efforts. These conditions favor the RF mechanized penetration tactics currently employed in Pokrovsk.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Dispositions: RF units are highly concentrated on exploiting the operational depth gained toward Pokrovsk. They are simultaneously leveraging kinetic success claims in Siversk and high-level Information Operations (IO) to maximize cognitive strain on UAF C2.

UAF Dispositions: UAF GFC is committed to slowing the Pokrovsk penetration with holding attacks (e.g., 132nd DShV) while managing the PHOENIX retrograde. Immediate commitment of anti-armor reserves is required, diverting attention from hardening secondary defense lines west of Pokrovsk.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (STRATEGIC): RF intent is to achieve maximum kinetic and diplomatic damage NLT 11 DEC 25 (date of the Coalition of the Willing meeting).

CAPABILITIES:

• Synchronized Multi-Domain Attack: RF is executing a highly effective synchronization of kinetic operations (Pokrovsk breakthrough supported by 260th GRAU surge) with strategic IO (UK casualty, "Korean Model" peace leak). (Confidence: HIGH)
• Sustained Deep Strike Capability: The aerial danger alert in Lipetsk Oblast (20:07Z) confirms UAF deep strike/reconnaissance capabilities continue to interdict Russian rear assets, despite RF efforts to target UAF C2 nodes (Kuzmuk exploitation).

Courses of Action (COA) confirmed in progress:

1. Full seizure and consolidation of Siversk, utilizing it as a secondary psychological victory.
2. Rapid armored exploitation toward the Myrnohrad rail hub to confirm operational isolation of Dimitrov forces.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF media is demonstrating highly specific, sensitive target exploitation in the IO domain: the immediate identification and naming of the deceased UK serviceman (George Hooley, 19:47Z). This represents a rapid escalation in the use of sensitive personnel information to generate strategic shock and diplomatic friction.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The SAR score 24.96 at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base indicates a critical logistical surge. This surge supports the high-tempo offensive operations in Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia and suggests RF forces have achieved the necessary sustainment capacity for a short, decisive offensive push towards Pokrovsk. (Confidence: HIGH)

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, exhibiting tight synchronization across combat axes and the Information Environment. The immediate, coordinated deployment of the "Korean Model" leak and the UK fatality IO across multiple RF channels demonstrates centralized and rapid strategic communication control.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Force posture is stressed but responsive. The National Command Authority (NCA) is actively engaged in counter-IO, confirming the upcoming Coalition meeting and focusing on diplomatic continuity (Zelenskyy, 19:52Z). Readiness of mobile anti-armor reserves remains the critical factor for Pokrovsk stabilization.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (OPERATIONAL): UAF deep strike capabilities remain viable (Lipetsk air alert, 20:07Z), forcing RF to commit air defense assets to the deep rear.
• SETBACK (STRATEGIC/IO): The leaked US peace plan (Axios, 20:01Z), proposing a "Korean Model" DMZ, directly contradicts UAF objectives and creates extreme confusion among allies and domestic forces regarding the long-term war aim ahead of the critical Coalition meeting.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Mobile anti-armor assets (FPV/ATGM teams) to prevent the full operational seizure of the Pokrovsk hub. CONSTRAINT: UAF strategic communication assets are constrained by the simultaneous need to counter the Belgian financial threat, the UK fatality narrative, AND the damaging "Korean Model" leak. Resource allocation must prioritize countering the DMZ narrative, as it threatens the foundation of Western diplomatic support.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO strategy is currently executing a three-pronged saturation attack:

1. "Korean Model" Paralysis (NEW PRIMARY THREAT): Leaks detailing a DMZ peace plan (Axios, ASTRA, 20:01Z-20:05Z) are designed to signal US/Western wavering, potentially reducing the appetite for new long-term materiel commitments at the Coalition meeting. (Confidence: HIGH)
2. NATO Escalation Amplification: The immediate naming and detailing of the deceased UK paratrooper (19:47Z) confirms RF intent to maximize diplomatic friction between the UAF and supporting nations.
3. Leadership Degradation: Attacks focusing on President Zelenskyy's persona and attire (19:46Z) are persistent low-level IO targeting domestic and international trust.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF StratCom must rapidly bridge the credibility gap created by the Pokrovsk tactical losses and the DMZ peace plan leak. The domestic sentiment supporting the volunteer mobilization (Sternenko/Barakuda) needs continued reinforcement to counteract the uncertainty introduced by the diplomatic leaks.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The diplomatic environment is near-critical. The Coalition of the Willing meeting tomorrow is now proceeding under maximal RF pressure. UAF confirmed delivery of its response to the US peace proposal (20:01Z). The ongoing Belgian legal threat (from previous reports) remains a severe risk to long-term EU financial stability for Ukraine.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces successfully consolidate control of the Pokrovsk logistical hub (rail and road intersections) NLT 110600Z DEC 25, utilizing overwhelming armor superiority and localized fire control to force a tactical withdrawal west of Dimitrov. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Diplomatic Weaponization: RF IO will intensify the "Korean Model" narrative (DMZ leak) in the 12 hours preceding the Coalition meeting to frame the conflict as nearing conclusion, undermining the need for new, substantial multi-year aid packages.
2. Increased Siversk Attrition: RF will maintain high-intensity (attritional) pressure on the Siversk axis to fix UAF reserves and prevent their transfer to the critical Pokrovsk front.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves an operational rout at Pokrovsk leading to the encirclement and destruction of the Dimitrov garrison. Simultaneously, the uncertainty surrounding the US-affiliated "Korean Model" combined with the Belgian legal challenge causes key EU nations to postpone major financial mechanisms (e.g., the frozen asset loan), resulting in severe financial and kinetic degradation. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

1. Aviation Targeting: RF successfully targets UAF ground facilities (FOBs) using intelligence gained from the Kuzmuk exploitation, neutralizing newly acquired fixed-wing combat aviation assets before they can influence the Pokrovsk battle.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE TACTICAL STABILIZATION AND STRATEGIC IO DAMAGE CONTROL

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)