Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE

TIME: 101900Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 101830Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The tactical crisis along the Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk direction) has deepened and is now centered on the critical intermediate city of Myrnohrad.

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad): RF propaganda (Voenkory Russkoy Vesny) explicitly claims forces (Tsentr Group) are now storming Myrnohrad (formerly known as Dimitrov/Pokrovsk area). This escalation from localized pocket claims to a named city assault indicates that RF forces believe they have achieved tactical momentum beyond Dimitrov. RF forces confirm the use of high-impact thermobaric weapons (TOS-2 Tosochka) in the Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) direction targeting UAF strongholds. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Black Sea/Maritime: Confirmed successful UAF USV strike against a second RF shadow fleet tanker, acknowledged by pro-RF sources. UAF continues to hold operational control of the maritime denial zone. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Dnipropetrovsk Border: RF sources are escalating claims of offensive operations in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (unspecified location), reinforcing the identified MLCOA of a probing/diversionary attack near Mezheva/Novopodhorodne. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Dense fog and low visibility reported in previous reports are assumed to persist, favoring close-quarters engagements and RF mechanized infiltration. The use of the TOS-2 is effective regardless of visibility but implies RF is encountering heavily fortified UAF positions in the built-up area.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Dispositions: UAF command is actively engaging in strategic maneuver, with President Zelenskyy confirming undisclosed "strengthening of our combat aviation." Reserves are prioritized to prevent a catastrophic collapse of the Pokrovsk defensive line, with a secondary commitment to holding the newly secured Shyriaieve/Ivanivka logistics corridor.

RF Dispositions: RF commitment of the TOS-2 Tosochka (10th Guards NBC Protection Regiment) signifies a maximum effort to breach UAF strongholds and clear resistance in the approach to Pokrovsk. RF forces are synchronizing heavy kinetic action with immediate IO blitzes (Myrnohrad claims).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RF THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (TACTICAL): RF intent is to liquidate UAF strongholds on the Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk axis rapidly through the application of maximum firepower, leveraging thermobaric effects to reduce the risk to dismounted infantry in urban or fortified sectors.

CAPABILITIES:

• Thermobaric Application: Confirmed operational capability to deploy the highly destructive TOS-2 system rapidly in the critical Krasnoarmeysk direction. This capability poses a severe threat to UAF static positions and field fortifications. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Multi-Domain Synchronization: RF C2 effectively coordinates front-line tactical successes with strategic IO claims regarding Myrnohrad penetration and Dnipropetrovsk advance, forcing UAF to fight on multiple cognitive fronts simultaneously. (Confidence: HIGH)

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate integration of the TOS-2 system near Pokrovsk suggests RF forces are facing entrenched resistance that conventional artillery is struggling to suppress, necessitating the commitment of specialized, area-denial weapons systems. This may indicate slower RF progress than desired, despite aggressive claims.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

While the strategic logistical surge (260th GRAU base activity reported in DIS) remains critical, new social media appeals from RF units (e.g., Arkhangel Spetsnaza reporting "collection is going badly") suggest fragmented logistics support and reliance on non-state funding remains a persistent weakness for specific RF formations. This presents a low-level target for UAF IO exploitation. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating the Pokrovsk offensive, rapidly deploying high-value assets like the TOS-2. Propaganda efforts are highly disciplined, immediately amplifying the Myrnohrad claim to maximize psychological impact.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high at the strategic level, focusing on coalition building and long-term sustainment (US reconstruction talks). The confirmed acquisition/strengthening of combat aviation provides an immediate, though undisclosed, reinforcement capability that must be integrated rapidly into operational planning.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (STRATEGIC/FACT): President Zelenskyy confirmed new strengthening of combat aviation and the scheduling of a 30+ nation "Coalition of the Willing" meeting, directly challenging RF diplomatic isolation efforts.
• SUCCESS (OPERATIONAL/FACT): The second USV strike confirms UAF ability to persistently degrade RF maritime supply lines.
• SETBACK (TACTICAL/JUDGMENT): The confirmed deployment of the TOS-2 indicates that UAF units holding strongholds in the Pokrovsk direction are facing an immediate and severe existential threat requiring specialized counter-measures.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Integration and immediate operational deployment planning for the newly acquired combat aviation assets. CONSTRAINT: UAF forces must rapidly develop and deploy counter-TOS-2 tactics, potentially requiring deep penetration drone reconnaissance to identify launch/reload positions.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is pursuing a maximalist strategy:

1. Tactical Panic: Asserting control over the Dnipropetrovsk border and storming Myrnohrad (escalating pressure from the Pokrovsk crisis).
2. Demoralization PO: Circulation of captured UAF serviceman interviews confirming voluntary surrender ("to survive").
3. Cultural Warfare: RF state media continues to push fabricated stories regarding Ukrainian language policies ("Santa didn't bring a gift because she speaks Russian").

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF StratCom must counter the escalated kinetic claims immediately by highlighting the simultaneous RF appeals for financial aid ("collection is going badly"), framing it as evidence of RF systemic logistical failure despite localized tactical gains. The positive diplomatic news (Coalition, US talks) must be amplified.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Strategic momentum is firmly with Ukraine in the diplomatic sphere, evidenced by the US reconstruction meeting and the "Coalition of the Willing" summit planning. This directly refutes the RF "Korean Model" narrative by demonstrating long-term international commitment.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (NEXT 12 HOURS)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces utilize persistent thermobaric and artillery fire to force UAF withdrawal from fortified strongholds west of Grishino, securing the flank for an immediate push on Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk city center. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Urban Breaching: Continued deployment of TOS-2 or similar heavy demolition systems (e.g., FAB-3000 strikes) to suppress forward UAF strongholds NLT 110200Z DEC 25.
2. Dnipropetrovsk Recon: Intensified deep reconnaissance along the Mezheva/Novopodhorodne border area, leveraging the weather/darkness to confirm UAF reserve commitment status.
3. Information Exploitation: RF IO will use the immediate fallout of any Myrnohrad tactical success to generate maximum noise before the scheduled UAF "Coalition of the Willing" meeting.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF armor bypasses Myrnohrad, exploiting a temporary UAF C2 collapse resulting from TOS-2 strikes, and simultaneously executes a successful deep strike against the newly reinforced combat aviation assets. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

1. Operational Paralysis: RF achieves a deep, uncontested penetration into the Pokrovsk logistics hub, coupled with successful jamming of UAF tactical communications.
2. Targeting Success: RF successfully identifies and targets the operating bases or assembly areas of the newly reinforced UAF combat aviation, neutralizing the strategic advantage before it is integrated.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: COUNTER-FIRE AND ASSET INTEGRATION

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)