Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - OPERATIONAL CRISIS UPDATE

TIME: 101730Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 101700Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational situation is characterized by high-intensity kinetic action on the Eastern front aimed at achieving a major tactical envelopment, juxtaposed with UAF asymmetrical success in the deep battle and maritime domains.

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): RF forces maintain aggressive pressure on the Dimitrov pocket following the confirmed seizure of Svetloe and Grishino. This maneuver attempts to convert a tactical breach into an operational isolation of Pokrovsk's immediate flank defenses. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (South): UAF continues execution of Contingency Plan PHOENIX (Stepnohorsk retrograde). HUR claimed successful destruction of key RF ISR/Air Defense assets: 2x 1L125 Niobium-SV Radars and 1x 9A83 launcher (S-300V). This temporary degradation of RF counter-battery and air defense capabilities provides a tactical window for UAF maneuver. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Black Sea Maritime Area (Deep Battle): Confirmed successful SBU Sea Baby Unmanned Surface Vessel (USV) strike on the RF 'shadow fleet' oil/chemical tanker "Dashan." This is the second confirmed strike of this type and directly impacts RF logistical sustainment. (Confidence: HIGH)
• RF Capabilities (Air): RF Aerospace Forces (VKS) received a new batch of modernized Su-34 frontline bombers, ensuring sustained air superiority and high kinetic output (KAB glide bombs) on the frontline. (Confidence: HIGH)

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The implementation of national rolling blackouts (effective 11 DEC) remains the critical environmental constraint, potentially degrading local C2 and logistical hubs. UAF must assume RF will attempt to synchronize high-precision strikes (KABs) with blackout periods.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Dispositions: Forces are prioritizing the controlled withdrawal in Zaporizhzhia while specialized units (HUR/SBU) demonstrate high lethality in the deep battle. The primary operational focus must now shift entirely to facilitating the exfiltration of the Dimitrov garrison and stabilizing the Pokrovsk flank.

RF Dispositions: RF maintains momentum in Donetsk (Pokrovsk direction) and sustained air power. RF internal messaging shows efforts to stabilize public perception regarding domestic drone attacks (proposing compensation for damage).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RF THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): Achieve localized operational success by liquidating the UAF pocket in Dimitrov NLT 111200Z DEC 25, leveraging this gain to threaten the main Pokrovsk defensive lines. Sustain KAB saturation using newly bolstered Su-34 inventory.

INTENTION (STRATEGIC/IO): Intensify the "Korean Model" diplomatic pressure campaign (leveraging Trump consultation leaks) to undermine the 15 DEC Berlin Summit and erode Western political will regarding UAF territorial integrity demands. Simultaneously, use soft power messaging (Bollywood star) to reinforce non-Western global alignment.

CAPABILITIES:

• Kinetic Sustainment: Confirmed delivery of new Su-34s increases RF capacity for continuous KAB employment. (Confidence: HIGH)
• ISR Degradation (Fact): Loss of 2x Niobium-SV radars is a quantifiable tactical loss, temporarily impeding RF ability to conduct effective counter-battery fire against UAF artillery operating near Zaporizhzhia.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has not changed its strategy (attrition, air dominance), but the receipt of new Su-34s represents a significant resource reinforcement. The reported UAV strikes on rear logistical corridors (Shyriaieve/Ivanivka) indicate RF is still targeting UAF secondary logistical nodes to complicate the PHOENIX retrograde.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The successful USV strike on the tanker "Dashan" significantly validates the vulnerability of the RF shadow fleet, which is critical for sustaining war economy imports (fuel, chemicals). This increases RF operational risk tolerance in the Black Sea. The anticipated 260th GRAU surge remains the immediate kinetic logistical threat.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains capable of coordinating complex maneuvers (Pokrovsk encirclement, PHOENIX pressure). However, the loss of high-value ISR assets (Niobium-SV) requires immediate reallocation of airborne or alternative ground-based reconnaissance platforms.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is defined by a critical prioritization threshold: immediate tactical stabilization in Pokrovsk versus capitalizing on deep strike successes. The successful negotiation and signing of the 2026 National Budget (Fact) provides a signal of enduring institutional stability despite frontline crises.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (OPERATIONAL/FACT): Two confirmed Sea Baby USV strikes (including the latest on 'Dashan') successfully degrade RF maritime logistics and complicate Black Sea operations.
• SUCCESS (TACTICAL/FACT): HUR confirmed BDA on 2x Niobium-SV radars and 1x S-300V system in the Southern Axis, creating a crucial window for UAF fire maneuver.
• SETBACK (OPERATIONAL/FACT): The high probability of encirclement of the Dimitrov garrison necessitates emergency exfiltration protocols.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid provision of fire support and maneuver assets to facilitate the Dimitrov exfiltration. CONSTRAINT: The diplomatic volatility (Trump consultation, Belgian opposition to frozen assets) creates friction in long-term materiel guarantees, demanding urgent StratCom intervention.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is effectively leveraging recent diplomatic and internal developments:

1. Diplomatic Sabotage: Amplifying the "Korean Model" leaks and focusing on allied consultation with Trump to sow distrust in long-term support.
2. Soft Power: Use of high-profile, nostalgic cultural figures (Mithun Chakraborty) to cement historical and cultural ties, primarily aimed at reinforcing domestic morale and ties with non-Western blocs.
3. Domestic Admission: RF political proposal for drone damage compensation confirms that UAF deep strikes are having a measurable physical and cognitive impact on the Russian rear.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale in Ukraine faces testing due to the confluence of the Dimitrov crisis and the imminent power blackouts. UAF StratCom efforts must simultaneously emphasize stability (2026 budget) and operational lethality (successful maritime/radar strikes) to counter the negative narratives.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

CRITICAL DETERIORATION: Public confirmation that European leaders engaged in "peace negotiations" consultation with Trump signals serious concern regarding the future US security commitment. This greatly increases the risk of the MDCOA—allies seeking an immediate, suboptimal negotiated end to the conflict (the "Korean Model"). Public opposition from Belgium to using frozen RF assets signals cracks in coalition financial unity ahead of the 15 DEC Summit.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces focus overwhelming kinetic and IO pressure on the Pokrovsk Axis and the diplomatic environment, exploiting UAF power constraints. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Pokrovsk Assault: RF VDV/Mechanized forces will attempt to complete the encirclement of the Dimitrov garrison NLT 111200Z DEC 25, securing the Pokrovsk flank line.
2. KAB/EW Synchronization: RF will maximize KAB utilization (supported by new Su-34s) against the PHOENIX retrograde and UAV-targeted logistical corridors (Shyriaieve) synchronized with the onset of national power blackouts (11 DEC).
3. IO Apex: RF state media will flood channels with negative diplomatic messaging (Trump/Korean Model) immediately preceding the 15 DEC summit to create an atmosphere of defeatism.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves decisive tactical victory in Donetsk, leading to a diplomatic split among key allies. (Confidence: MEDIUM/HIGH)

1. Dimitrov Rout & Pokrovsk Breach: Failure to exfiltrate UAF forces from Dimitrov results in a large-scale personnel loss, allowing RF to bypass the secondary defensive line and achieve operational momentum toward Pokrovsk city.
2. Strategic Diplomatic Defection: The combination of kinetic setbacks and political uncertainty leads to one or more key European states signaling, prior to the 15 DEC summit, willingness to accept a temporary cessation of hostilities based on current lines of contact, effectively halting critical materiel flow.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: INTERVENTION IN POKROVSK AND LOGISTICAL INTERDICTION

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)