Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - OPERATIONAL CRISIS UPDATE

TIME: 101700Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 101612Z DEC 25; Daily Intelligence Summary 101501Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains dominated by high RF kinetic pressure on the Southern Axis, synchronized with strategic IO efforts aimed at undermining UAF diplomatic positioning.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (South): Confirmed continued heavy utilization of KAB (Guided Glide Bombs) on the Zaporizhzhia junction (16:35:22). This fire saturation directly supports RF efforts to break the PHOENIX retrograde perimeter and threatens the Synelnykivskyi logistical hub.
• Black Sea Maritime Area: UAF deep strike capability remains active. RF military sources claim a successful naval drone attack against the 'shadow fleet' oil/chemical tanker "Dashan" (Gambia flag) (16:25:48). This confirms UAF intent and capability to degrade RF economic and military logistics far from the immediate frontline.
• RF Deep Rear (Internal): A major fire incident has impacted civilian infrastructure in St. Petersburg (1,500 sq. m). This incident strains RF domestic emergency response capacity and presents an immediate opportunity for UAF information operations (IO) regarding internal RF stability.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The environmental constraint of the national rolling blackouts, effective 11 DEC, remains the dominant factor. RF KAB operations are expected to increase vulnerability during these periods. No new specific weather factors reported.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Dispositions: UAF tactical forces retain the ability to execute effective long-range, unconventional strikes (maritime drones). However, UAF NCA is concurrently dealing with increased internal domestic distractions (high-profile legal cases, police involvement in fatal accidents) that may draw critical focus away from the frontline crisis management.

RF Dispositions: RF maintains operational tempo and fire superiority via KAB employment. RF C2 is attempting to manage both high kinetic output and internal domestic emergencies (St. Petersburg fire, military blogger friction). RF is using propaganda (awarding Guards titles) to sustain internal morale.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RF THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (OPERATIONAL): RF primary kinetic intention is to maintain extreme pressure on the PHOENIX retrograde in Zaporizhzhia using air-to-ground guided munitions (KABs) and to ensure rapid delivery of the 260th GRAU surge to the front NLT 12 DEC.

INTENTION (STRATEGIC/IO): RF strategy is focused on undermining the upcoming 15 DEC Berlin Summit by leveraging high-level political friction (Trump consultation) to amplify the "Korean Model" narrative and erode confidence in UAF territorial integrity demands.

CAPABILITIES: RF capability for sustained maritime logistics via the 'shadow fleet' is validated, though highly vulnerable to UAF naval drone operations.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has not substantially altered its tactical approach (reliance on KABs). The claimed maritime drone strike indicates RF must now allocate greater resources to protecting high-value logistical assets in the Black Sea, potentially diverting assets from the Kerch Strait or Crimean security.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

• 260th GRAU Surge: This remains the primary kinetic threat source. Immediate interdiction is required. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Shadow Fleet Vulnerability: The confirmed successful strike on the tanker "Dashan" reveals critical logistical vulnerability that UAF can exploit to degrade RF economic and military sustainment.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 must now manage significant internal security challenges (St. Petersburg fire) while maintaining offensive synchronization. The RF internal information domain shows friction, evidenced by military bloggers reporting "discreditation." (Confidence: MEDIUM)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Overall readiness is transitioning to operate under anticipated power constraints (11 DEC). The ability of specialized units to execute deep strikes (maritime domain) demonstrates critical asymmetrical capabilities that must be sustained and scaled. UAF C2 must triage focus between high-intensity kinetic operations and significant rear-area social and political friction.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESS (FACT/JUDGMENT): Successful execution of a probable maritime drone strike on the RF shadow fleet tanker "Dashan." This strike degrades RF war economy sustainment and challenges RF control of the Northern Black Sea.
• SETBACK (FACT): Continued high KAB saturation in Zaporizhzhia, indicating RF ability to target the PHOENIX retrograde remains robust.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Sustained and increased allocation of deep strike assets (including naval drones) to exploit confirmed logistical vulnerabilities (tanker routes, 260th GRAU base).

CONSTRAINT: The volume of high-profile domestic friction (political corruption trials, fatal police accidents) consumes high-level NCA attention required for coordinating complex operational/diplomatic maneuvering.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is successfully amplifying divisive narratives (Trump migration comments) to undermine European cohesion ahead of the 15 DEC summit. The crucial diplomatic development is the high-level consultation between European leaders and Trump (16:27:00), which RF IO will attempt to frame as a pre-negotiation for US withdrawal, reinforcing the MDCOA of a diplomatic breakdown ("Korean Model").

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

National morale will be tested by the convergence of confirmed power blackouts (11 DEC) and the appearance of high-level political uncertainty following the Trump call. UAF StratCom must immediately anchor the 20-point peace plan to counter the strategic uncertainty introduced by the diplomatic maneuvering.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Trump-European leaders call confirms an urgent shift in the diplomatic environment. Allies are attempting to manage potential US policy changes, creating a dangerous window for RF to push concessions. This makes the 15 DEC Berlin Summit a highly volatile decision point.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF maximizes fire saturation on the Southern axis while intensifying IO to capitalize on Western political friction and national power instability. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Kinetic Escalation (ZAP): RF will intensify KAB and artillery use, synchronized with the onset of national blackouts (11 DEC), to degrade UAF C2/Logistics and accelerate the collapse of the PHOENIX retrograde perimeter.
2. IO Synchronization (Diplomatic Sabotage): RF will aggressively link the Trump consultation to the "Korean Model" leak, attempting to force the 15 DEC Berlin summit participants to publicly signal flexibility on Ukrainian territorial integrity.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves operational rout in Zaporizhzhia while strategic IO triggers key allies to undermine UAF diplomatic red lines. (Confidence: MEDIUM/HIGH)

1. PHOENIX Collapse & Flanking (Zaporizhzhia): Unchanged.
2. Strategic Diplomatic Defection: The diplomatic pressure causes key allies to issue a joint statement suggesting a "temporary separation line" or an immediate ceasefire based on current lines, effectively undermining the UAF 20-point plan and freezing Western materiel transfers based on perceived futility.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: INTERDICTION OF KINETIC AND DIPLOMATIC THREATS

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)