Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - OPERATIONAL CRISIS UPDATE

TIME: 101612Z DEC 25

REFERENCE: Previous ISR 101600Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains dominated by two simultaneous crises: the Dimitrov pocket (Pokrovsk Axis) and the controlled PHOENIX retrograde (Zaporizhzhia Axis).

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): UAF forces, specifically the 7th Corps DShV, have successfully repelled a significant RF breakthrough attempt north of Pokrovsk (15:49:47). This confirmation indicates that the secondary defensive line west of Grishino is holding despite the localized crisis in Dimitrov UBA. The operational objective shifts from pure exfiltration to securing the immediate northern flank of Pokrovsk.
• Siversk Axis: UAF 54th OMB reports engaging and destroying RF personnel in the central UBA (16:01:03). This confirms UAF operational control within the city center, denying RF claims of consolidation and tying down RF reserves.
• Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia): The PHOENIX retrograde continues under RF pressure. Confirmed fighting in Huliaipole (16:04:00) suggests RF forces are maintaining broad pressure to prevent UAF stabilization.
• Northern Border (Sumy): RF forces are executing an intense "burn out the border" campaign utilizing high-volume drone strikes targeting UAF logistics and evacuation efforts (15:51:49). This diversionary pressure is increasing strain on UAF peripheral security.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• RF Fire Support: RF continues heavy, confirmed use of KAB (Guided Glide Bombs), with recent launches reported in Donetsk Oblast and specifically at the critical Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts junction (16:04:17, 16:07:29). This confirms the operational manifestation of the previous report's warning regarding the 260th GRAU logistical surge.
• Critical Infrastructure (FACT): Ukrenergo confirms national implementation of scheduled rolling blackouts and power limitation graphs for all regions starting 11 DEC (16:02:51, 16:05:45). This is a critical operational factor impacting UAF C2 relay, rear area industrial production, and civilian morale.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Dispositions:

• Forces on the Pokrovsk axis are demonstrating robust, technologically augmented, holding capacity (7th DShV).
• Frontline units are now operating under the constraint of imminent national power instability (11 DEC). C2 redundancies reliant on external power must be immediately activated.

RF Dispositions:

• RF is maintaining high operational tempo, leveraging KAB superiority to degrade UAF defensive preparation.
• RF capability for sustained attrition warfare is reinforced by the reported recruitment of 400,000 contract personnel in 2025 (Medvedev, 15:51:07). (Confidence: MEDIUM—Official claim, likely inflated but indicative of high capacity).
• Confirmed localized RF logistical deficiencies are emerging (video of soldiers drinking from puddles, 15:59:01), potentially impacting troop performance and morale, particularly for less-supported units.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RF THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (STRATEGIC): RF intention is unequivocally territorial maximalism and permanent control of seized assets. This is evidenced by the official refusal to discuss ceding the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) or the Kinburn Spit (16:11:02), reinforcing the narrative that current operations are designed to establish permanent resource and strategic security boundaries (e.g., Dnipro water access). (Confidence: HIGH)

CAPABILITIES:

• Fire Superiority: The 260th GRAU surge is now demonstrably impacting the battlefield via concentrated KAB and mass artillery strikes in key junction areas. This capability is at its peak.
• Hybrid Domain Expansion: RF is effectively synchronizing tactical kinetics (KABs) with strategic disruption (power grid strikes) and IO (diplomatic leaks/accusations).

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has adapted its strike pattern to align with strategic vulnerabilities, focusing air assets on the critical Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk junction to maximize pressure on the PHOENIX retrograde while simultaneously ensuring widespread national power disruption via grid strikes.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

• RF External Surge: The logistics surge remains a critical threat, directly linked to observed KAB launches. The window for pre-emptive interdiction is closing rapidly. (Confidence: HIGH)
• RF Internal Flaw: The documented deficiency in providing basic necessities (water/supply) to some frontline units is a localized weakness that may be exploited via IO and specialized small-unit interdiction. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust in its ability to synchronize fire missions and strategic IO. However, the internal focus on blaming external actors for drone attacks (Moscow attacks blamed on EU/Ukraine, 15:33:51) suggests C2 prioritizes denial and deflection over effective internal security response.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively resilient at key operational points (Pokrovsk, Siversk) but is experiencing elevated vulnerability on secondary axes (Sumy) due to sustained RF drone pressure. The entire military complex is now preparing to operate under the constraints of nationwide power rationing.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESSES (FACT):
  • 7th Corps DShV successfully repelled an RF breakthrough attempt north of Pokrovsk (15:49:47). This prevents the RF from leveraging the Dimitrov crisis to immediately encircle Pokrovsk from the north.
  • 54th OMB maintaining control and lethal engagement capability within the Siversk UBA (16:01:03).
• SETBACKS (FACT):
  • Confirmed national rolling blackouts (16:05:45), signifying significant operational limitations starting 11 DEC across all domains (C2, transportation, medical support, industrial throughput).

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate power generation assets and C2 redundancy systems (e.g., satellite communications, dedicated UPS) for critical military infrastructure.
• CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The need to dedicate scarce electronic warfare (EW) and mobile air defense assets to the newly intensified threat along the Sumy border, potentially drawing resources away from core operational axes (Pokrovsk/Zaporizhzhia).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO has solidified its maximalist position, rejecting any withdrawal from key seized strategic assets (ZNPP, Kinburn Spit). The RF continues the high-level disinformation campaign blaming the EU and Ukraine for internal attacks (Moscow drones).

UAF StratCom continues the risky strategy of promoting unspecified "end of the war" news this week (Zelensky, 15:55:16). This creates an expectation gap that, if not met by concrete diplomatic or kinetic success by 12 DEC, will severely erode morale and domestic stability amid energy cuts.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF frontline morale is supported by visible successes (7th DShV counter-attack footage). National sentiment is under intense pressure due to the confirmation of widespread power outages coinciding with high-stakes political messaging. RF IO is also attempting to generate internal noise by exploiting local crimes (Odesa murder framed as antisemitism, 15:51:26).

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The international environment is accelerating toward negotiation. The confirmed meeting of the "Coalition of the Willing" leaders in Berlin on 15 DEC (15:53:58) is a major decision point. The primary threat remains the proliferation of diplomatic leaks (e.g., "Korean Model") designed to undermine the UAF 20-point peace plan. International allies are signaling coordinated action, but the nature of that action remains ambiguous.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF maximizes fire saturation and exploits nationwide power instability to destabilize UAF C2 and logistics while formalizing territorial demands. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Exploitation of Power Cuts (110000Z DEC 25 onward): RF forces will utilize the confirmed national rolling blackouts to launch focused deep strikes (missiles/drones) against critical, non-military infrastructure (key rail choke points, power substations, industrial hubs) during peak outage periods, aiming to convert intermittent power loss into systemic supply chain failure.
2. Sustained KAB Assault: The confirmed KAB utilization in the ZAP/DON/DNI junction will escalate, attempting to collapse UAF secondary defenses and convert the PHOENIX retrograde into a full rout before UAF forces can stabilize.
3. IO Hardening: RF will use the Berlin 15 DEC meeting as a pretext to officially dismiss the UAF 20-point plan and solidify their maximalist territorial demands (ZNPP/Kinburn/Dnipro).

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves a major operational success on the Southern axis while forcing a catastrophic strategic diversion. (Confidence: MEDIUM/HIGH)

1. PHOENIX Collapse & Flanking (Zaporizhzhia): The RF 37th GMRB, leveraging the peak of the 260th GRAU fire surge, breaks through the controlled retrograde perimeter in Stepnohorsk. This success opens the flank to the rail hub of Synelnykivskyi and necessitates the commitment of fragmented UAF reserves in a piecemeal fashion.
2. Simultaneous Pechenihy Dam Attack: The MDCOA remains the deliberate breach of the Pechenihy Dam, synchronized with the military success in Zaporizhzhia. This forces the immediate diversion of engineering and logistics resources, crippling UAF ability to react to the southern rout.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEFENSE & LOGISTICS INTERDICTION

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)