Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - OPERATIONAL CRISIS UPDATE

TIME: 101600Z DEC 25

OPERATIONAL SUMMARY: The current operational situation is defined by the critical crisis of the Dimitrov (Myrnohrad) pocket on the Pokrovsk axis and the persistent strain on UAF logistics and C2 resulting from confirmed RF intelligence exploitation. UAF forces are executing a high-risk but necessary controlled retrograde (Plan PHOENIX) on the Zaporizhzhia axis, leveraging high-tech counter-attack capabilities (NRK, FPVs) for localized successes. The information environment is dominated by competing peace proposals and strategic Russian framing of territorial expansion based on resource security (Dnipro water).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): The operational crisis around the Dimitrov Urban Built-up Area (UBA) is reaching culmination. Conflicting reports exist regarding the status of UAF forces; RF claims of large-scale capture/surrender are contested by UAF frontline IO sources. The focus remains on maintaining the integrity of the secondary defensive line west of Grishino to protect Pokrovsk. RF forces (MoD claim, 15:01:21) are actively pressuring UAF strongholds in the Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) direction.
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Stepnohorsk): The execution of Contingency Plan PHOENIX is highly contested. UAF forces are engaged in close-quarters combat (GUR footage confirms fighting in Stepnohorsk UBA, 15:06:47) while attempting to move to pre-designated assembly areas. Key terrain is the established secondary line necessary to prevent a rout and stabilize the southern flank.
• Kupyansk Axis (OSINT): OSINT suggests RF grouping in the western Kupyansk sector may be operationally encircled (14:59:26). If confirmed, this presents a localized UAF counter-opportunity that could draw RF operational reserves. (Confidence: LOW/MEDIUM)

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

• Weather conditions remain suitable for mechanized offensive operations.
• RF forces are utilizing KAB (Guided Glide Bombs) heavily against static positions in Donetsk and Kharkiv oblasts (Confirmed: 15:04:18, 15:16:44), placing strain on fixed defensive infrastructure.
• The Pechenihy Dam (Kharkiv Oblast) integrity remains the single largest unmitigated MDCOA trigger (Intelligence Gap: CRITICAL).

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Dispositions:

• Forces in Dimitrov are either isolated or conducting emergency breakout maneuvers. The operational status of the 132nd DShV cover force is critical.
• The 5th Separate Assault Kyiv Brigade (5th OShBr) is deploying advanced technology (Unmanned Combat Ground Vehicle - NRK) for effective night engagements, demonstrating localized technological superiority (15:27:42).
• Air Defense assets are engaged in countering persistent RF UAV and KAB threats across multiple oblasts (Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Donetsk).

RF Dispositions:

• RF forces are leveraging high-precision aviation assets (KABs) to soften targets ahead of ground assaults.
• The concentration of artillery munitions at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base continues to suggest a readiness for sustained high-intensity fire missions.
• RF is exhibiting a high sensitivity to UAF deep strikes, evidenced by the reported limitation of mobile internet in Smolensk Oblast to mitigate UAF UAV reconnaissance/targeting (14:46:24).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RF THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (STRATEGIC): RF intentions are expanding beyond the "Korean Model/DMZ" narrative to justify deeper territorial acquisition based on existential resource control. Pro-Russian messaging is linking permanent water security for Donbas to seizing territory up to the Dnipro River (14:44:53). This frames the current offensive depth in Pokrovsk and Zaporizhzhia as a necessary step toward strategic objectives. CAPABILITIES:

• Precision Fire Support: RF maintains the capability to execute high-volume, deep strikes utilizing KABs and long-range artillery, leveraging the 260th GRAU surge.
• Information Conditioning: RF demonstrates the ability to synchronize strategic IO (water claims, DMZ leaks) with tactical kinetics, creating a pervasive sense of inevitability and maximum political pressure.
• Adaptation: The mobile internet restriction in Smolensk indicates RF C2 is adapting internal security measures to counter UAF deep strike and reconnaissance capabilities.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has not altered its core objective (Dimitrov liquidation) but is using concentrated mechanized pressure supported by high-yield aviation assets (KABs) to achieve rapid tactical consolidation. The denial of tactical encirclement claims by UAF sources suggests RF is exaggerating or prematurely announcing localized successes to induce panic, a standard IO tactic.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The critical logistical surge at the 260th GRAU Base remains the central sustainment indicator. Failure to interdict this hub will guarantee an increase in RF fire superiority across the Eastern and Southern axes within the next 72 hours. The confirmed threat to the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka corridor forces UAF to commit increasingly valuable SHORAD resources to rear security. (Confidence: HIGH)

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, rapidly exploiting tactical gains (Pokrovsk axis) and integrating high-level propaganda messaging (Dnipro water framing). The reported operational vacuum in Western Kupyansk (if confirmed) may indicate localized RF C2 failure or strategic misprioritization, but overall operational synchronization remains high.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Frontline posture is characterized by robust, technologically augmented, but highly attrited defense. Units like the 5th OShBr and the 3rd Regiment's specialized drone units are providing vital counter-mobility and high-lethality attrition capability. However, the decision by the GSU to limit public access to military discipline (AWOL/desertion) statistics suggests that continuous high-intensity warfare is creating internal strain that requires proactive management. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SUCCESSES (FACT): Highly effective use of Unmanned Combat Ground Vehicle (NRK) by the 5th OShBr in nocturnal engagement (15:27:42). Successful, high-attrition drone operation in Novopavlivka (3rd Regiment, 15:41:33). Confirmation of close-quarters combat presence in Stepnohorsk, indicating Plan PHOENIX is still a controlled engagement (15:06:47).
• SETBACKS (FACT): Persistent RF aerial pressure via KABs on Eastern positions. Ongoing isolation threat at Dimitrov, forcing operational reserves (132nd DShV) into high-risk cover roles.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

• CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate anti-artillery and deep strike capacity to neutralize the 260th GRAU logistical buildup.
• CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The ongoing requirement to divert limited mobile SHORAD assets to protect critical, secondary logistics lines (Shyriaieve/Ivanivka) leaves frontline units and forward C2 more vulnerable to KABs and high-altitude drones.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is executing a multi-layered campaign:

1. Strategic Framing: Justifying deeper penetration by claiming water security for Donbas requires control up to the Dnipro River. This pre-empts negotiated settlement lines and elevates RF demands.
2. Tactical Disinformation: Premature or exaggerated claims of UAF captures/surrenders in Dimitrov/Myrnohrad to maximize psychological shock and pressure UAF leadership into poor tactical decisions.
3. Internal Noise Generation: Amplification of politically charged domestic issues (Kolomoisky/Mindich claims) to distract and portray internal Ukrainian instability.

UAF StratCom is attempting to counter the strategic negativity with high-level coordination statements (Finland/G7) and, most notably, President Zelensky’s unspecific promise of "news about the end of the war" this week (15:33:24). This counter-narrative is high-risk, as non-delivery will severely damage morale.

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Frontline morale is sustained by visible success (drone footage, NRK videos). The primary threat is the cumulative effect of strategic narratives (DMZ, Dnipro demand) eroding confidence in the ultimate victory or long-term Western support. Internal discipline concerns (GSU action) suggest that attrition is impacting personnel readiness, requiring proactive IO focused on unit cohesion and national duty (225 OShP example).

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Diplomatic activity is accelerating. Zelensky is actively coordinating (Finland/G7), attempting to stabilize the diplomatic front assaulted by RF leaks. Reports of European leaders meeting in Berlin to discuss a peace plan indicate a rapid internationalization of the negotiation framework, which must be immediately countered by asserting the UAF 20-point plan as the sole foundation for discussions.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF liquidates the Dimitrov pocket, rapidly shifts focus to Pokrovsk flanking maneuvers, and intensifies IO justifying future territorial demands. (Confidence: HIGH)

1. Dimitrov Finalization (NLT 111800Z DEC 25): RF forces will complete the operational isolation of Dimitrov (Myrnohrad), regardless of the current status of the pocketed UAF element, to clear the immediate southern flank. This will be paired with high-volume propaganda celebrating the victory.
2. Fire Saturation Peak (Next 72 Hours): Munitions mobilized from the 260th GRAU base will reach the front lines, enabling a sustained, high-density artillery campaign focused on degrading the UAF secondary defense lines in Zaporizhzhia and Pokrovsk simultaneously.
3. Dnipro Expansion Narrative: RF state media will pivot official discourse to prioritize the "water security/Dnipro access" argument, conditioning global audiences to accept that any future settlement must include significant territorial concessions beyond current lines.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF exploits UAF command vulnerability during the PHOENIX retrograde and/or forces a strategic diversion via environmental weaponization. (Confidence: MEDIUM/HIGH)

1. PHOENIX Catastrophic Failure: RF 37th GMRB, leveraging high-density fires enabled by the 260th GRAU surge and successful EW jamming, converts the UAF controlled retrograde in Stepnohorsk into a rout. This opens the entire Zaporizhzhia front flank and exposes the critical rail hub of Synelnykivskyi to operational threat.
2. Pechenihy Dam Attack: RF engineers or long-range fires execute a deliberate breach of the Pechenihy Dam structure. The resulting flood forces the strategic commitment of UAF reserves (including air defense and engineering assets) to disaster relief in Kharkiv, creating critical operational vulnerabilities on the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia fronts.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: LOGISTICS INTERDICTION & DEFENSIVE CONSOLIDATION

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INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)