Archived operational intelligence briefing
TIME: 102200Z DEC 25
The operational picture is characterized by two simultaneous crises of maneuver: the imminent encirclement on the Donetsk Axis and the controlled retrograde on the Zaporizhzhia Axis.
Weather conditions remain conducive to mechanized movement. The critical, unmitigated threat remains the Pechenihy Dam (Kharkiv Oblast). The failure to obtain structural integrity data (Intelligence Gap HIGH) means the threat of hydro-weaponization remains an immediate, potentially devastating MDCOA that could force a strategic commitment of UAF reserves.
UAF Dispositions:
RF Dispositions:
INTENTION (Confirmed): RF seeks immediate operational consolidation on the Pokrovsk Axis and strategic psychological victory through the forceful dissemination of the "Korean Model/DMZ" narrative. CAPABILITIES:
RF has executed a critical shift from pure frontal attrition to combined arms maneuver penetration in the Pokrovsk sector (Grishino/Svetloe seizure). The RF targeting of the secondary logistics corridor (Shyriaieve/Ivanivka) represents an effective adaptation to UAF decentralization efforts. RF is relying heavily on UAV swarms for interdiction, leveraging low-cost assets to tie up UAF mobile SHORAD.
RF sustainment is surging, evidenced by the 260th GRAU activity spike. This surge is designed to enable a short-term, high-intensity push, likely sustaining the 37th and 38th GMRBs on the Stepnohorsk axis and providing cover for the Dimitrov pocket liquidation. RF is currently exhibiting high logistical confidence.
RF C2 remains synchronized and adaptive, demonstrating rapid exploitation of tactical successes (Donetsk penetration) and strategic intelligence (CI breach). Internal RF C2 morale issues (criticism of "stupid frontal attacks" noted in previous reports) are being overridden by large-scale mechanized momentum and deep fires coordination. (Confidence: MEDIUM/HIGH)
Force posture is defensively reactive and highly stressed. Readiness of frontline mechanized units is strained by continuous high-tempo defensive operations and the execution of complex maneuvers (PHOENIX retrograde). Specialized units (e.g., 225 OShP) maintain high lethality and readiness, compensating for armor disadvantages through drone warfare.
RF State Media is executing a strategic IO campaign centered on the "Korean Model/DMZ." The leaked "Washington Post Peace Plan" is a decisive tactical maneuver intended to:
UAF counter-IO, heavily driven by frontline units like the 225 OShP, focuses on: mocking RF tactical ineptitude ("бессмысленными, тупорылыми атаками в лоб"), celebrating drone lethality, and linking the army's fight to national unity ("воює вся Україна").
Frontline morale appears sustained by visible tactical success (drone kill counts) and strong unit cohesion. The immediate threat is that the strategic IO push (DMZ leak) could erode trust in the National Command Authority (NCA) and international backing, particularly if not immediately and forcefully countered.
The international environment is under immediate assault by the RF diplomatic leak. The UAF NCA must rapidly finalize and present the 20-point peace plan as the only acceptable framework to stabilize the diplomatic ground and preserve the potential for critical materiel transfers (e.g., Polish MiG-29s).
RF liquidates the Dimitrov pocket and interdicts UAF logistics surge points, forcing fragmentation of the operational reserve. (Confidence: HIGH)
RF achieves operational collapse via synergistic attack across critical, unmitigated threats. (Confidence: MEDIUM)
| Event | Estimated Timeline | Decision Point |
|---|---|---|
| Dimitrov Pocket Closure/Exfiltration Failure | NLT 111200Z DEC 25 | Decision to commit secondary reserve to suppress RF fires for extraction, accepting risk on Siversk. |
| RF Artillery Saturation Peak (Post-GRAU Resupply) | NLT 120000Z DEC 25 | Decision to conduct preemptive deep strike on logistics assets approaching the front. |
| UAF NCA Rejection of "Korean Model" | NLT 110600Z DEC 25 | Decision to execute pre-written StratCom plan to dominate global messaging with the 20-point plan. |
| Pechenihy Dam Structural Failure (MDCOA Trigger) | Unpredictable (Imminent Threat) | Decision to activate J3 disaster response command and divert specialized engineering battalions. |
COMMAND PRIORITY: CRISIS MANAGEMENT & LOGISTICS INTERDICTION
| Category | Action | Priority | Execution Order |
|---|---|---|---|
| OPERATIONAL MANEUVER (J3) | IMMEDIATE DIMITROV EXFILTRATION. Command must confirm that emergency breakout protocols are underway. 132nd DShV is authorized to expend maximum available munitions to suppress RF artillery and cover the withdrawal to the secondary line (west of Grishino). | CRITICAL | 1 |
| TARGETING (J2/J3) | INTERDICT 260TH GRAU SURGE. Task maximum available deep strike assets (ATACMS, long-range drones, etc.) against the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (SAR Score 24.96). High-value target prioritization: incoming rail cars and storage facilities known to hold high-caliber artillery munitions. | CRITICAL | 2 |
| LOGISTICS & AD (J4/J3) | SECURE SHYRIAIEVE CORRIDOR. Immediately deploy 4x Mobile SHORAD platoons (minimum) to the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka logistics corridor (Odesa Oblast) to mitigate the confirmed RF UAV swarm interdiction threat. This corridor is now CRITICAL. | URGENT | 3 |
| STRATCOM (P7) | FORCEFUL DENIAL OF DMZ NARRATIVE. The National Command Authority must issue an immediate, public, and unequivocal rejection of the "Washington Post Peace Plan" leak, asserting the 20-point plan as the sole diplomatic platform. This must precede the expected RF saturation effort. | URGENT | 4 |
| ENGINEERING (J3/Eng) | RECON PECHENIHY DAM. Re-task UAS/specialized reconnaissance units (including potential civilian contractor assets) to obtain high-resolution IMINT/SAR BDA on the Pechenihy Dam structure. Obtain Time-to-Failure estimate NLT 24 hours. | URGENT | 5 |
| CR Priority | Intelligence Gap | Target/Area | Collection Task |
|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Status of UAF GLOCs into Dimitrov (physically severed vs. under fire control). | Dimitrov UBA, Donetsk Axis | Urgent Persistent Aerial Reconnaissance (PAR) and SIGINT to verify physical encirclement. |
| HIGH | Structural BDA and integrity assessment of the Pechenihy Dam. | Pechenihy Dam, Kharkiv Oblast | Priority IMINT/SAR tasking for engineering assessment (J2/J3). |
| HIGH | Verification of effectiveness of "RED PLAN" protocols following deep strikes on relocated C2 nodes (Odesa/Dnipropetrovsk). | Claimed Strike Locations (Odesa/Dnipropetrovsk) | HUMINT/OSINT/IMINT BDA required to confirm successful C2 survival/degradation. |
| MEDIUM | Detailed assessment of RF 37th GMRB's current maneuver element speed and EW capacity in the Stepnohorsk axis. | Stepnohorsk Axis, Zaporizhzhia | Increased HUMINT probing and SIGINT collection against GMRB C2. |
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