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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-10 15:13:01Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-10 15:00:24Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - OPERATIONAL CRISIS UPDATE

TIME: 102200Z DEC 25

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is characterized by two simultaneous crises of maneuver: the imminent encirclement on the Donetsk Axis and the controlled retrograde on the Zaporizhzhia Axis.

  • Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): The rapid RF seizure of Svetloe and Grishino has created a critical salient. Key terrain now centers on securing the exfiltration corridors for UAF forces currently isolated in the Dimitrov Urban Built-up Area (UBA). Loss of Dimitrov will directly expose Pokrovsk to flanking attacks.
  • Zaporizhzhia Axis (Stepnohorsk): UAF forces are executing Contingency Plan PHOENIX (controlled retrograde) to prevent the encirclement threat posed by the RF 37th GMRB. The primary terrain of consequence is the secondary defensive line west of Stepnohorsk, necessary to preserve combat power.
  • Deep Rear: RF targeting has shifted focus from primary hubs to the secondary logistics backbone, specifically the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka rail corridor northwest of Odesa, indicating a refined understanding of UAF logistical redundancy, likely due to the ongoing CI breach exploitation.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather conditions remain conducive to mechanized movement. The critical, unmitigated threat remains the Pechenihy Dam (Kharkiv Oblast). The failure to obtain structural integrity data (Intelligence Gap HIGH) means the threat of hydro-weaponization remains an immediate, potentially devastating MDCOA that could force a strategic commitment of UAF reserves.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Dispositions:

  • Forces in Dimitrov (estimated one battalion-sized element) are under threat of total isolation. The 132nd DShV is conducting covering attacks.
  • Forces in the Stepnohorsk area are executing a controlled withdrawal (PHOENIX) to assembly areas, mitigating the 37th GMRB advance.
  • Logistics nodes are in transition, attempting to implement the "RED PLAN" protocols, though effectiveness is highly questionable given recent confirmed strikes and new UAV swarm threats on the Shyriaieve corridor.

RF Dispositions:

  • RF mechanized elements are prioritizing penetration speed in the Pokrovsk Axis.
  • RF deep fire and UAV assets are executing synchronized kinetic strikes against relocated UAF C2/Logistics nodes (Odesa/Dnipropetrovsk).
  • SAR data confirms a critical logistical surge at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (Score 24.96), indicating RF is massing artillery munitions to sustain or intensify the Eastern/Southern offensives.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RF THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (Confirmed): RF seeks immediate operational consolidation on the Pokrovsk Axis and strategic psychological victory through the forceful dissemination of the "Korean Model/DMZ" narrative. CAPABILITIES:

  • Targeting Precision (FACT): RF demonstrates the ability to exploit intelligence gaps (Kuzmuk CI breach) to target relocated UAF C2 nodes, indicating the "RED PLAN" relocation sequence may have been compromised or executed too slowly. (Confidence: HIGH)
  • Logistical Massing (FACT): The critical SAR score (24.96) at the 260th GRAU base confirms RF capability to rapidly surge heavy fire support, enabling sustained high-tempo offensives in Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk. (Confidence: HIGH)
  • Information Warfare (JUDGMENT): RF capabilities successfully synchronized diplomatic leaks ("Washington Post Peace Plan") with kinetic action, achieving immediate strategic distraction and maximizing domestic pressure on UAF leadership.

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has executed a critical shift from pure frontal attrition to combined arms maneuver penetration in the Pokrovsk sector (Grishino/Svetloe seizure). The RF targeting of the secondary logistics corridor (Shyriaieve/Ivanivka) represents an effective adaptation to UAF decentralization efforts. RF is relying heavily on UAV swarms for interdiction, leveraging low-cost assets to tie up UAF mobile SHORAD.

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment is surging, evidenced by the 260th GRAU activity spike. This surge is designed to enable a short-term, high-intensity push, likely sustaining the 37th and 38th GMRBs on the Stepnohorsk axis and providing cover for the Dimitrov pocket liquidation. RF is currently exhibiting high logistical confidence.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains synchronized and adaptive, demonstrating rapid exploitation of tactical successes (Donetsk penetration) and strategic intelligence (CI breach). Internal RF C2 morale issues (criticism of "stupid frontal attacks" noted in previous reports) are being overridden by large-scale mechanized momentum and deep fires coordination. (Confidence: MEDIUM/HIGH)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Force posture is defensively reactive and highly stressed. Readiness of frontline mechanized units is strained by continuous high-tempo defensive operations and the execution of complex maneuvers (PHOENIX retrograde). Specialized units (e.g., 225 OShP) maintain high lethality and readiness, compensating for armor disadvantages through drone warfare.

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • SETBACKS (FACT): Imminent operational isolation of forces in Dimitrov. Confirmed loss of Svetloe/Grishino. Confirmed RF exploitation of the Kuzmuk CI breach targeting C2/Logistics (Odesa/Dnipropetrovsk strikes).
  • SUCCESSES (FACT): Activation of Contingency Plan PHOENIX demonstrates UAF capacity for controlled withdrawal to preserve combat power, provided the retrograde is not successfully interdicted by RF EW/fires. Successful morale maintenance via IO emphasizing military efficacy and national support (225 OShP videos, Volunteer Day messaging).

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

  • CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate allocation of specialized Counter-UAS/SHORAD systems to the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka corridor to protect the secondary logistics lifeline.
  • CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The ongoing reliance on external funding mechanisms (civilian donors) for crucial high-tech assets (drones, specialized antennas) for units like the 225 OShP remains an institutional weakness in sustaining critical attrition capability.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF State Media is executing a strategic IO campaign centered on the "Korean Model/DMZ." The leaked "Washington Post Peace Plan" is a decisive tactical maneuver intended to:

  1. Force UAF into premature diplomatic concessions.
  2. Fracture Western consensus (specifically influencing Polish MiG-29 transfer decisions).
  3. Demoralize UAF frontline troops by suggesting impending strategic stalemate and Western abandonment.

UAF counter-IO, heavily driven by frontline units like the 225 OShP, focuses on: mocking RF tactical ineptitude ("бессмысленными, тупорылыми атаками в лоб"), celebrating drone lethality, and linking the army's fight to national unity ("воює вся Україна").

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Frontline morale appears sustained by visible tactical success (drone kill counts) and strong unit cohesion. The immediate threat is that the strategic IO push (DMZ leak) could erode trust in the National Command Authority (NCA) and international backing, particularly if not immediately and forcefully countered.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The international environment is under immediate assault by the RF diplomatic leak. The UAF NCA must rapidly finalize and present the 20-point peace plan as the only acceptable framework to stabilize the diplomatic ground and preserve the potential for critical materiel transfers (e.g., Polish MiG-29s).


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF liquidates the Dimitrov pocket and interdicts UAF logistics surge points, forcing fragmentation of the operational reserve. (Confidence: HIGH)

  1. Dimitrov Elimination (NLT 111200Z DEC 25): RF forces will commit maximum fire support (leveraging recent logistical surge) to physically sever the remaining GLOCs into Dimitrov and compel the surrender or chaotic withdrawal of the pocketed UAF forces, securing the immediate southern flank for the Pokrovsk advance.
  2. Logistics Interdiction (Next 48 Hours): RF UAV swarms will intensify attacks on the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka rail corridor, forcing UAF J4 to commit significant mobile air defense assets away from frontline protection.
  3. DMZ Narrative Saturation: RF will leverage official channels (state media, diplomatic proxies) to push the "Korean Model" narrative aggressively globally, aiming to force the UAF 20-point plan off the front pages ahead of key Western political events.

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves operational collapse via synergistic attack across critical, unmitigated threats. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

  1. PHOENIX Failure & Rout: The RF 37th GMRB successfully exploits high-density artillery saturation (from 260th GRAU resupply) and Electronic Warfare (EW) to disrupt UAF C2 during Contingency Plan PHOENIX, converting the controlled retrograde into a rout and seizing key terrain west of Stepnohorsk, jeopardizing the entire Zaporizhzhia front flank.
  2. Pechenihy Catastrophe: Catastrophic failure of the Pechenihy Dam, requiring immediate diversion of UAF combat and engineering reserves to disaster relief in the Kharkiv sector, creating an operational vacuum that allows RF forces to achieve decisive penetration elsewhere (e.g., Slovyansk/Drobysheve axis).

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated TimelineDecision Point
Dimitrov Pocket Closure/Exfiltration FailureNLT 111200Z DEC 25Decision to commit secondary reserve to suppress RF fires for extraction, accepting risk on Siversk.
RF Artillery Saturation Peak (Post-GRAU Resupply)NLT 120000Z DEC 25Decision to conduct preemptive deep strike on logistics assets approaching the front.
UAF NCA Rejection of "Korean Model"NLT 110600Z DEC 25Decision to execute pre-written StratCom plan to dominate global messaging with the 20-point plan.
Pechenihy Dam Structural Failure (MDCOA Trigger)Unpredictable (Imminent Threat)Decision to activate J3 disaster response command and divert specialized engineering battalions.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

COMMAND PRIORITY: CRISIS MANAGEMENT & LOGISTICS INTERDICTION

CategoryActionPriorityExecution Order
OPERATIONAL MANEUVER (J3)IMMEDIATE DIMITROV EXFILTRATION. Command must confirm that emergency breakout protocols are underway. 132nd DShV is authorized to expend maximum available munitions to suppress RF artillery and cover the withdrawal to the secondary line (west of Grishino).CRITICAL1
TARGETING (J2/J3)INTERDICT 260TH GRAU SURGE. Task maximum available deep strike assets (ATACMS, long-range drones, etc.) against the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base (SAR Score 24.96). High-value target prioritization: incoming rail cars and storage facilities known to hold high-caliber artillery munitions.CRITICAL2
LOGISTICS & AD (J4/J3)SECURE SHYRIAIEVE CORRIDOR. Immediately deploy 4x Mobile SHORAD platoons (minimum) to the Shyriaieve/Ivanivka logistics corridor (Odesa Oblast) to mitigate the confirmed RF UAV swarm interdiction threat. This corridor is now CRITICAL.URGENT3
STRATCOM (P7)FORCEFUL DENIAL OF DMZ NARRATIVE. The National Command Authority must issue an immediate, public, and unequivocal rejection of the "Washington Post Peace Plan" leak, asserting the 20-point plan as the sole diplomatic platform. This must precede the expected RF saturation effort.URGENT4
ENGINEERING (J3/Eng)RECON PECHENIHY DAM. Re-task UAS/specialized reconnaissance units (including potential civilian contractor assets) to obtain high-resolution IMINT/SAR BDA on the Pechenihy Dam structure. Obtain Time-to-Failure estimate NLT 24 hours.URGENT5

INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)

CR PriorityIntelligence GapTarget/AreaCollection Task
CRITICALStatus of UAF GLOCs into Dimitrov (physically severed vs. under fire control).Dimitrov UBA, Donetsk AxisUrgent Persistent Aerial Reconnaissance (PAR) and SIGINT to verify physical encirclement.
HIGHStructural BDA and integrity assessment of the Pechenihy Dam.Pechenihy Dam, Kharkiv OblastPriority IMINT/SAR tasking for engineering assessment (J2/J3).
HIGHVerification of effectiveness of "RED PLAN" protocols following deep strikes on relocated C2 nodes (Odesa/Dnipropetrovsk).Claimed Strike Locations (Odesa/Dnipropetrovsk)HUMINT/OSINT/IMINT BDA required to confirm successful C2 survival/degradation.
MEDIUMDetailed assessment of RF 37th GMRB's current maneuver element speed and EW capacity in the Stepnohorsk axis.Stepnohorsk Axis, ZaporizhzhiaIncreased HUMINT probing and SIGINT collection against GMRB C2.
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