Situation Report

OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (OSSITREP)

TIME: 101100Z DEC 2025 AOR: Pokrovsk Operational Axis (Donetsk Oblast) & Strategic Information Environment (SIE) ANALYST JUDGMENT: The tactical situation in the Pokrovsk axis has deteriorated further, reaching the point of operational isolation for forward UAF elements in Myrnohrad/Dimitrov. This kinetic pressure is synchronized with an aggressive Russian Federation (RF) information campaign aimed at exploiting both strategic diplomatic leaks (WP Peace Plan) and recent severe Ukrainian Operational Security (OPSEC) failures (WSJ drone article). The immediate objective is stabilization and controlled withdrawal from the Myrnohrad salient, while simultaneously launching a robust counter-disinformation effort.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF operational exploitation is rapidly transitioning the Myrnohrad (formerly Dimitrov/Krasnoarmiyske) sector from contested ground to a functional operational cordon.

• Pokrovsk Axis (CRITICAL): UAF sources confirm that all access roads leading directly into Myrnohrad are now in the 'Grey Zone' (10:22Z), indicating RF physical control or sustained fire control over primary supply routes (PSRs). RF claims report fighting in the center of Dyhmytrv/Dimitrov (10:30Z, 10:20Z), validating the encirclement assessment from the previous report.
  • Assessment: The logistical position of remaining UAF forces in the Myrnohrad/Dimitrov salient is untenable. Isolation is functional, and a catastrophic loss of personnel and equipment is imminent unless immediate, successful exfiltration occurred prior to 101100Z DEC 25. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Deep Fire Zones: Confirmed RF Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) usage against Zaporizhzhia (10:19Z) and Sumy Oblasts (10:27Z). This sustains pressure on UAF rear logistics and reserves.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Persistent low visibility favors RF close-air support and mechanized penetration. The previous assessment regarding the Pechenihy Dam hydro-weaponization remains a strategic constraint on reserve deployment in Kharkiv.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: High combat tempo focused on reducing pockets of resistance within the Myrnohrad salient and securing road junctions immediately west of the contested settlements. RF forces are utilizing dedicated reconnaissance and strike elements (e.g., Rubicon unit) to maintain momentum.
• UAF (Blue Force): UAF forces are engaged in critical withdrawal or breakout maneuvers. Air Defense elements maintain awareness, confirmed by Air Force alerts, though KAB strikes demonstrate RF capability to bypass tactical AD coverage. The operational focus has shifted from holding the line to stabilizing the front behind Myrnohrad/Dimitrov.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF is effectively coordinating kinetic assaults with immediate, targeted information release. The use of specific unit branding (e.g., Rubicon MoD unit video) serves dual purposes: unit morale boost and external projection of controlled operational success.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

No evidence of RF logistics failure. The sustained KAB tempo requires reliable airbase and munition supply chains. RF domestic messaging prioritizes internal stability and social policy (TASS, State Duma actions), projecting stability despite the ongoing conflict.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 remains effective, particularly in synchronizing media coverage (TASS, pro-war channels) with tactical developments. RF counter-intelligence (Kaliningrad GUR arrests) demonstrates continued capacity for disruption deep within RF territory.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is critically stressed in the Donetsk Oblast. The fragmentation and isolation of forces in the Myrnohrad/Dimitrov salient represent a significant operational loss. Readiness requires rapid re-deployment and establishment of a credible defensive line west/southwest of Pokrovsk city.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setbacks (CRITICAL):
  1. Functional Isolation of Myrnohrad Salient: Roads confirmed in Grey Zone, indicating likely imminent loss of forward fighting units.
  2. Major OPSEC Breach: Detailed logistical and personnel aspects of the crucial "Pautyna" (Web) drone operation were published via the WSJ (10:04Z, 10:38Z). This exposes methodologies, agents, and logistics to RF targeting.
  3. Governance/Integrity Erosion: High-profile integrity issues (Mindich case, Ivano-Frankivsk reconstruction resignation) undermine the NACP counter-corruption messaging at a moment when domestic confidence is vital.
• Successes: Poland confirms readiness to move forward with the transfer of retired MiG-29 fighters (10:19Z). This, if executed rapidly, provides a crucial counter-narrative and tactical capability boost.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most urgent constraint is the gap between the defensive line being broken near Myrnohrad and the next established line. This requires immediate commitment of pre-positioned tactical reserves. The OPSEC breach demands an immediate review of all long-range drone/SOF logistical chains.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The SIE is characterized by two converging, highly damaging narratives:

1. RF Peace Negotiation Control: RF channels (Podubnyy, WarGonzo) frame the supposed EU/US peace plan as a means to "exclude Russia" but simultaneously argue Kyiv is "yielding" (10:04Z, 10:13Z). This is designed to reduce the perceived value of Western support and make the resulting peace deal appear inevitable and predetermined by external forces.
2. UAF Incompetence Narrative: RF amplification of the WSJ drone article focuses specifically on the most embarrassing details (drunk drivers, compromised cover story). The goal is to delegitimize UAF intelligence and special operations to the international audience and demoralize domestic forces.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal sentiment is under extreme pressure from battlefield losses (Myrnohrad) overlaid with strategic uncertainty (WP leak) and domestic political infighting/corruption reports. The Russian media projection of normalcy (school schedules, tax breaks, celebrities) contrasts sharply with the kinetic reality, aiming to create a cognitive dissonance that favors RF stability narratives.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Polish MiG-29 development is positive, confirming continued, albeit cautious, military support. However, the Vatican official's alleged criticism of Trump (10:02Z) signals continued strategic instability in Western political alliances, reinforcing the high political risk surrounding the WP peace plan leak.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF forces will consolidate the Myrnohrad operational area and transition to phase two of the Pokrovsk encirclement, supported by escalating political warfare utilizing the recent OPSEC breach.

1. Pokrovsk Encirclement Advancement: RF forces will utilize the established foothold to push mechanized units along the T0504 and O0515 highways, seeking to place Pokrovsk city under effective siege/interdiction NLT 111800Z DEC 25. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Strategic Targeting of Deep Assets: Based on the detailed OPSEC breach (WSJ article), RF GRU/SVR will prioritize targeting known or newly identified UAV manufacturing/assembly sites and SOF C2 nodes involved in long-range strike operations within the next 72 hours. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. Diplomatic Leverage (Peace Push): RF will use the Myrnohrad success as proof of "inevitable victory" and escalate internal and international calls for immediate, unconditional negotiations based on the "Korean Model" separation line. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF exploits the defensive line failure near Pokrovsk with sufficient speed to bypass prepared secondary defenses, causing a widespread operational collapse across the entire western Donetsk front, coupled with targeted assassination/decapitation strikes enabled by compromised OPSEC.

1. Decapitation Strike on Critical Personnel/Assets: Leveraging the OPSEC breach data (which identified agents and methodologies), RF executes successful long-range kinetic strikes against specific UAF intelligence or drone program personnel/infrastructure, resulting in the paralysis of deep strike capability for weeks. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
2. Breakthrough to Western Donetsk: RF armored elements achieve a high-velocity breakthrough past the secondary defensive line west of Pokrovsk, threatening the key logistics hubs of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk NLT 130000Z DEC 25. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS