Situation Report

OPERATIONAL SITUATION REPORT (OSITREP)

TIME: 100945Z DEC 2025 AOR: Eastern and Southern Ukraine Frontlines (Pokrovsk/Huliaipole Axes) PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis at the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk) has accelerated beyond prior predictive timelines.

• Myrnohrad Sector (CRITICAL): Open-source imagery (OSINT, 09:41Z) suggests the presence of captured UAF personnel allegedly within Myrnohrad, confirming either a deep RF penetration or the isolation of UAF defenders earlier than anticipated. Myrnohrad is a critical rail and logistics node northwest of Pokrovsk center.
• Deep Battle: Confirmed air raid alerts in RF territory (Bryansk and Lipetsk Oblasts, 09:12Z, 09:39Z) indicate UAF deep strike operations remain active, although RF Air Defense (AD) successfully neutralized at least two UAVs over Bryansk (09:32Z).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Difficult winter conditions (low visibility, snow, fog) persist (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, based on previous reporting and image analysis of destroyed materiel 09:19Z). These conditions continue to benefit RF mechanized assaults by degrading UAF drone effectiveness and masking movement. The risk of flooding in the Kharkiv sector due to the Pechenihy Dam strike (07 DEC) remains a logistical constraint.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF forces are committed to rapid exploitation of the Myrnohrad breach, likely aiming to secure the rail junction. RF Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirms ongoing kinetic strikes against Ukrainian military industry and fuel/energy facilities (09:13Z).
• UAF (Blue Force): Forces are engaged in high-risk Counter-Infiltration Operations (CIO) and are potentially isolated or forced into highly stressed defensive positions within the Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk UBA. Urgent decision required regarding reinforcement or controlled withdrawal from Myrnohrad perimeter.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The acceleration of the Pokrovsk Axis collapse, specifically the confirmed fighting or isolation risk in Myrnohrad, suggests RF successfully utilized the weather/low visibility conditions to achieve a high-velocity maneuver breakthrough, moving faster than UAF reserve deployment (e.g., BRAVO-BLOCK fragmentation, 07 DEC).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF publicly emphasizes its continued industrial output (Su-34 bomber transfer 09:27Z) to project military resilience against sanctions and attrition. This PR effort is likely targeted internally and to dissuade Western support efforts. Manpower mobilization control remains a high priority for RF domestic governance.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF political and military C2 remains tightly synchronized. Strategic information operations (Peskov’s truce rejection) immediately leverage kinetic success claims (MoD strike reports) to maximize strategic effect.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is critical in the Pokrovsk Axis due to the Myrnohrad situation. Unit readiness is severely stressed by continuous mechanized pressure and the high-risk urban fighting environment. The continuous exposure of corruption scandals (MoD ship sales, 09:30Z) severely impacts long-term institutional trust and internal readiness, requiring immediate, aggressive counter-measures.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setbacks (CRITICAL): Potential tactical collapse or isolation of units in Myrnohrad (09:41Z imagery). Unconfirmed but claimed RF strikes on Ukrainian military industry/fuel complex. Ongoing severe internal security issues (corruption scandals).
• Successes: UAF successfully executed deep strikes into Lipetsk and Bryansk Oblasts (confirmed by local RF alerts and AD reports). SBU successfully targeted and detained a Russian "shadow fleet" vessel in Odesa (09:27Z), indicating strong maritime counter-hybrid capabilities.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate focus shifts to two domains:

1. Air and Missile Capacity: The conditional offer from Poland to transfer MiG-29s in exchange for missile and drone technology (09:33Z) must be treated as a High-Value Resource Opportunity (HVRO). This transaction offers an immediate kinetic boost (aircraft) and a critical long-term technological gain.
2. Internal Security/Integrity: Anti-corruption resources (DBR/SBU) must be fully supported to address the crisis surrounding the sale of decommissioned naval assets, as internal corruption is strategically enabling RF information operations.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF strategy centers on the finality of their war aims:

1. Rejection of Soft Peace: Peskov explicitly rejects "energy truce," confirming Moscow demands "peace" on its own terms (09:20Z). This is a strategic communication effort to demoralize the Ukrainian populace ahead of winter.
2. Hybrid Security Focus: RF internal media promotes anti-fraud alerts and new laws on military registration, demonstrating state control over internal security and manpower despite the conflict.
3. Destabilization by Corruption: RF leverages confirmed UAF corruption issues (ship sales, high-profile escape) to amplify narratives of state failure, waste of Western aid, and military incompetence.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is under kinetic stress from the Myrnohrad development and psychological pressure from CNI strikes. High-profile corruption scandals serve as a severe internal morale degradation factor. The UAF General Staff (09:22Z) correctly identified the need for enhanced psychological support, but this must be paired with demonstrable action against corruption.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Polish Technology Exchange: Poland's offer to exchange MiG-29s for UAF missile/drone technology represents a significant potential commitment shift, prioritizing reciprocal technological advancement alongside immediate military aid. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, based on Polish General Staff communiqué)
• RF Hardline Stance: Moscow’s repeated and explicit rejection of any limited truce confirms that current diplomatic channels are non-viable for de-escalation; the only path forward is military defense or strategic collapse.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will utilize current tactical momentum (Myrnohrad isolation/penetration) to rapidly achieve an operational break in the Donbas front, while leveraging the internal security environment to erode Kyiv's negotiating position.

1. Myrnohrad Encirclement: RF forces will consolidate control of Myrnohrad and its logistics infrastructure, attempting to isolate the UAF defensive cluster in Pokrovsk. This will force a chaotic UAF withdrawal or mass commitment of strategic reserves NLT 110600Z DEC 25.
2. Increased Deep Strike Tempo: RF will intensify coordinated kinetic strikes against verified military production facilities (MI) and command posts, capitalizing on the intelligence derived from the Kuzmuk CI leak (07 DEC report) and the confirmed weakness in CNI protection.
3. Information Surge: IO campaigns will saturate the environment with images of captured UAF personnel and proof of corruption (e.g., naval asset sales) to reduce Western appetite for further aid ahead of the next major EU/NATO funding announcement.

(CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves simultaneous operational envelopment in Donbas and a critical decapitation strike against UAF command architecture facilitated by CI failure.

1. Operational Collapse in Donbas: RF successfully isolates Pokrovsk, forcing a rapid, disorganized UAF retreat across the entire sector. This mass movement becomes vulnerable to RF air and deep-fire assets, resulting in catastrophic loss of equipment and personnel.
2. CI-Enabled Decapitation (REFINED): RF successfully targets and destroys a critical UAF strategic reserve assembly area or relocated CP (necessitated by the Kuzmuk leak and CNI hardening efforts) using high-precision strike assets (Jet-Shahed/Iskander). This MDCOA is compounded by the high-profile nature of recent corruption scandals, which could mask or facilitate high-level treason/espionage.

(CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - High RF commitment and confirmed internal security flaws significantly raise the probability.)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS