Situation Report

OPERATIONAL SITUATION REPORT (OSITREP)

TIME: 101200Z DEC 2025 AOR: Eastern and Southern Ukraine Frontlines (Pokrovsk/Huliaipole Axes) PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity has shifted decisively to the Pokrovsk Axis (Donetsk), where Russian Federation (RF) forces have initiated heavy mechanized assaults, exploiting difficult weather conditions to breach defenses near Myrnohrad/Dymytrov.

• Pokrovsk Axis: High-intensity urban and near-urban combat is ongoing. The goal of the RF mechanized push is likely the isolation and capture of the Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk cluster, a critical regional logistics node.
• Huliaipole Axis (Zaporizhzhia): The operational tempo remains high, characterized by continuous RF ground pressure (confirmed clashes near Zatyshshya and Huliaipole). RF likely intends to fix UAF reserves here while concentrating effort on Pokrovsk.
• Deep Battle: RF continues its strategic campaign of critical national infrastructure (CNI) degradation, with confirmed strikes causing electricity and water outages in Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Kharkiv Oblasts.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Difficult winter conditions persist (low visibility, snow, fog, mud). Crucially, these conditions are being actively leveraged by RF mechanized forces (Pokrovsk direction) to mask movement and circumvent UAF drone surveillance density, which favors localized shock action over sustained attrition.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF: RF is utilizing concentrated mechanized units supported by heavy artillery (Giatsint-B confirmation from previous reporting) and leveraging poor visibility in the Pokrovsk UBA. RF maintains high coordination between kinetic (CNI strikes) and informational domains (diplomatic rejection of truces).
• UAF (Blue Force): Forces are engaged in high-risk, close-quarters defense within the Pokrovsk perimeter. UAF priority remains holding the main defensive lines while deploying localized counter-mechanized assets (UGV/FPV noted in previous report) to slow RF maneuver.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has adapted its offensive timing, utilizing adverse weather conditions (low visibility/fog) to initiate large-scale mechanized assaults (Pokrovsk), mitigating the tactical advantage UAF has gained through widespread FPV and UGV deployment (seen in clearer conditions on the Stepnohorsk axis).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF reliance on private fundraising for tactical units (Confirmed VDV appeals) indicates persistent, localized sustainment friction, particularly for high-value units. Despite this, strategic logistics supporting CNI strikes and front-line artillery tempo remain uncompromised. Reports of the IL-76 crash in Sudan (previous report) continue to signal sanctions impact on high-level aviation logistics (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly synchronized between political messaging (Peskov/Lavrov rejecting truces, attacking the dollar) and kinetic action (immediate CNI strikes and mechanized offensives), confirming a top-down focus on achieving strategic objectives through simultaneous multi-domain pressure.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Tactical readiness is stressed by the RF commitment of mechanized assets in Pokrovsk. UAF units are currently engaged in critical urban Counter-Infiltration Operations (CIO), which necessitates rapid commitment of local reserves and high expenditure of anti-tank munitions.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setbacks: Confirmed loss of essential services (water/power) in Sumy and partial loss in Mykolaiv/Kharkiv, confirming the operational impact of RF deep strikes. The RF mechanized push in Pokrovsk requires immediate mitigation.
• Successes: UAF forces are successfully holding the perimeter against heavy and continuous pressure in Huliaipole and stabilizing the general Kharkiv line (confirmed repelled assaults near Kursk/North Slobozhansky).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Immediate Kinetic Need: High-volume requirement for Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and FPV drones configured for anti-mechanized targeting to counter the armored assault in Pokrovsk.
• CNI Defense Need: Urgent requirement for mobile Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) to protect remaining energy and water infrastructure, particularly in the northern and southern oblasts now proven to be RF targets.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF strategy leverages three primary narratives:

1. Rejection of Soft Peace: Peskov explicitly rejects an "energy truce," framing the conflict as a zero-sum game demanding complete "peace" (RF terms/capitulation). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Hybrid Warfare & Espionage: FSB claims of GUR agent arrests on the Lithuanian border serve to justify expanded counter-intelligence operations and project a narrative of RF internal security invulnerability against Western-backed espionage.
3. Western Collapse/Decoupling: Lavrov’s highly publicized statements attacking the use of the US dollar as a weapon reinforce the narrative that the West is fracturing and failing financially, supporting RF goals to resist EU asset confiscation.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The new CNI strikes in Sumy and Mykolaiv will test civilian morale. UAF communications must immediately counter the "Winter Energy Collapse" narrative with demonstrable infrastructure repair and effective defense against the Pokrovsk breach. RF domestic morale is supported by state media focusing on social benefits (free professional training for SVO participants).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Hybrid Risk Proliferation: Denmark's official assessment of sharply increased hybrid risks from Russia confirms that NATO periphery nations perceive the conflict's hybrid domain escalation is spilling over into adjacent European regions.
• Negotiation Stance: RF has decisively rejected limited, humanitarian truces (energy ceasefire), confirming their intent to use humanitarian suffering as a direct tool for leverage toward broader, unfavorable political concessions (territorial status, neutrality).

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will attempt to convert tactical gains in Pokrovsk into a strategic pivot point, while utilizing CNI strikes and diplomatic isolation efforts to accelerate Ukraine's collapse timeline NLT 96 hours.

1. Pokrovsk Breakthrough: RF ground forces will intensify the mechanized assault in Pokrovsk for the next 48 hours, accepting heavy losses to capture Myrnohrad and achieve a critical depth penetration, forcing the commitment of UAF strategic reserves. (NLT 121200Z DEC 25).
2. CNI Coordination: Simultaneous deep strikes will target rail CNI (likely focusing on the Fastiv bypass noted previously) and additional energy/water distribution centers in oblasts bordering the frontlines (Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia/Dnipro), aiming to paralyze inter-front logistics.
3. Political Isolation: RF diplomatic channels will amplify statements regarding U.S. election/NATO skepticism and the failure of humanitarian truces to isolate Kyiv internationally and diminish perceived support ahead of the EU asset freeze decision.

(CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves a successful envelopment in the Pokrovsk axis, coinciding with the exposure of critical rear-area UAF CPs due to the compromise risk associated with the Oleksandr Kuzmuk dismissal (TrO leak, previously noted).

1. CI-Enabled Decapitation: RF utilizes compromised CI data (Kuzmuk leak) to target relocated TrO Command Posts or reserve assembly areas (e.g., "BRAVO-BLOCK" fragmentation areas) using high-precision missile strikes (Jet-Shahed or Iskander).
2. Pokrovsk Envelopment: RF utilizes reserves from the Kostiantynivka axis to fully encircle or isolate the UAF defensive groups currently fighting inside Pokrovsk UBA, forcing a mass surrender or chaotic breakout, creating a massive operational gap in the Donbas front.

(CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - The combination of CI risk and the high RF commitment in Pokrovsk significantly raises the probability of a sudden operational failure.)

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS