Situation Report

OPERATIONAL SITUATION REPORT (OSITREP)

TIME: 101200Z DEC 2025 AOR: Eastern and Southern Ukraine Frontlines (Stepnohorsk/Pokrovsk/Kupiansk Axes) PREPARED BY: Senior Military Intelligence Analyst, Eastern European Warfare Desk

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains dominated by high-intensity attrition warfare, focused on controlling key logistical and urban nodes.

• Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk Junction (Stepnohorsk Axis): UAF is successfully employing asymmetrical defenses (UGV/drones) to interdict localized RF assaults. The 5th Assault Brigade confirmed the successful interdiction of an RF night assault utilizing an armed UGV against an MT-LB. This validates the UAF defensive posture leveraging technological adaptation.
• Donetsk Front (Pokrovsk Axis): Counter-Infiltration Operations (CIO) continue within the UBA. The situation is stable but characterized by constant RF heavy fire pressure (KAB/Artillery).
• Kupiansk Axis (Kharkiv Region): RF VKS confirmed launching additional Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) into the region, maintaining the threat profile on UAF forward positions and CNI.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Winter conditions (snow, fog, low temperatures) persist across the AO. No change from previous reporting. Conditions favor ground friction but minimally impede RF standoff air capabilities (KAB).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF (Red Force): High utilization of combined kinetic and non-kinetic means. RF VKS maintains KAB saturation capacity. RF ground forces are adapting to deep defense layers but are being countered by UAF technological advances (UGVs/FPV saturation).
• UAF (Blue Force): Forces are executing responsive defensive holding actions while showing high tactical adaptation. The visible upgrade to the digital mobilization system (Reserve+ now including photos) is a key domestic control measure, signaling a prioritized effort to enhance accountability and reduce internal CI risk noted in previous reports.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF continues reliance on attrition (KAB saturation). However, the successful UAF UGV strike indicates RF tactical adaptation against night operations/infiltration efforts is being actively defeated by UAF technological parity efforts.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed crash of an RF IL-76 military transport aircraft in Sudan, while geographically separate, contributes to the overall assessment of RF global logistical strain and potentially risks future deep-strike resupply or expeditionary support. RF domestic logistics appear stable enough to support the kinetic tempo, but the EU's push to indefinitely freeze Russian assets represents a high-impact financial threat to long-term sustainment.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective in synchronizing kinetic (KAB launches) and informational (Lavrov statements regarding US proposals) domains almost simultaneously. This suggests tight top-down control prioritizing strategic political messaging over slow tactical gains.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Tactical readiness is high, evidenced by the successful UGV counter-assault in the Zaporizhzhia direction. Strategic readiness is improving internally through the immediate implementation of security enhancements for mobilization (Reserve+ photo verification), addressing the CI concerns and TCC friction noted previously.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed use and effectiveness of Armed UGVs by the 5th Assault Brigade; sustained high-tempo drone attrition in Zaporizhzhia sector. Digital security enhancement (Reserve+ update) is a measurable step in internal CI resilience.
• Setbacks: Continued pressure in Pokrovsk UBA. Persistent KAB threat necessitates resource reallocation.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Technology/Asymmetry: Successful UGV use suggests high ROI. Immediate requirements exist for mass production/deployment of these and similar assets to defend against RF night assaults and attrition tactics.
• Strategic Defense: The political threat landscape (NATO exit bill, asset freeze standoff) is the primary constraint. Resources must be allocated to political counter-messaging and developing resource contingency plans (J5/J8).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF strategy is centered on diplomatic leverage and Western fragility:

1. Negotiation Framing: RF (Lavrov) is explicitly publicizing alleged US proposals (via Witkoff) focusing on "minority rights and religious freedoms" in Ukraine. This forces Ukraine and the West to either deny the existence of US proposals or implicitly accept this sensitive internal political issue as a foreign policy negotiation point. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Financial Instability: RF IO amplifies threats of retaliation against EU asset confiscation, aiming to intimidate EU member states (specifically exploiting Hungarian veto concerns) and prevent the permanent financial isolation of Russia.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is reinforced by visible tactical successes (UGV, drone strikes) and demonstrable efforts to combat internal corruption/inefficiency (Reserve+ update). Russian public sentiment remains managed, with state media focusing on domestic benefits for SVO participants (free retraining) to mitigate manpower concerns.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• CRITICAL DIPLOMATIC/FINANCIAL CONFRONTATION: The EU move to adopt a special law for indefinite freezing of €210 billion in Russian assets, circumventing the need for immediate unanimity, has triggered an aggressive diplomatic response from Russia. This standoff, coupled with the US NATO bill, creates a period of extreme strategic uncertainty.
• Negotiation Signal: Lavrov's public description of US proposals is a definitive signal that RF seeks to codify internal political concessions (minority/religious rights) into any future peace deal.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will maintain kinetic pressure (KAB/attrition) while prioritizing the strategic leveraging of political uncertainty to force a disadvantageous negotiation track.

1. Phase I (Kinetic-Diplomatic Synergy): RF sustains pressure on the Stepnohorsk axis (Huliaipole flank) NLT 111200Z DEC 25. This military pressure is simultaneously leveraged by RF diplomatic channels to pressure key EU/NATO capitals, accelerating the perception of Western abandonment.
2. Phase II (Normalization of Terms): RF IO, led by state-controlled media, will normalize the "minority rights and religious freedoms" framework as the only viable path to peace, targeting Western European capitals and internal Ukrainian audiences NLT 130000Z DEC 25.
3. Phase III (Domain Integration): Increased utilization of deep-battle assets (Jet Shaheds, KABs) to target infrastructure in Kharkiv/Donetsk, synchronizing physical damage with the narrative of strategic inevitability and the collapse of the UAF position.

(CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves a critical operational breakthrough while international cohesion fractures, leading to immediate political isolation and resource starvation for UAF.

1. Stepnohorsk Encirclement and Reserve Targeting: RF successfully bypasses UAF defenses at Huliaipole, utilizing compromised CI (Kuzmuk leak data) to launch precision strikes against MSRs and the aggregated "BRAVO-BLOCK" reserve.
2. Dual Political Failure: Hungary successfully stalls or vetoes the EU asset confiscation measure, coinciding with a sustained political crisis regarding the US NATO commitment. This dual strategic failure causes a significant and immediate downturn in long-term aid commitments, forcing the NCA to confront a resource gap amidst a tactical crisis.

(CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Tactical resilience is strong, but political environment risk is rising.)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS