Situation Report

OPERATIONAL SITUATION REPORT (OSITREP)

TIME: 101000Z DEC 2025

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Operational focus remains split between three high-priority sectors:

1. Donetsk Front (Pokrovsk Axis): UAF continues urban Counter-Infiltration Operations (CIO). RF forces maintain contact and attrition pressure, utilizing Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) extensively, confirmed by recent air activity alerts. UAF defensive holding action is confirmed by pro-RF sources labeling Pokrovsk a "fortress" (Colonelcassad, 07:57Z).
2. Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk Junction (Stepnohorsk-Huliaipole Axis): Localized fighting around Huliaipole is confirmed (Сливочный каприз, 07:37Z), indicating the 38th GMRB flanking maneuver is engaged with UAF forward elements, threatening the Stepnohorsk axis rear.
3. Kupiansk Axis (Dvurichna-Kamyanka): RF reported offensive actions (08:01Z). This indicates sustained, localized pressure in the Kharkiv sector, possibly linked to the operational effects anticipated from the Pechenihy Dam strike (Hydro-Weaponization threat, D-3 DASUM).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Winter conditions are confirmed across the AO: snow, slippery roads, and fog are reported in the Donetsk/Mariupol area (Mash na Donbasse, 08:00Z).

• Impact on RF: Low temperatures are reportedly impacting the operational effectiveness and morale of RF assault units (Дневник Десантника, 07:35Z). Road conditions impede high-speed logistics.
• Impact on UAF: Low ceilings and fog may complicate UAF deep-strike targeting (IMINT/EO/IR).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF (Red Force): Forces are committed to sustaining high-tempo attrition warfare, prioritizing air-delivered standoff munitions (KAB) and FPV drone strikes, evidenced by the destruction of a UAF light vehicle (08:04Z). RF Air Force (VKS) received modernized Su-34 fighter-bombers, maintaining high capability for KAB delivery.
• UAF (Blue Force): Defenses are focused on localized attrition at Pokrovsk and denying velocity to the Huliaipole flank. Air defense systems remain under severe stress from massed drone/missile attacks (previous OSITREP) and constant KAB launches in Donetsk.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF adaptation focuses on domain integration: consistent use of FPV drones for tactical attrition and reconnaissance (confirmed strike on motorcycle) paired with high-volume KAB use, effectively bypassing many forward defenses and targeting maneuver units.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF supply chains support the modernization and deployment of advanced air assets (Su-34). However, the noted winter friction and the continued need for non-governmental funding (D-3 report on 33rd GMRR) suggest persistent, though localized, logistical shortfalls impacting tactical sustainment.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective at the operational level, coordinating deep strikes and major ground assaults (Pokrovsk, Stepnohorsk flank). New IO messaging (Lavrov/Trump statements following the NATO exit bill) demonstrates highly responsive C2 and synchronization across the information domain.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forward units are executing holding actions and exploiting RF frontal assault weaknesses at Pokrovsk. Strategic readiness is stressed by the persistent CI threat (Kuzmuk leak, D-3) and infrastructure vulnerability (Odesa, Pechenihy). Readiness levels remain critical but stable due to high unit cohesion.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Continued high attrition inflicted on RF mechanized units. Active counter-corruption efforts (arrest of former MoD official 08:00Z) support the UAF internal integrity narrative. Successful capture of RF servicemen (DShV ZSU, 07:33Z) provides tactical intelligence opportunities.
• Setbacks: Confirmed localized fighting at Huliaipole validates the immediate threat to the Stepnohorsk axis. The persistent threat of RF flanking maneuver against the fragmented "BRAVO-BLOCK" remains the greatest immediate operational risk. New constraint: public friction regarding mobilization (TCC attack in Lviv, 07:45Z), potentially impacting rear area security and draft quality.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

• Air Defense: The confirmed VKS modernization (Su-34) and sustained KAB usage necessitate rapid enhancement of long-range air defense/counter-KAB capabilities.
• Political/Strategic: The conditional nature of the Polish MiG-29 transfer, contingent on UAF technology exchange, remains a critical strategic constraint. The newly introduced US NATO exit bill further elevates strategic uncertainty regarding future long-term aid streams.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Primary Campaign (NATO Fracture): The US Congressman's introduction of a NATO exit bill is immediately amplified and leveraged across all RF state and military channels (TASS, KANARUHOV, Colonelcassad). Lavrov is used as the key messenger, framing Trump's previous position as aligning with Russia's view and emphasizing the "hopeless political blindness" of current Western leadership. Goal: Undermine UAF confidence in long-term NATO support and delegitimize current allied leadership.
• UAF Narrative: Balancing complex internal challenges (TCC confrontation, MoD corruption) with external resilience narratives. The reliance on anti-corruption messaging is a strategic move to preempt RF IO exploitation of internal scandals.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal friction regarding mobilization processes (Lviv TCC incident) represents a measurable degradation in public support for conscription efforts. UAF morale relies heavily on visible demonstration of state integrity (anti-corruption drive) and frontline unit resilience. RF ground troop morale is facing measurable environmental degradation due to winter conditions.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• CRITICAL DEVELOPMENT (US/NATO): The introduction of the US NATO exit bill fundamentally escalates strategic risk. This event will be exploited by RF IO to its maximum extent. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Strategic Dialogue: Russian MFA Lavrov is openly signaling negotiation terms focusing on "rights of national minorities and religious freedoms" within Ukraine, a clear attempt to codify specific political concessions into any future peace framework, using Trump's plan as a strategic leverage point. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF maintains the high-tempo pressure with minimal operational change, prioritizing the envelopment of the Stepnohorsk axis.

1. Phase I (Huliaipole Engagement): RF continues localized fighting, pinning UAF forward units near Huliaipole (confirmed active zone). The 33rd GMRR/38th GMRB will attempt to locate and rapidly engage the fragmented "BRAVO-BLOCK" reserve NLT 111800Z DEC 25.
2. Phase II (Operational Envelopment): Successful bypass/destruction of the "BRAVO-BLOCK" allows the flanking force to sever MSRs supporting the Stepnohorsk defensive box, forcing a phased UAF withdrawal or isolation NLT 120600Z DEC 25.
3. Phase III (Deep IO/Kinetic Synergy): RF IO synchronizes major battlefield events (e.g., Stepnohorsk pressure) with sustained narrative amplification regarding the NATO political crisis to pressure the National Command Authority (NCA) toward negotiated settlement on RF terms.

(CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

RF achieves decisive operational effects through the successful exploitation of CI and operational vulnerabilities.

1. Decapitation Strike & Encirclement Synergy: RF uses compromised CI data (Kuzmuk leak) to target a consolidated assembly point of the aggregated "BRAVO-BLOCK" reserve. Simultaneously, the 33rd/38th GMRB achieves operational velocity, cutting MSRs and capturing the Stepnohorsk junction, creating a localized pocket of resistance and large-scale UAF personnel losses.
2. Strategic Collapse Narrative: The combination of a major tactical loss (Stepnohorsk encirclement) and the amplified uncertainty surrounding the US NATO exit bill causes a significant, demonstrable dip in domestic support (reflected in TCC confrontations) and international commitment, leading to immediate pressure for an unfavorable ceasefire.

(CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS