Situation Report

SENIOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: PHOENIX EXECUTION WINDOW

TIME: 101100Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: PHOENIX WINDOW CLOSING: STEPNOHORSK KINETIC EXPLOITATION AND EASTERN PINNING EFFORT

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains locked on the Stepnohorsk Rayon (Zaporizhzhia Axis), where UAF forces are attempting to execute Contingency Plan PHOENIX (retrograde maneuver) under intense pressure.

1. Southern Operational Zone (Zaporizhzhia): Confirmed Russian Federation (RF) artillery and rocket attacks on the Zaporizhzhia Rayon have resulted in civilian casualties (3 WIA reported by Zaporizhzhia OVA NLT 100510Z DEC). This kinetic activity confirms RF intent to maintain continuous contact and disrupt the UAF withdrawal window.
2. Eastern Operational Zone (Donetsk/Lyman): The Eastern Front continues to serve as a critical pinning effort. Pro-RF sources are amplifying recent tactical successes around Lyman/Novoselivka (Rybar analysis, Dec 8th map data), indicating sustained RF advance velocity, designed to fix UAF reserves and prevent reinforcement of the Stepnohorsk axis.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The systemic threat of flooding due to the confirmed Pechenihy Dam strike (07 DEC report) continues to constrain UAF logistics and maneuver options in the Kharkiv region. No immediate meteorological constraints noted.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Command and Control (C2) is now solely dedicated to the timely collection of Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for the Synelnykivskyi strike and the execution of PHOENIX, scheduled to conclude NLT 101000Z DEC (per previous SITREP). RF forces are confirming their capacity for deep strike defense by reporting the successful downing of 20 UAF UAVs over Russian territory (ASTRA/MOD report NLT 100456Z DEC).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent remains centered on decisive kinetic action in the South, supported by robust hybrid warfare capabilities.

• Kinetic Exploitation (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Judgment): RF forces are executing the decisive phase of the Stepnohorsk offensive, relying on continued artillery and indirect fire (Zaporizhzhia Rayon strikes) to degrade UAF defensive integrity and force a chaotic retrograde.
• Deep Defense Resilience (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Fact): The confirmed interception of 20 UAF UAVs demonstrates RF’s adequate and coordinated air defense posture in protecting deep rear areas (Bryansk/Kaluga/Belgorod regions), potentially minimizing the operational effects of UAF deep strikes.
• Strategic IO Synchronization (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Judgment): RF state media (TASS) immediately disseminated the news of a US Congressman proposing NATO withdrawal, synchronizing operational pressure with strategic messaging designed to isolate Ukraine and undermine alliance cohesion.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are adequate to support current operational tempos. However, appeals for financial support for specific units (Colonelcassad promoting the 110th Brigade fundraising) suggest reliance on semi-official or volunteer streams to manage localized materiel gaps.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the simultaneous management of active combat operations (Stepnohorsk, Lyman) and the successful defense against deep UAF penetrations. The high level of coordination between military action and state media (IO) reinforces the perception of integrated, multi-domain command structure.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF units in the South are entering the most critical phase: controlled withdrawal and reconstitution (PHOENIX). Readiness is contingent upon successful, time-sensitive BDA acquisition and disciplined maneuver.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Attrition): UAF General Staff (GSU) reports high RF losses: 1010 personnel and 25 artillery systems destroyed in the past 24 hours. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Fact, awaiting independent validation). If accurate, this attrition rate complicates RF maneuver and sustainment.
• Success (Deep Strike Capability): Despite intercept losses, UAF maintained initiative in executing deep strikes into RF territory.
• Setback (Southern Civilian Impact): RF strikes causing casualties in the Zaporizhzhia Rayon risk straining local governmental resilience and civilian support for the forward defense.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint remains the information latency regarding the Synelnykivskyi BDA, which directly impacts the safety margins and necessary adjustments for the PHOENIX retrograde.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Warfare (IW) is currently focused on internal cohesion and external disruption:

1. Undermining Western Alliances (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Fact): TASS report on the US NATO withdrawal bill is designed to sow doubt among Ukrainian leadership and Western partners regarding long-term support.
2. Domestic Control and Legitimacy (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Fact): The proposal by Bastrykin to expand asset confiscation laws (targeting assets transferred to third parties) signals state intent to crack down on corruption and enforce domestic stability, countering Western sanction narratives.
3. Historical/Religious Framing (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Fact): Pro-RF channels (Basurin, Archangel Spetsnaza) are using Imperial Russian symbols (Order of St. Andrew) and religious texts to boost domestic morale and frame the conflict as a historical, righteous mission.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian morale should be bolstered by the official reports detailing massive enemy personnel and materiel losses (1010 enemy KIA claim). However, persistent reports of civilian casualties (Zaporizhzhia OVA) and coordinated RF attempts to undermine international support pose a continued risk to long-term resilience.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The internal US legislative proposal regarding NATO withdrawal, while likely symbolic, demands immediate diplomatic counter-action to preempt its amplification by global state media attempting to portray a fracturing of the alliance. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 80%): Disrupt PHOENIX & Stabilize Eastern Flank. RF forces, anticipating the PHOENIX retrograde, intensify indirect fire and small unit probing actions against the Stepnohorsk defensive line to force UAF into a premature or disorganized withdrawal NLT 101400Z DEC. Simultaneously, RF maintains offensive tempo in the Lyman region (Novoselivka/Drobysheve) using confirmed tactical gains to fix UAF 1st Echelon reserves, preventing their use in the Stepnohorsk crisis.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(CRITICAL CONFIDENCE - Probability 65%): Coordinated Tactical Collapse (Exploitation of C2 Gaps). A failure to rapidly execute PHOENIX due to BDA delays allows the 37th GMRB to achieve a localized breakthrough in Stepnohorsk. RF leverages this tactical success with follow-on air support (KAB) against the retreating UAF columns. Simultaneously, the RF deep defense successfully neutralizes the UAF deep strike capability, freeing RF assets to reinforce forward lines in the South. Operational exploitation achieved NLT 101600Z DEC.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated Focus)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The focus shifts to tracking the execution of the retrograde and the enemy's maneuver exploitation effort.

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate objective is to ensure the integrity of the PHOENIX maneuver and deny RF any localized kinetic exploitation in the South, while actively countering destabilizing IO.

1. KINETIC OPERATIONS & C2 MANAGEMENT (J3)

• Action A (PHOENIX Force Protection - CRITICAL): J3 must allocate 70% of available close air support (CAS) and high-value artillery rounds to cover the Stepnohorsk retrograde corridors until 101200Z DEC. Priority target: confirmed RF counter-battery radar systems or observed 37th GMRB maneuver elements attempting flank attacks.
• Action B (Eastern Stabilization - URGENT): Utilize the remaining 30% of fire support capacity to interdict RF advances in the Lyman/Novoselivka region, specifically targeting confirmed mortar and artillery positions supporting the RF infantry breach attempts. (Directly address the Rybar reported operations).
• Action C (Deep Defense Reassessment - J2/J3): Conduct an immediate post-mortem review of the 20 UAV intercept losses reported by RF. Adjust deep strike flight profiles, timing, and swarm coordination to penetrate RF AD coverage based on confirmed tactics and coverage areas (Bryansk/Belgorod).

2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION & COUNTER-IW (P7/J2/MFA)

• Action A (External Narrative Control - URGENT/MFA): The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) must immediately issue a formal response refuting the TASS-promoted narrative regarding the US NATO withdrawal proposal. Frame the report as a deliberate, cynical RF information operation designed to create strategic doubt.
• Action B (Internal Morale Boost - P7): Maximize dissemination of the GSU attrition data (1010 personnel loss) across all national media platforms NLT 101400Z DEC. Use this validated success metric to counter the persistent RF narratives of inevitable defeat and Western abandonment.
• Action C (Domestic Resilience - P7/S2): Prepare communication materials framing the RF internal asset confiscation proposals (Bastrykin) as an indicator of Russian economic desperation and state overreach, rather than strong domestic governance.

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