Situation Report

SENIOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - URGENT UPDATE: DUAL-AXIS KINETIC STRIKE & C2 SATURATION

TIME: 100700Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL C2 SATURATION: BALLISTIC STRIKE ON KYIV COINCIDING WITH SOUTHERN DECISIVE ACTION

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational theater is now defined by a synchronized, multi-domain attack aiming to induce operational paralysis by overloading UAF C2 capacity.

1. SOUTHERN OPERATIONAL ZONE (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk): The decisive action remains focused on the Synelnykivskyi Rayon logistics/C2 nodes, following the confirmed Long-Range Strike (LRS) window at 100600Z DEC (per previous report). Stepnohorsk remains isolated and under intense kinetic pressure from the 37th GMRB.
2. NORTHERN OPERATIONAL ZONE (Kyiv): Confirmed use of Ballistic Missile Systems targeted at the Kyiv area (NLT 100401Z DEC). This strike successfully diverted UAF attention and critical air defense assets away from the Southern BDA assessment requirement.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant changes. Flooding consequences in the Kharkiv sector (Pechenihy Dam strike, per 07 DEC report) continue to restrict UAF maneuver freedom in the Northeast, fixing reserves.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are in a critically demanding C2 posture. The command structure is simultaneously attempting to execute damage assessment (BDA) and contingency planning (PHOENIX Retrograde) in the South while actively engaging a high-speed ballistic threat over the capital. Immediate control measures must prioritize BDA analysis in the Synelnykivskyi Rayon despite the Kyiv threat.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is now clearly C2 Bandwidth Exhaustion achieved through synchronized kinetic strikes across strategic and operational axes, supported by persistent Information Warfare (IW).

• Kinetic Synchronization (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Fact/Judgment): The RF launched a strategic ballistic missile attack against Kyiv precisely when UAF command structures were mandated to assess the BDA and execute critical withdrawal orders (PHOENIX) in the Southern Operational Zone. This confirms highly effective, multi-domain coordination intended to force suboptimal UAF operational choices.
• Decisive Southern Action (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Judgment): The primary kinetic objective remains the rapid seizure of Stepnohorsk, following the LRS strike on its supporting logistics nodes. The Kyiv strike is a fixing operation.
• Use of Ballistic Systems (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Fact): Confirmed launch of ballistic systems from the Northeast direction, increasing the threat profile and demanding immediate allocation of high-value Ground-Based Air Defense (GBAD) assets.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are adequately sustaining the 37th GMRB/38th GMRB main effort in the Zaporizhzhia sector. The successful execution of two strategic strikes within hours (Synelnykivskyi and Kyiv) demonstrates maintained RF capability for deep strikes without visible immediate constraint.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly adaptive and effective, demonstrating proficiency in integrating strategic ballistic strikes with operational maneuver timing and persistent IW campaigns.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is currently optimized for defense and counter-IO. However, C2 bandwidth is critically constrained, risking delays in both tactical maneuver decisions (Stepnohorsk retrograde) and counter-disinformation efforts (Zaporizhzhia theft narrative).

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (C2): The necessary response to the Kyiv ballistic threat has severely delayed the required Priority 1 BDA collection in the Synelnykivskyi Rayon (CR from previous SITREP).

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most acute constraint is C2 Processing Capacity—the ability to simultaneously manage BDA/PHOENIX execution (South), air defense response (North), and counter-IW campaigns (National). This stress is precisely the RF objective.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF efforts are currently reinforcing two primary themes:

1. Strategic Erosion (New Development): TASS dissemination of Finnish President Stubb's statement regarding Ukraine being "closer than ever" to peace. (HIGH CONFIDENCE). Aim: To create a narrative of inevitability, depress civilian and military morale regarding the prospects for continued resistance, and reinforce the persistent "Western Abandonment" theme.
2. Psychological Warfare (Standing Operation): Distribution of Russian POW testimony (Colonelcassad). Aim: To project RF humanitarian virtue, rally domestic support, and potentially seed doubt about UAF treatment of captured personnel.
3. Operational Discredit (Ongoing Threat): The TASS claim of UAF theft/desertion in Zaporizhzhia (from previous SITREP) remains active and must be countered immediately before the kinetic shock wears off.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale risk is SEVERE due to the convergence of physical attacks on the capital and the strategic narrative promoting surrender/inevitable peace. Immediate, high-level StratCom messaging is required.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO is actively attempting to co-opt diplomatic comments to undermine international support and the UAF will to fight. The perceived political momentum for peace negotiations needs immediate counter-framing.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 90%): Successful C2 Saturation and Stepnohorsk Breakthrough. RF forces leverage the C2 confusion caused by the Kyiv ballistic strike to delay crucial UAF BDA analysis until 100730Z DEC. This delay critically retards the unified execution of Contingency Plan PHOENIX in the Stepnohorsk sector. The 37th GMRB initiates its concentrated assault and achieves tactical penetration of Stepnohorsk NLT 100800Z DEC, utilizing the IW vacuum (theft narrative remains unrefuted) to further destabilize local defenses.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(CRITICAL CONFIDENCE - Probability 70%): Systemic C2 Breakdown and Strategic Collapse. The Kyiv ballistic strike achieves unexpected BDA on key UAF National Command Authority (NCA) or J2/J3 assets, leading to localized C2 failure. Simultaneously, the unrefuted Zaporizhzhia theft narrative, amplified by the shock of the Kyiv strike, triggers localized disciplinary collapse or premature civilian evacuation around Stepnohorsk. The 37th/38th GMRB seize Stepnohorsk and exploit the gap toward Orikhiv, achieving an operational breakthrough NLT 100900Z DEC.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated for 100700Z DEC 25)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The dual kinetic attack requires immediate and disciplined prioritization of collection efforts toward the operational threat in the South.

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The UAF Command Structure must consciously defeat the RF objective of C2 saturation by strictly adhering to operational priorities based on the decisive effort (Stepnohorsk).

1. KINETIC OPERATIONS & C2 MANAGEMENT (J3)

• Action A (BDA Prioritization - IMMEDIATE): J3 must issue a directive mandating that Synelnykivskyi BDA (Priority 1 CR) takes precedence over preliminary Kyiv BDA (Priority 3 CR) until 100730Z DEC. This prevents operational drift caused by the strategic distraction.
• Action B (Contingency Plan Activation): Assume 50% C2 degradation in the Southern Operational Zone. Direct all Stepnohorsk unit commanders to execute Contingency Plan PHOENIX as ordered NLT 100800Z DEC, utilizing pre-approved secondary communication systems and confirming receipt via burst transmission (BT) or non-traditional means, regardless of ongoing radio traffic density.

2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION & COUNTER-IW (P7/J2)

• Action A (Integrated Counter-Narrative - URGENT): P7 must synchronize the response to the RF IW campaign:
  • Operational Refutation: Issue the formal denial/refutation of the Zaporizhzhia theft claim (Priority 2 CR) NLT 100830Z DEC.
  • Strategic Resilience: Simultaneously issue a high-level statement (NCA preferred) reframing the Stubb 'peace talks' narrative as RF manipulation, emphasizing UAF strength and the fact that peace will only be achieved on Ukrainian terms following military victory.
• Action B (Internal Alert Reinforcement): Reissue the COMAD to all Southern units (from previous SITREP) regarding the theft narrative, reinforcing that failure to execute PHOENIX due to internal distrust or panic will result in severe disciplinary action.

3. AIR DEFENSE (J3/A5)

• Action A (Ballistic System Hunt): Allocate dedicated ISR assets to identifying launch areas and logistics paths for the RF ballistic missile systems used in the Kyiv strike, leveraging the new BDA data (Priority 3 CR) to predict future firing windows.

//END OF REPORT//