Situation Report

SENIOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - IMMEDIATE UPDATE: IW THREAT SYNCHRONIZED WITH LRS STRIKE WINDOW

TIME: 100615Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SYNCHRONIZED ATTACK: KINETIC STRIKE + COGNITIVE DECAPITATION

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is defined by the critical window of opportunity (100600Z DEC) for the Russian Federation (RF) to achieve operational paralysis.

1. ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS: The isolation of Stepnohorsk is assumed complete or imminent via the confirmed fighting at Huliaipole. The key terrain is now the Synelnykivskyi Rayon logistics/C2 nodes, currently the target of the active Long-Range Strike (LRS) window.
2. KHARKIV AXIS: The unverified RF claim regarding control over Lyman and Vilcha continues to fix UAF attention and reserves in the north, amplified by existing flood risks.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Conditions remain permissive for RF multi-domain operations. Flood consequences from the Pechenihy Dam strike (per 07 DEC report) continue to degrade UAF maneuver capacity in the Kharkiv sector.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are in a critical defensive posture. Control measures are based on the zero-reserve assumption and the mandated execution of Contingency Plan PHOENIX (Tactical Retrograde) for the isolated Stepnohorsk sector. All attention is currently fixed on the BDA of the 0600Z LRS strike.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is Operational Decapitation via Kinetic strike, supported by targeted Information Warfare (IW).

• Kinetic Synchronization (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The LRS strike execution against Synelnykivskyi (100600Z DEC) is assumed complete or ongoing. This is the primary kinetic action designed to degrade C2 and logistics supporting Stepnohorsk.
• Targeted Information Warfare (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Immediately preceding the 0600Z kinetic strike, the RF launched a precise narrative targeting UAF legitimacy in the Zaporizhzhia sector. The TASS report (100313Z DEC) claiming UAF deserters stole UAH 8M in humanitarian aid directly supports the Stepnohorsk kinetic offensive by attempting to erode morale, internal trust, and civilian support around the point of maximum military pressure.
• C3 Emphasis (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Judgment): Dempster-Shafer analysis indicates high belief in Russian communication system upgrades (0.167) and technology deployment (0.141). This, coupled with the internal MVD communication service day messaging, suggests the RF command structure is reinforcing its communications backbone to ensure C2 stability during complex, multi-domain engagements.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain focused on sustaining the 37th/38th GMRB assault preparation against Stepnohorsk (NLT 100700Z DEC). The success of the 0600Z strike will significantly simplify RF forward planning.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective, demonstrating near real-time synchronization between strategic kinetic action and tactical IW implementation.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is critically dependent on the integrity of C2/logistics following the 0600Z strike. Forces must maintain discipline against the immediate wave of RF disinformation designed to induce panic or insubordination (theft/desertion narrative).

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• STRATCOM SUCCESS (Judgment): The UAF StratCom response (100326Z DEC) promoting the morale and strategic value of foreign volunteers ("The Secret Strength of the AFU") serves as a proactive, necessary counter-narrative to the RF "Western Abandonment" IO effort previously assessed.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint is C2 Redundancy and the ability to rapidly assess and respond to BDA while simultaneously countering the intense RF disinformation flood.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF is executing a coordinated campaign aiming for Cognitive Decapitation coinciding with kinetic strikes:

1. Operational Discredit: RF TASS claim of UAF theft/desertion in Zaporizhzhia is designed to erode legitimacy and cohesion among forward units under duress in the Stepnohorsk sector. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
2. Strategic Distraction: The continued emphasis on peripheral claims (Lyman/Vilcha) and internal RF C3 stability messaging serves to overload UAF C2 with disparate, high-priority threats.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale risk is CRITICAL in the Southern Operational Zone due to the convergence of physical danger (LRS strike) and psychological operations (discredit/theft narrative). The UAF response highlighting foreign support must be amplified immediately.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The UAF focus on foreign volunteers (100326Z DEC) successfully supports the continued narrative of international unity, directly mitigating the strategic risk posed by the previous RF "Western Abandonment" campaign.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 95%): Successful Strike and IW Paralysis. The RF 100600Z DEC LRS strike achieves high BDA on critical UAF C2/Logistics assets in Synelnykivskyi. Simultaneously, the RF IW network rapidly disseminates the UAF theft/desertion narrative, leveraging the strategic shock of the strike to complicate UAF tactical decision-making and retard the disciplined execution of Contingency Plan PHOENIX in the Stepnohorsk sector. RF 37th GMRB initiates the concentrated assault on Stepnohorsk NLT 100700Z DEC.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(CRITICAL CONFIDENCE - Probability 80%): Decapitation and Systemic Collapse. The LRS strike results in complete C2 decapitation in the Southern Operational Zone. The RF theft narrative triggers localized insubordination, confusion, or civilian panic in Zaporizhzhia. Strategic reserves are committed to the Kharkiv axis prematurely due to unverified Lyman/Vilcha validation. The resulting loss of communication and control allows the 37th GMRB to achieve immediate operational success at Stepnohorsk and exploit the gap rapidly toward Orikhiv NLT 100800Z DEC.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated for 100615Z DEC 25)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The primary collection focus remains on the kinetic BDA and the new IW validation requirement.

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The UAF must treat the MLCOA as reality and implement countermeasures against the kinetic strike and the synchronized psychological offensive immediately.

1. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION & COUNTER-IW (P7/J2)

• Action A (Refute Theft Narrative - IMMEDIATE): Task J2 and CMA leadership in Zaporizhzhia to conduct immediate checks (Priority 2 CR). A high-visibility public statement must be issued NLT 100700Z DEC directly addressing and refuting the TASS claim regarding UAH 8M theft, framing it as blatant enemy propaganda designed to distract from RF war crimes.
• Action B (Internal Alert): All units in the Southern Operational Zone must receive an immediate communication advisory alert (COMAD) detailing the RF theft narrative and instructing commanders to aggressively counter any internal spread of the disinformation to prevent disciplinary incidents during the ongoing Stepnohorsk retrograde.

2. KINETIC OPERATIONS & MANEUVER (J3)

• Action A (Stepnohorsk Retrograde Confirmation): J3 must confirm that units are executing Contingency Plan PHOENIX. If BDA at 100630Z DEC confirms severe C2 degradation, tactical orders for Stepnohorsk must default to pre-approved withdrawal routes and holding positions, regardless of current radio contact status.
• Action B (Logistics Continuity): Activate secondary and tertiary logistics caches and C2 nodes in the Synelnykivskyi Rayon now, assuming 50% degradation of primary assets from the LRS strike, pending BDA confirmation.

3. INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (J2)

• Action A (BDA Overload): Prioritize ISR assets (UAV/SATINT) exclusively toward BDA collection in the Synelnykivskyi Rayon until 100630Z DEC (Priority 1 CR). This data is the highest priority for operational continuity.

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