Situation Report

SENIOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CRITICAL UPDATE: STEPNOHORSK ISOLATION CONFIRMED // DUAL AXIS PRESSURE

TIME: 100600Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: HULIAIPOLE KINETIC CONFIRMATION // SYNELNYKIVSKYI STRIKE WINDOW OPEN // NEW RF ADVANCE CLAIM: LYMAN/VILCHA

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is now defined by two simultaneous, coordinated RF pressures across distinct domains:

1. ZAPORIZHZHIA/DEEP REAR AXIS (Operational Crisis): The focus remains on the Stepnohorsk Axis, now confirmed to be under intense interdiction pressure from the south. The critical C2/Logistics nodes in Synelnykivskyi Rayon have entered the active precision strike window (NLT 100600Z DEC).
2. KHARKIV AXIS (Threat Expansion): RF claims control over Lyman and Vilcha (Kharkiv Oblast), signaling either a tactical breakthrough or a deliberate attempt to open a new operational axis to fix UAF reserves in the north.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Conditions remain permissive for RF multi-domain operations (UAVs, KABs, ground maneuver). The flood risks resulting from the 07 DEC Pechenihy Dam strike continue to complicate UAF maneuver planning in the Kharkiv theater, lending credence to the RF Lyman/Vilcha claim.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The critical window for proactive defense confirmation (SHORAD/Reserve BDA) has passed unconfirmed (per previous 100430Z DEC report). UAF forces must now operate under the assumption that Logistics Strike and Stepnohorsk Isolation are imminent or ongoing. Control measures must transition to Contingency Plan PHOENIX (Tactical Retrograde/Holding Action without Reserve) for the Stepnohorsk sector.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is Operational Paralysis via Kinetic and Informational Decapitation.

• Huliaipole Interdiction (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Fact Validation): The "Воин DV" video and Dempster-Shafer analysis (belief in Artillery Barrage: 0.0527) confirms kinetic action ("BATTLE FOR HULIAIPOLE"). This validates the previous assessment that the 38th GMRB has successfully executed its flanking maneuver and is now suppressing the area, effectively isolating Stepnohorsk.
• Strike Execution (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The LRS strike window NLT 100600Z DEC is active. RF forces are demonstrating high fidelity C2 synchronization across the UAV group pathing and LRS asset launch.
• Kharkiv Expansion (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - CRITICAL NEW THREAT): The RF claim regarding Lyman and Vilcha (TASS 100302Z DEC) is a strong indicator of a renewed RF commitment to the northern theater, likely leveraging UAF resource strain (SHORAD/reserves) and potential disruption from the Pechenihy strike.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains focused on delivering the 100600Z DEC LRS strike. The successful holding action/interdiction at Huliaipole simplifies RF forward logistics planning for the Stepnohorsk assault (NLT 100700Z DEC).

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust, successfully integrating IO (abandonment narrative), tactical success (Huliaipole), and strategic strike timing (Synelnykivskyi).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is defensively critical. Forces in Stepnohorsk are under direct isolation protocols. Readiness is severely challenged by the confirmed threat convergence (Deep Strike, Flank Cut-off, New Northern Threat).

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• SETBACK (Zaporizhzhia): The confirmation of heavy fighting at Huliaipole constitutes an operational setback, confirming the degradation of maneuver capability on the southern flank.
• SETBACK (Logistics Rear): The failure to confirm the SHORAD redeployment (100445Z DEC deadline) suggests a critical vulnerability during the current LRS strike window.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Air Defense: All AD assets previously designated for Synelnykivskyi defense must be executing defensive procedures immediately. Maneuver: The zero-reserve assumption for Stepnohorsk must drive all maneuver decisions until the Huliaipole situation can be resolved or reinforcements can be drawn from other, non-threatened axes (if available).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF strategic narrative of "Western Abandonment" continues to be the main effort in the cognitive domain. The latest message (TASS 100253Z DEC) directly links European fear of US (Trump) accusations to potential abandonment of Kyiv, deliberately targeting strategic confidence and political cohesion.

• Tactical Messaging: The simultaneous release of the "BATTLE FOR HULIAIPOLE" video and the Lyman/Vilcha control claim aims to overwhelm UAF C2 with multiple, critical points of failure, potentially inducing systemic command errors or chaotic tactical withdrawals.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale is at the highest risk point since the previous report due to the transition of threats from 'potential' to 'kinetic reality' (Huliaipole fighting; Synelnykivskyi strike window).

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The RF IO strategy requires an immediate, visible counter-response NLT 100600Z DEC to mitigate the psychological impact of the "abandonment" narrative on both forward troops and key international partners.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 95%): Successful Logistics Strike and Stepnohorsk Ground Assault Preparation. The RF LRS strike (100600Z DEC) achieves significant BDA against logistics or C2 in Synelnykivskyi Rayon, exploiting the lack of confirmed SHORAD. Concurrently, RF 38th GMRB establishes full fire superiority at Huliaipole, confirming Stepnohorsk isolation. RF ground forces (37th GMRB) initiate the final, concentrated assault on Stepnohorsk NLT 100700Z DEC, anticipating minimal resistance from isolated units. The claim regarding Lyman/Vilcha serves as a successful strategic feint, preventing resource diversion to Zaporizhzhia.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(CRITICAL CONFIDENCE - Probability 80%): Simultaneous Operational Collapse via Decapitation and Diversion. The 100600Z DEC strike causes C2 decapitation. This coincides with verified operational collapse at Huliaipole (surrender or chaotic retreat). Simultaneously, the RF claim on Lyman/Vilcha proves to be a validated minor breakthrough, forcing UAF High Command to commit the last mobile reserves to the Northern front to prevent further environmental/urban disaster near Kharkiv. The resulting lack of strategic reserves allows the 37th GMRB to achieve a complete, rapid encirclement of Stepnohorsk NLT 100730Z DEC.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated for 100600Z DEC 25)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The focus shifts from pre-strike protection (SHORAD confirmation) to post-strike BDA and validation of the Lyman/Vilcha claim to prevent strategic overreaction.

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The UAF must treat the MLCOA as a current reality and execute defensive measures to mitigate the confirmed damage and prevent strategic resource depletion by the new northern threat.

1. AIR DEFENSE AND COUNTER-ISR (J3/J2)

• Action A (BDA Priority): Immediately prioritize BDA collection (Priority 1 CR) for the 100600Z DEC strike. Operational response plans must be pre-approved for immediate execution based on the expected severity threshold (e.g., if a high-value C2 node is hit, initiate immediate relocation of secondary C2).
• Action B (Post-Strike Dispersal): Assuming damage has occurred, all surviving C2/Logistics nodes in the Southern Operational Zone must execute pre-planned dispersal/hardened protocols immediately to prevent follow-on strikes.

2. KINETIC OPERATIONS & MANEUVER (J3)

• Action A (Stepnohorsk Retrograde): EXECUTE CONTINGENCY PLAN "PHOENIX". J3 must formally inform forward units near Stepnohorsk that they are isolated and confirm their orders for tactical retrograde or consolidated holding action based on available ammunition reserves. Do not wait for Huliaipole relief.
• Action B (Kharkiv Analysis): J3 must treat the Lyman/Vilcha claim as an Information Fixing Operation until physical validation (Priority 2 CR) is received. Do not commit strategic reserves to the Kharkiv axis based solely on unverified RF claims, thereby falling into the RF trap intended to relieve pressure on Zaporizhzhia.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION (P7 - Cognitive Domain)

• Action A (Counter-Abandonment Response): The NCA must issue a high-visibility, coordinated diplomatic statement immediately (NLT 100700Z DEC) that directly refutes the RF narrative amplified via the TASS/CNN reports. The message must stress the current provision of military aid and unity among NATO partners to stabilize morale and international political resolve.
• Action B (Kharkiv Messaging): Prepare messaging to preemptively deny the Lyman/Vilcha claim, framing it as a desperate propaganda effort designed to distract from RF losses elsewhere, pending BDA confirmation.

//END OF REPORT//