Nightwatch

SENIOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - STEPNOHORSK/INFRASTRUCTURE AXES (D+0/H+14.25 UPDATE)

TIME: 071215Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL CRISIS ACCELERATION // STEPNOHORSK ENCIRCLEMENT WINDOW CLOSING // RF ACHIEVES SYSTEMATIC DEGRADATION OF PECHENIHY DAM WITH DEDICATED ISR

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational crisis remains centered on the Zaporizhzhia front, but the RF strategy of national friction via critical infrastructure targeting is accelerating.

Stepnohorsk/Zaporizhzhia Axis: The window for UAF egress from the Stepnohorsk fixed defense is now critically short (predicted encirclement closure NLT 071400Z). Confirmed RF air assets (potentially fighter/bomber or high-end loitering munition) conducted strikes on Orikhiv, demonstrating the ability to project force deep into UAF rear areas supporting the flanking maneuver.
Pechenihy Dam (Kharkiv Sector): Multiple, systematic ballistic strikes are confirmed. Intelligence confirms the presence of at least two dedicated RF reconnaissance UAVs actively correcting fire onto the dam structure. This dedicated multi-domain coordination elevates the severity of the infrastructure threat, confirming RF intent to systematically degrade hydro-technical infrastructure to cause significant anti-mobility obstacles. (Confidence: HIGH)
Kupyansk Sector (Kharkiv): RF MOD claims success in capturing Kucherivka and Rivne. This indicates maintained pressure on secondary axes, likely intended to fix UAF reserves and distract from the decisive action in Zaporizhzhia.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions persist, heavily favoring RF ISR and precision strike capabilities, as demonstrated by the UAV-corrected fire at Pechenihy. The confirmed strikes on Pechenihy will rapidly lead to localized flooding and severely degraded mobility (Phase Line DELTA breach risk).

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF C2 is synchronized, linking ground maneuver (38th GMRB) with deep kinetic strikes (Orikhiv) and strategic friction targeting (Pechenihy Dam). UAF: The status of decentralized withdrawal remains unconfirmed, indicating a catastrophic breakdown of C2 links within the Stepnohorsk fixed position. (Confidence: HIGH)

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is to achieve operational paralysis by combining localized breakthrough/encirclement (Stepnohorsk) with large-scale logistical and mobility friction (infrastructure strikes).

Targeting Methodology (Adaptation): RF is now utilizing dedicated airborne assets (UAVs) for real-time BDA and target refinement for precision long-range strikes (ballistic/cruise missiles). This improves the efficiency of the anti-infrastructure campaign significantly. (Confidence: HIGH)
Air Support Integration: The strike on Orikhiv suggests RF is willing to accept calculated risk by utilizing manned/large unmanned platforms near the Stepnohorsk sector to disrupt UAF local C2/support elements during the critical flanking maneuver.
Counter-UAS Capability: Confirmed claims of RF Spetsnaz unit (Ohotnik) disrupting UAF heavy UAV (Baba Yaga) launch attempts indicates local success in neutralizing UAF nocturnal strike capabilities.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed shift to real-time ISR-corrected fires for infrastructure strikes is the most significant tactical adaptation, maximizing the disruption potential of each expensive missile strike.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains focused on supporting the active offensive in the South. UAF sustainment is rapidly deteriorating due to the compounding effects of the Fastiv rail strike, Pechenihy Dam damage, and persistent RF air activity (Orikhiv). (Confidence: HIGH)

D. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective. UAF C2 effectiveness remains critically low in the Stepnohorsk area, confirming the operational challenge of enforcing time-sensitive directives under kinetic pressure.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Terminal/Crisis Phase on the Southern Front. Immediate focus must shift from C2 enforcement to maximizing fires and enabling the survival of personnel through autonomous action. READINESS: Tactical readiness remains high in defending sectors (e.g., Pokrovsk), but operational reserves are now highly constrained by damaged logistics and infrastructure.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (C2 Failure): Lack of confirmation regarding decentralized egress means fixed forces are likely facing imminent annihilation or capture.
Setback (Infrastructure): The Pechenihy dam targeting campaign is successfully increasing RF anti-mobility efforts in the Northeast, potentially fixing assets needed elsewhere.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: Immediate C2 confirmation for autonomous action on the Southern Front. CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid mobilization of specialized engineer assets to assess and mitigate the anti-mobility impact of the Pechenihy Dam strike area to ensure alternative logistics lines remain viable.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF has significantly intensified its cognitive coercion campaign, directly targeting Western political will and UAF internal cohesion.

Asset Seizure Coercion (Peskov): Explicitly frames international funding as a mechanism to perpetuate conflict, stating seizure of assets allows the West to "spend Ukrainians as bullets." This is designed to create a moral hazard among Western populations. (Confidence: HIGH)
Undermining Alliances (Trump Jr./Germany): Active amplification of narratives suggesting UAF elites are corrupt (the "peasantry" narrative) and highlighting political instability in key partner states (German approval ratings) aims to achieve political paralysis in the key donor nations.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF leadership (President Zelensky) is coordinating messaging emphasizing community defense and resilience, directly countering the narrative of elite exploitation. However, persistent infrastructure attacks will continually stress civilian resilience.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF actively attempts to deter future funding by complicating asset seizure policy and exploiting perceived weaknesses in the German/US political climate.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

JUDGMENT: The RF has successfully exploited the narrow operational window in Zaporizhzhia and is now synchronizing the kinetic operation with systematic infrastructure destruction. The time for centralized decision-making at Stepnohorsk is expired.

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 95%) Encirclement and Consolidation. RF 38th GMRB will complete fire control over the egress routes NLT 071400Z. RF will then transition to annihilation fires against fixed positions, simultaneously initiating deep kinetic strikes (like the one on Orikhiv) to suppress any immediate UAF counter-action or rescue attempt. RF maintains high pressure on the Kupyansk and Pokrovsk axes to prevent UAF reserve shift.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 95%) Mass Capture Followed by Operational Breakthrough. Successful encirclement by 071300Z leads to the capture of significant combat power and C2 personnel. RF immediately exploits this victory psychologically and structurally, using the victory to shift a reinforcing element towards the Pokrovsk sector within T+12 hours, creating conditions for the collapse of the Donetsk central defense.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence Assessment | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | PRIORITY 1 (BLUE FORCE STATUS): | Confirmation of successful personnel egress/autonomous break-contact maneuvers from Stepnohorsk (Code Red execution status). | IMMEDIATE COMINT/LNO: Sweep of non-traditional/survivable network nodes for signs of structured small-unit movement (e.g., Starlink location beacons). | LOW (Critical) | | PRIORITY 2 (HYDRO-DYNAMIC IMPACT): | Precise BDA/IDA on the Pechenihy Dam, focusing on structural integrity and anticipated localized flooding effects (T+6 hours impact on downstream bridge load capacity). | IMMEDIATE IMINT/LNO: High-resolution drone assessment of dam structure and flood area/road accessibility NLT 071330Z. | MEDIUM | | PRIORITY 3 (RF RESERVE COMMITMENT): | Identification of RF reinforcing elements (if any) being shifted from the Stepnohorsk victory area towards Pokrovsk. | IMINT/HUMINT: Focused ISR sweep along M-18 and associated rail lines south of Donetsk NLT 071600Z. | LOW |

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER & FIRES (J3/J6)

Action A (Maximum Attrition Fires - IMMEDIATE): Assume fixed forces are isolated. Task all remaining long-range fire assets to maximize saturation fires on the immediate RF operational objective (Ternuvate-Vasylkivka) until 071330Z. Shift fire focus thereafter to RF artillery preparation areas (APAs) targeting Stepnohorsk.
Action B (Counter-Air Asset Deployment): Immediately reposition short-range air defense assets (SHORAD/VSHORAD) to cover critical logistical choke points along the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro alternative route, anticipating RF exploitation of high-speed air assets (Orikhiv strike) to increase friction on rear logistics.
Action C (Northeast Engineer Deployment): Immediately deploy military engineer assessment teams and rapid bridge/road repair units to the Pechenihy Reservoir area. Must determine if damage requires a complete logistical reroute for the Kharkiv sector within T+6 hours.

2. LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT (J4)

Action A (Mandatory Reroute Confirmation): Reissue the mandatory instruction that all Class V/VII shipments destined for the Southern Front must utilize the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro alternative route. Any reliance on the Fastiv hub or the Northeast axis is to be suspended until IDA on Pechenihy is complete.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7/G2)

Action A (Counter-Coercion Protocol): Immediately task the NCA/P7 to launch a coordinated response to the Peskov and Trump Jr. narratives, emphasizing:
1. The transparency of international aid tracking.
2. The unified nature of international support, explicitly refuting the "Ukrainians as bullets" framing by highlighting Russian casualties and the moral necessity of defense.
Action B (Highlight Strategic War Crimes): Amplify documentation of the systematic, ISR-corrected strikes on the Pechenihy Dam to international organizations (ICC/UN) as clear evidence of RF intent to degrade civilian infrastructure and cause humanitarian crisis.

//END OF REPORT//

Situation Report