Nightwatch

SENIOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - STEPNOHORSK AXIS (D+0/H+13.5 UPDATE)

TIME: 071135Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL CRISIS INTENSIFIES // RF FLANKING MANEUVER CONFIRMED KINETIC // TIME WINDOW FOR DECENTRALIZED EGRESS CLOSING RAPIDLY // FOCUS SHIFTS TO MITIGATION AND SECONDARY AXIS DEFENSE

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The crisis on the Stepnohorsk Axis is entering its final kinetic phase. The failure to execute the dispersal order NLT 071100Z has solidified the operational vulnerability.

Zaporizhzhia/Stepnohorsk Axis: RF Vostok Group (38th GMRB) is confirming active kinetic operations on the Huliaipole flank, utilizing FPV drones against UAF vehicles and communications systems, directly supporting the predicted encirclement effort.
Huliaipole (Flank): RF claims of active fighting ("Battle for Huliaipole") validate the Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA) outlined previously.
Pokrovsk Sector (Donetsk): Heavy defensive fighting continues. UAF sources confirm successful tactical engagement, inflicting high RF attrition (anti-tank ditch "kill-zone"). This indicates aggressive RF ground pressure is maintained across the Donetsk Oblasts to prevent UAF reserves from being shifted south.
Sloviansk/Northern Donetsk: Confirmed RF air strike on Sloviansk civil infrastructure. RF sources claim advances in the difficult terrain north/northeast of Sloviansk (Zakhotnoye area), indicating RF attempts to generate breakthroughs on secondary axes.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions favor RF ISR and maneuver. The RF campaign against hydro-technical infrastructure is having immediate tactical effects:

Pechenihy Dam (Kharkiv): Confirmed RF strike has resulted in the immediate closure of two territorial roads in the Kharkiv region due to infrastructure damage (RBC-Ukraine, 11:21:38Z). This creates localized anti-mobility obstacles for UAF forces in the Northeast, fixing forces and logistics.
Energy Grid: Confirmed strategic strike damage suggests recovery of key energy infrastructure will take "weeks" (Ukrenergo statement amplified by RF sources, 11:10:00Z). This compounds the logistical friction caused by the Fastiv rail strike.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Maintaining operational synchronization. Flank forces are actively engaged in shaping fires/drone attacks. Strategic deep strikes are achieving desired friction on UAF logistics and C2 capacity nationwide. UAF: Fixed Stepnohorsk forces are now in a terminal position. The unconfirmed status of decentralized withdrawal remains the critical C2 vulnerability.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is confirmed as maximum exploitation of the Stepnohorsk operational crisis, while maintaining heavy, attritional pressure on the Pokrovsk and Sloviansk axes.

Tactical Drone Integration: RF Vostok Group is demonstrating high proficiency in utilizing FPV drones (36th Army) to suppress UAF communications and vehicles on the Huliaipole flank, enabling the 38th GMRB's decisive maneuver. (Confidence: HIGH)
Infrastructure Degradation: The RF targeting philosophy is confirmed: targeting hydro-technical infrastructure (Pechenihy Dam) to cause tactical mobility friction, while simultaneously maintaining strategic kinetic pressure (Kinzhal/Air Strikes) on the UAF energy and rail systems.
Air Support: Continued use of manned and potentially unmanned air assets (high-speed targets over Kharkiv, air strike on Sloviansk) indicates robust air operations leveraging UAF resource constraints.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF adaptation focuses on localized technological dominance: effective tactical integration of FPV drones to clear avenues of advance for mechanized elements in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains robust for offensive operations, particularly in Zaporizhzhia. UAF logistics faces critical friction due to the Fastiv rail damage and the newly confirmed weeks-long energy grid recovery timeline, which degrades the capacity for emergency rail movements. (Confidence: HIGH)

D. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective and synchronized. UAF C2 effectiveness remains critically low on the Stepnohorsk Axis due to the failure to execute the time-sensitive dispersal order and the persistent lack of confirmation regarding autonomous small-unit action. (Confidence: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Critical. The objective for Stepnohorsk forces must be the immediate, decentralized break-contact and personnel extraction (Mission Command Directive). READINESS: High readiness to fight tactically is confirmed by the success of defenses in the Pokrovsk sector (inflicting high RF losses). However, operational readiness on the Southern Front remains severely compromised by the C2 failure and logistical constraints.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (Operational): The time window for orderly withdrawal at Stepnohorsk is now less than 75 minutes before the predicted encirclement closure (NLT 071400Z).
Success (Tactical Attrition): Successful defense and massed fires in the Pokrovsk sector are inflicting high-volume losses on RF assault units. This must be exploited to draw RF focus away from the Stepnohorsk exploitation.
Potential Success (Technical Adaptation): Alleged sighting of modified F-16s for cost-effective drone interception (using non-traditional munitions) suggests rapid UAF technical adaptation to address the critical loitering munition threat. (Requires Verification)

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: C2 Communication. Commanders must be assumed isolated and must act autonomously now. CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid replenishment of Class V (Ammunition) in the Pokrovsk sector to maintain the successful rate of attrition, utilizing the confirmed logistical bypass route.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF maintains high-volume cognitive coercion synchronized with kinetic operations:

Amplifying Vulnerability: Heavy amplification of Western media quotes (NYT, Czech President Pavel) suggesting UAF defense is collapsing due to "internal problems." This is designed to induce panic and erode confidence in defense efficacy just as the Stepnohorsk crisis peaks. (Confidence: HIGH)
Asset Seizure Disruption: Kremlin is focused on undermining Western consensus on utilizing frozen Russian assets, framing Belgium as driven by financial opportunism to create diplomatic division. (Confidence: HIGH)
Distraction/Global Focus: Reporting on internal Russian domestic initiatives (Max messengers) and international events (Benin coup attempt, Mongolia-China economic shift) serves to dilute global focus on the high-intensity combat in Ukraine.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale remains resilient, but strategic strike announcements (weeks of energy recovery) will place renewed stress on civilian resilience metrics. UAF counter-IO focusing on RF hypocrisy is effective in maintaining a moral advantage.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF actively attempts to deter future Western funding by complicating asset seizure policy. Ukrainian messaging must reaffirm Western unity and long-term commitment.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

JUDGMENT: The encirclement of UAF fixed forces at Stepnohorsk will occur NLT 071400Z (Confidence: HIGH). The time-critical priority is immediate force preservation and rapid defensive consolidation on secondary axes.

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 95%) RF Completes Operational Encirclement and Annihilation Fires. The RF 38th GMRB utilizes successful FPV drone attacks and concentrated fires to secure the Ternuvate-Vasylkivka route NLT 071400Z. Isolated UAF units unable to egress will be subjected to massed fires until RF ground forces consolidate the perimeter NLT 071800Z. Simultaneously, RF reinforces the Pokrovsk and Sloviansk axes, leveraging the Stepnohorsk victory to create pressure for a deeper penetration in Donetsk.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 95%) Mass Capture Followed by Operational Breakthrough. The rapid speed of the 38th GMRB, combined with UAF C2 failure, results in the capture of significant combat power and C2 personnel at Stepnohorsk NLT 071300Z. RF uses this captured equipment and personnel for immediate, high-propaganda impact, while rapidly shifting a reinforcing mechanized element (or VDV reserve) toward the Pokrovsk axis, threatening the collapse of UAF defenses in the Donetsk central sector within T+24 hours.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence Assessment | | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | | PRIORITY 1 (BLUE FORCE STATUS): | Confirmation that subordinate commanders in the Stepnohorsk fixed defense have initiated decentralized, autonomous break-contact maneuvers. | IMMEDIATE COMINT/LNO: High-frequency, encrypted burst transmission check for specified egress codes/vectors NLT 071145Z. | LOW (Critical) | | PRIORITY 2 (FLANK MANEUVER SPEED/COMPOSITION): | Precise movement vector and speed of the RF 38th GMRB, focusing on the Ternuvate area. | IMMEDIATE SAR/EO/IR: Focused mission over Huliaipole flank (Danylivka-Malomykhaylivka area) NLT 071145Z. | MEDIUM | | PRIORITY 3 (AIR DEFENSE ADAPTATION): | Verification of the alleged modified F-16 configuration and its operational deployment/effectiveness against loitering munitions. | IMMEDIATE TECHINT/IMINT: Urgent technical request to NATO partners regarding F-16 AD modifications (e.g., APKWS II integration). | LOW | | PRIORITY 4 (HYDRO-DYNAMIC IMPACT): | Initial Damage Assessment (IDA) for the Pechenihy Reservoir Dam strike's impact on downstream mobility/bridge integrity. | IMINT/LNO Report: Flyover/local assessment of Pechenihy Dam structure and Oskol River logistics impact NLT 071500Z. | MEDIUM |

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER & FIRES (J3/J6)

Action A (Mandatory Decentralization - TERMINAL RENEWAL): J3 must transmit a Code Red Alert via all redundant, survivable channels NLT 071145Z. The message must explicitly mandate complete autonomy for all Stepnohorsk Company/Platoon leaders for immediate, decentralized withdrawal. Use of all remaining heavy munitions for destructive fires covering egress is authorized.
Action B (Route Denial Fires): Immediately task all available long-range fire assets to maximize saturation of the Ternuvate - Vasylkivka axis from 071135Z to 071300Z. This short, focused window is the last chance to create a physical obstacle and delay the 38th GMRB.
Action C (Exploitation of C2 Void): Prioritize high-speed, low-altitude UAS missions against known RF forward C2 and logistics nodes in the immediate Stepnohorsk sector to prevent RF C2 from adjusting to the UAF withdrawal.

2. LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT (J4)

Action A (Secure Logistical Axis): Enforce the use of the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro alternative route as the exclusive primary axis for Class V/VII supply to the Southern Front until further notice. No reliance on the Fastiv hub or energy-dependent rail systems.
Action B (Prioritized Resupply): Immediately expedite the shipment of Class V (Ammunition) via the alternative route to the Pokrovsk sector. Capitalize on current defensive success to increase RF attrition rates.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7/G2)

Action A (Counter Propaganda): Task the NCA/Foreign Ministry to issue a coordinated statement with key allies refuting the asset seizure narrative (Peskov/Belgium), emphasizing unified international support and commitment to utilizing frozen assets to support Ukraine's defense.
Action B (Highlight RF War Crimes): Amplify documentation of the Sloviansk airstrike and the Pechenihy Dam strike to international bodies, framing the continued targeting of critical civil infrastructure and residential areas as systematic war crimes designed to break civilian morale.

//END OF REPORT//

Situation Report