Situation Report

SENIOR INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - STEPNOHORSK AXIS (D+1/H+12.0 UPDATE)

TIME: 071100Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL PARALYSIS CONFIRMED // RF FLANKING ASSAULT INITIATED // STEPNOHORSK ENCIRCLEMENT WINDOW OPEN // CRITICAL DAMAGE CONTROL REQUIRED

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational situation is deteriorating rapidly. RF forces are transitioning from fixing operations to kinetic exploitation on the critical Huliaipole flank, aligning precisely with the predicted Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA).

• Zaporizhzhia/Stepnohorsk Axis (Main Effort - RF 37th GMRB): RF maintains heavy use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) and artillery (Confirmed multiple KAB launches toward Zaporizhzhia and attacks on the Zaporizhzhia district, 070935Z - 070940Z). This fire support aims to complete the functional paralysis of UAF fixed defenses and C2 nodes prior to the breakthrough assault.
• Huliaipole Flank (Shaping Effort/Encirclement - RF 38th GMRB): Alleged RF offensive activity near Huliaipole is reported by adversary channels (071002Z) and validated by Dempster-Shafer analysis (High Belief in Ground Assault). This confirms the RF 38th GMRB flanking movement is underway, seeking to sever the tertiary logistical artery and achieve operational encirclement.
• Deep Battle: UAF deep strike capability remains operational, confirming damage to a Russian Rosrezerv oil depot in Tver (070948Z). This provides long-term logistical friction on the RF rear but does not alleviate immediate frontline pressure.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear, cold conditions persist (Confidence: HIGH), continuing to favor RF ISR collection, high-tempo tactical aviation, and rapid maneuver by the flanking element (38th GMRB).

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF Vostok Group is executing synchronized operations: frontal fixing (37th GMRB) and unconstrained flanking (38th GMRB). RF C2 is highly effective in synchronizing kinetic strikes with cognitive warfare. RF MOD claims localized gains in secondary sectors (Kucherovka, Rovnoye, 070941Z), likely aimed at misdirecting UAF attention. UAF: BRAVO-BLOCK movement remains UNCONFIRMED past the 071015Z deadline. Fixed UAF defenses at Stepnohorsk are facing imminent encirclement risk (NLT 071800Z) due to the failure of operational reserves to move.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is verified: Achieve operational encirclement at Stepnohorsk by 071800Z by exploiting the UAF operational reserve's paralysis.

• Massive Strike Capability: President Zelensky confirmed that RF forces launched over 1,600 drones, 1,200 KABs, and 70 missiles over the last week (070938Z). This demonstrates RF's sustained capacity to saturate UAF AD, degrade infrastructure, and impose paralyzing attrition. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Adaptation (Deep Interdiction): RF claims of repeated mass strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (070951Z) confirm the strategic focus on disrupting UAF industrial capacity and civil-military resilience in parallel with the Stepnohorsk kinetic MLD.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed/highly probable activation of the Huliaipole flank (38th GMRB) represents the tactical shift from preparation/shaping to execution of the encirclement phase. RF C2 is maximizing this kinetic window while simultaneously pushing coordinated strategic information operations (IO).

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF strikes against Russian oil infrastructure (Ryazan, Uryupinsk, Tver) indicate impending shortages (T+48-72h) of high-quality fuel for RF maneuver elements. However, this is a strategic delay, not an immediate tactical constraint. RF continues to prioritize high-value asset usage (KABs/Hypersonic) despite overall resource strain.

D. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, responsive, and synchronized across military domains (kinetic, logistical interdiction, IO). UAF strategic C2 failure (paralysis of BRAVO-BLOCK) is the critical enabling factor for the current RF success. (Confidence: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Active Crisis - Defensive Dispersal Required. Forward defenses at Stepnohorsk are highly attrited and face a critical lack of operational depth. The failure of BRAVO-BLOCK to initiate movement means immediate defensive maneuver must focus on dispersed withdrawal and delaying tactics rather than counter-attack.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Operational): Encirclement of fixed UAF forces at Stepnohorsk is imminent due to confirmed RF flanking movement and continued reserve immobilization.
• Success (Deep Battle): Confirmed BDA on the Rosrezerv Tver oil depot provides proof of concept for UAF capacity to impose strategic cost on RF logistics, mitigating future RF offensive capacity beyond the immediate crisis.
• Success (Tactical): Localized FPV drone success in Sumy (070957Z) indicates continued tactical superiority in the local kinetic fight, despite operational paralysis.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The constraint is the irreversible loss of the coordinated maneuver window for BRAVO-BLOCK. CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, explicit authorization for tactical commanders of BRAVO-BLOCK to execute decentralized dispersal and movement NLT 071100Z. Logistics (J4) must prioritize supplying fixed defenses for a short-term holding action to enable reserve extraction/dispersal.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO channels are currently maximizing the "Peace Trap" narrative (070952Z, 070958Z) by selectively quoting Ushakov and Peskov claiming positive US interest in a negotiated settlement (implying the US is bypassing Kyiv).

Objective: This pressure is designed to maintain the strategic paralysis of the NCA, preventing them from issuing the critical, risk-accepting order for the operational reserve to move.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmation of sustained, massive strikes (>1600 drones/week) reported by the NCA itself (Zelensky, 070938Z) generates high public stress but also reinforces the necessity of resistance. International statements (Czech President, 070959Z) supporting continued resistance help counter the "EU Collapse" narrative.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

High-level US-UA negotiations confirm that "territory and security guarantees" remain the main challenges (070935Z). RF IO is exploiting this friction, requiring a strong, unified Western counter-message to maintain the credibility of long-term support.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

JUDGMENT: The RF 38th GMRB flanking assault will accelerate. The window for a coherent UAF response has closed. UAF must now execute immediate damage control maneuvers.

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 95%) RF Flank Acceleration and Logistical Interdiction. The RF 37th GMRB sustains frontal fixing fires while the RF 38th GMRB, utilizing heavy CAS/UAS support (KABs confirmed near the AO), completes the rapid bypass of Huliaipole defenses. RF establishes fire control and physical presence over the Ternuvate-Vasylkivka road NLT 071400Z, isolating UAF fixed forces at Stepnohorsk.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 95%) Operational Encirclement and Annihilation. Identical to MLCOA, but the 38th GMRB achieves full operational surprise/speed, resulting in the mass capture or annihilation of fixed UAF units NLT 071800Z, leading to catastrophic collapse of the Southern Sector defense line.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The critical decision point for disengagement has passed. The current timeline focuses on mitigating destruction.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The overarching objective is to convert an impending operational defeat into a costly, temporary tactical withdrawal, preserving the remnants of BRAVO-BLOCK and the core Stepnohorsk defenders.

1. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER & FIRES (J3/J6):

   • Action A (Mandatory Dispersal & Disengagement - CRITICAL, IMMEDIATE): Issue the ORDER NOW for decentralized movement of BRAVO-BLOCK elements. Simultaneously, all fixed UAF units at Stepnohorsk must initiate phased disengagement to avoid encirclement. Prioritize high-mobility infantry and armored vehicles for breakout along dispersed routes (secondary roads, cross-country).
   • Action B (Route Denial): Execute Action B from the previous SITREP: Immediate destructive fires on the entire Ternuvate - Vasylkivka axis to crater and mine the route. Utilize FASCAM (Family of Scatterable Mines) and long-range fires to deny the RF 38th GMRB a clean logistical cut-off point.
   • Action C (Exploiting the AD Void): Maximize the remaining time before RF AD reconstitution. Task all remaining deep-strike assets (Bayraktar/HIMARS) to saturate known and suspected RF C2/Logistics (Class V/III) nodes supporting the 38th GMRB flanking effort NLT 071200Z.

2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7/G2):

   • Action A (Refuting the Peace Trap): The NCA must immediately (NLT 071130Z) issue a statement strongly refuting the RF narrative of secret US-RF settlements (Ushakov/Peskov claims). Reaffirm that Ukraine defines its own peace terms and that the US only supports Kyiv's position. This stabilizes the strategic C2 environment.
   • Action B (Internal Resilience): Leverage the Tver oil depot BDA success to reinforce the narrative of UAF deep strike capability and strategic cost imposition, counteracting the high-stress statistics of massive RF air strikes (1,200 KABs).

3. LOGISTICS (J4):

   • Action A (Contingency Resupply): Assume the Stepnohorsk sector is cut off NLT 071400Z. Immediately shift all resupply efforts for fixed forces to low-level aerial/UAS delivery (Class I/V emergency resupply) and focus ground assets on supporting the pre-planned Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro alternative route, ensuring the rear remains robust for defense reconstitution.

//END OF REPORT//