Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - STEPNOHORSK AXIS (T+65 MINUTES)

TIME: 070705Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: LOGISTICAL PARALYSIS ESCALATION: DNIPRO HUB TARGETED // MDCOA RISK ELEVATED TO CATASTROPHIC // BRAVO-BLOCK MOVEMENT UNCONFIRMED

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) by the RF 37th GMRB at Stepnohorsk is confirmed ongoing. RF kinetic activity has geographically expanded in the deep rear, specifically targeting nodes necessary for the logistical bypass of the Southern Front.

• Frontline (Stepnohorsk): Engaged. Initial attrition data (Gap P3) remains outstanding.
• Deep Battle (Logistical Interdiction): Confirmed high-volume UAS activity targeting Chernihiv (North) and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Southeast, specifically Dnipro/Vasylkivka corridor) between 06:35Z and 06:45Z. This targets the central hub of the previously identified Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro logistical bypass route.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear and cold conditions persist. RF state media (TASS) confirms widespread snow expected across RF territory by mid-week, but this has no immediate tactical impact on the current MLD.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Maintaining a multi-axis offensive tempo: Kinetic maneuver (Stepnohorsk), synchronized flank pressure (Huliaipole), and deep logistical strike (Poltava/Dnipropetrovsk). RF deep strike effectiveness is achieving material effect in paralyzing UAF logistics. UAF: AD assets are highly engaged across the country (Chernihiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv). The operational readiness of the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve and the efficacy of contingency fires remain the primary intelligence gap (Gap P1), approaching critical status (T+65 minutes).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed to achieve operational paralysis of the Southern Front through simultaneous kinetic breakthrough and logistical starvation.

• Strategic Intent (Logistics Denial): The confirmed UAS/missile targeting of the Dnipropetrovsk area validates the RF capability and intent to systematically dismantle the entire UAF logistical redundancy framework. By targeting Fastiv (Primary), Poltava (Secondary Bypass), and now Dnipro (Secondary Hub/Terminal), RF seeks full isolation of the Southern Front. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Tactical Intent (North/Chernihiv): The Chernihiv strike is likely a secondary effort designed to fix UAF AD assets away from the critical logistical hub defense in the Southeast, or to target high-value political/command infrastructure in the region. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most significant adaptation is the rapid, sequential shift of deep strike focus from the initial successful interdiction point (Fastiv) to the new bypass route (Poltava) and now to the key hub of that new route (Dnipropetrovsk). This demonstrates effective RF ISR and targeting coordination.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF LOGISTICS STATUS: CATASTROPHIC RISK. If infrastructure damage in Dnipropetrovsk (Dnipro/Vasylkivka) is confirmed, the tertiary road movement plan (Action A from previous SITREP) must be accelerated immediately. Reliance on rail assets for the Southern Front is now effectively terminated for the duration of the MLD. Immediate BDA on Dnipro infrastructure (bridges, rail marshalling yards, fuel depots) is paramount (Gap P5).

D. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF deep strike C2 remains highly effective and synchronized with kinetic maneuver. UAF C2 effectiveness for the MLD counter-thrust remains unconfirmed (Gap P1).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: DEFENSIVE CRISIS // LOGISTICAL RESILIENCE CRITICAL FAILURE POINT. Readiness is severely compromised by the escalating logistical threat, which threatens to stop BRAVO-BLOCK movement regardless of enemy kinetic action on the route.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Logistical/Deep): Confirmed UAS attacks on the Dnipropetrovsk region targets the final operational rail hub for the Southern Front. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Success (IO/Intelligence): The public message from HUR Chief Budanov (07:02Z) regarding surveillance capability provides a crucial, timely counter-narrative of UAF intelligence superiority, countering the psychological effect of RF deep strikes.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The constraint is no longer capacity, but time and route integrity. UAF forces require immediate activation of dedicated trucking convoys protected by mobile AD and dedicated EW assets. Remaining long-range AD assets must be immediately redeployed to protect the road transit nodes leading out of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

The cognitive domain is highly volatile, attempting to manage battlefield shock with confidence-building narratives.

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Synchronization)

The previous severe threat posed by the "Kellogg Agreement" narrative (06:30Z) remains active and critically dangerous until officially countered. RF domestic IO (TASS) continues deflection through soft news (weather, holidays).

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF P7 efforts are focusing on national remembrance (06:59Z - 07:01Z) and intelligence competence (07:02Z) to maintain public trust. However, the lack of immediate confirmation regarding the denial of the "Kellogg Agreement" risks institutional panic and increased risk aversion at the NCA level.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO is actively attempting to create a perception of diplomatic resolution to halt Western support and delay the commitment of UAF reserves. The effectiveness of this campaign is currently maximized due to the timing of the MLD and the deep strike success.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The operational focus shifts to logistical survival. If BRAVO-BLOCK is not confirmed moving NLT 070730Z, the MDCOA is guaranteed.

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF 37th GMRB continues to fix forward UAF units at Stepnohorsk, achieving a moderate, costly penetration. Simultaneously, RF focuses ISR and residual strike assets on interdicting the tertiary road movement of BRAVO-BLOCK between Dnipro and the front, exploiting the logistical chaos caused by the successful targeting of the primary and secondary rail networks. UAF stabilizes the line late 07 DEC, but the cost in reserves and lost depth is severe.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Increased Certainty) The combination of the Fastiv, Poltava, and Dnipro strikes results in logistical paralysis, preventing BRAVO-BLOCK from achieving Minimum Combat Effectiveness (MCE) for deployment. The RF 38th GMRB successfully exploits the Huliaipole flank (Gap P4), bypassing defenses and enabling the 37th GMRB to achieve a deep operational penetration. UAF forward battalions are encircled and attrited NLT 071800Z due to lack of Class V resupply and immobilized reserves.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate priority has shifted from protecting the secondary rail bypass to ensuring the viability of the tertiary road movement plan and achieving confirmation of BRAVO-BLOCK deployment.

1. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER & FIRES (J3/J6):

   • Action A (Reserve Protection - CRITICAL): DO NOT DELAY. If confirmation of contingency fires (Action A from previous SITREP) is not received NLT 070715Z, C2 MUST ISSUE A MANDATORY ORDER to initiate defensive fire support along the BRAVO-BLOCK movement corridor immediately, prioritizing smoke and counter-battery fire against identified RF ISR positions.
   • Action B (Counter-Logistical ISR): Immediately task all available dedicated mobile EW platforms (e.g., Bukovel-AD) to secure the designated tertiary road corridor south of Dnipro, anticipating aggressive RF ISR and "Mangas" aerial mining efforts exploiting the logistical chaos.
   • Action C (MLD Attrition): Confirm execution of deep-strike UAS saturation missions over the 37th GMRB penetration zone (Action C from previous SITREP), maximizing exploitation of the confirmed Buk-M3 AD void.

2. LOGISTICS AND AIR DEFENSE (J4/J7):

   • Action A (Logistical Redundancy - CATASTROPHIC RISK MITIGATION): ASSUME ALL CENTRAL RAIL IS COMPROMISED. Immediately activate the full tertiary supply plan utilizing road networks. All remaining Class V and Class VII supplies must be transferred to dedicated heavy truck convoys and prepared for movement NLT 070800Z.
   • Action B (AD Redeployment): Immediately redeploy all mobile, surviving long-range and short-range AD assets (NASAMS, S-300, Gepard, Avenger) to cover the primary road transit nodes and fuel depots in the Dnipropetrovsk/Vasylkivka region and the tertiary routes leading to the front. Prioritize defense of fuel stocks.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7/G2):

   • Action A (Counter-Isolation Narrative - IMMEDIATE, NCA LEVEL): The National Command Authority must issue an official, high-tempo denial of the "Kellogg Agreement" narrative NLT 070730Z. Frame the rumor as a coordinated RF hybrid warfare effort designed to maximize domestic paralysis during the kinetic assault. Failure to act now guarantees adverse political and operational consequences.

//END OF REPORT//