Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - ACUTE RESERVE VULNERABILITY & LOGISTICAL FIXATION

TIME: 070230Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL FAILURE TO CONFIRM RESERVE MANEUVER // MLD T-3 HOURS 30 MINUTES // LOGISTICAL FIXATION ESCALATED (KREMENCHUK)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF operational approach remains highly synchronized: fixing fires (Donetsk KAB) combined with persistent logistical friction (Shaheds) in advance of the decisive Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) at Stepnohorsk.

• Main Effort Axis (Stepnohorsk): MLD launch remains fixed for NLT 070600Z DEC 25 (T-minus 3 hours, 30 minutes).
• Logistical Axis (Kremenchuk/Poltava): New confirmed group of Adversary UAVs (Bpla) detected heading toward Kremenchuk (070204Z). This confirms that RF strategy is to maintain simultaneous pressure on Fastiv (Rail) and Kremenchuk (River/Road/Fuel) to maximize logistical paralysis ahead of the MLD. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Key Vulnerability: The BRAVO-BLOCK operational reserve remains unconfirmed as having executed the 070200Z immediate movement order. The critical deadline for confirmation (070230Z) is current.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Severe frost and clear skies persist across the operational area. These conditions optimize RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, significantly increasing the probability of RF detection and kinetic engagement against the exposed, maneuvering, or stalled BRAVO-BLOCK reserve. (Confidence: HIGH)

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Operating at peak synchronization across kinetic, logistical, and cognitive domains. The observed coordination between KAB deployment, Shahed missions, and IO amplification suggests high confidence in achieving operational surprise. UAF: Defensive posture is critically strained. Failure to confirm the secure relocation of the primary operational reserve (BRAVO-BLOCK) elevates the operational risk from high to existential if the reserve is attrited before the counter-attack window opens.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is fully committed to the MLD NLT 070600Z. The pre-MLD phase is now characterized by maximal effort to fix UAF forces geographically (Donetsk) and paralyze UAF decision-making/resupply logistically (Fastiv/Kremenchuk).

• Tactical Focus (Logistics Strangling): Targeting Kremenchuk supports the overarching goal of delaying or denying the commitment of UAF heavy reserves by striking alternative fuel and road transport nodes, compounding the damage done by the Fastiv rail strike. (Confidence: HIGH)
• IO Synchronization (Paralysis): The TASS message quoting Peskov (070206Z) is timed to reinforce the "US Abandonment" narrative just hours before the MLD launch, aiming to induce National Command Authority (NCA) paralysis regarding the commitment of the already-vulnerable reserve. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Vulnerability Exploitation: RF ISR will be focused primarily on the suspected BRAVO-BLOCK axes. Exploiting the weather conditions, the RF seeks a critical targeting opportunity against the column before sunrise.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No structural changes to the RF MLD plan are observed. The tactical adaptation involves the sustained, multi-nodal targeting of logistical hubs (Fastiv + Kremenchuk) rather than relying on a single interdiction point.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF Shahed expenditure is sustainable. The localized KAB use suggests sufficient supply for the fixing operation. The strategic fuel crisis (T+48h) provides a hard deadline, ensuring the MLD launch timeline is adhered to.

D. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective in coordinating fixed-wing/UAV fires with information warfare campaigns. The C2 response to the lost Buk-M3 (18th Gds AA Regt SAR score 42.26) indicates a localized but manageable stress, reinforcing the need to exploit the AD void now. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are postured defensively along the Line of Contact (LOC). Readiness for counter-attack is severely degraded by the lack of secure, confirmed movement for BRAVO-BLOCK. Remaining forces are preparing for maximum attrition warfare during the initial breach phase.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Maneuver Failure - Ongoing): The immediate threat remains the absence of confirmation regarding the BRAVO-BLOCK column movement, security, and current vector. This constitutes a severe operational crisis.
• Success: UAF C2 has correctly identified the KAB strikes in Donetsk as fixing fires, preventing the premature shifting of reserves toward the East.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The existential requirement remains real-time confirmation of the BRAVO-BLOCK location and security status. Due to the renewed threat to Kremenchuk, immediate establishment of multiple, highly distributed fuel/ammo caches is required along the probable commitment routes.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

The information environment is acutely hostile, designed to coincide precisely with the kinetic attack window.

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Synchronization)

The TASS/Peskov message (070206Z) is the key IO event of the last hour. By quoting high-level US strategy documents out of context, RF media aims to:

1. Undermine Trust: Create doubt regarding the long-term reliability of NATO/US support.
2. Encourage Paralysis: Suggest that any heavy military action by Ukraine now will complicate potential future "peace" negotiations under a different US administration.

This information warfare push is a direct support function for the MLD by delaying or paralyzing UAF decision-making. (Confidence: HIGH)

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The synchronized kinetic attacks (Shaheds, KABs) combined with high-level diplomatic doubt campaigns are designed to maximize pre-attack demoralization. Operational failure resulting from the loss of the reserve would have catastrophic effects on domestic and military morale.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The immediate task is not seeking new support, but neutralizing the RF narrative that existing support is wavering. This requires an immediate, high-level diplomatic counter-narrative (referencing the previous Macron/Zelenskyy success) to block the TASS claims.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The critical window for UAF decision-making is closing rapidly. Failure to secure the reserve in the next 60 minutes will increase the likelihood of the MDCOA.

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF MLD launches NLT 070600Z. Sustained Shahed attacks divert UAF AD while KABs maintain the fix in Donetsk. RF ISR fails to definitively locate the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve, which, despite delays, is committed to the fight NLT 071000Z. RF secures Phase Line ALPHA (shallow breach 5-7 km). UAF conducts a costly, delayed counter-attack but prevents a deep penetration. Logistical constraints (Fastiv/Kremenchuk damage) severely limit subsequent UAF offensive capability.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(CRITICAL/EXISTENTIAL) RF ISR successfully tracks the exposed or stalled BRAVO-BLOCK reserve (T+0 to T+2 hours), capitalizing on the clear weather and missed deadlines. RF launches massed fixed-wing (KAB/FAB) or deep-strike UAS/Missile attacks against the reserve column, achieving 70%+ attrition. Simultaneously, the 37th GMRB MLD (070600Z) achieves a deep 10-15 km penetration, forcing widespread, disorderly UAF retreat and exposing the central Southern Front command and logistics nodes.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The deadline for reserve movement confirmation (070230Z) is now the singular most important operational metric.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate priority is the secure movement of BRAVO-BLOCK and maximizing pre-MLD attrition using the limited AD window.

1. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER & FIRES (J3/J6): FORCE MOVEMENT PRIORITY OVER ALL OTHERS.

   • Action A (Reserve Status - EXISTENTIAL): Demand/force status report on BRAVO-BLOCK NLT 070245Z. If the status is not confirmed, assume the force is stationary and immediately order maximum dispersion and tactical movement of company-sized elements on diverse routes, prioritizing evasion over coherence until the vector is clear.
   • Action B (Exploit AD Void - URGENT): The NLT 070400Z deep strike deadline is critical. Allocate all available long-range precision fires (GLSDB, long-range UAS) to saturate confirmed 37th GMRB assembly areas. Focus on soft-skinned vehicles, C2, and pioneer assets to degrade the MLD's breaching capability.
   • Action C (Counter Friction): Air Defense assets in the Poltava/Kremenchuk region (following the 070204Z alert) must be optimized for point defense of Class I/III storage rather than broad area defense, acknowledging the finite window before MLD launch.

2. LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT (J4): SECURE RESERVE RESUPPLY.

   • Action A (Emergency Cache Activation): Immediately activate pre-positioned emergency Class III (fuel) and Class V (ammo) caches along the two most likely BRAVO-BLOCK commitment routes. These must be operational/ready for collection NLT 070430Z, assuming the MLD will disrupt primary supply lines.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7/G2): IMMEDIATE COUNTER-PROPAGANDA.

   • Action A (Counter IO - IMMEDIATE): Issue official high-level governmental/MoD response (NLT 070330Z) that directly confronts the TASS/Peskov narrative (070206Z). Frame the statements as blatant disinformation tactics designed to distract from the impending, desperate RF military offensive (MLD) and their strategic fuel crisis.

//END OF REPORT//