Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTREP) - CRITICAL RAPID UPDATE TIME: 061935Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: T-1.5H MLD // LOGISTICAL DEGRADATION CONFIRMED LONG-TERM // CRITICAL UAS THREAT ON CENTRAL LOGISTICAL AXIS // COGNITIVE PARALYSIS PEAK

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational window has further compressed to T-1.5 hours until the confirmed RF Main Land Drive (MLD) initiation at Stepnohorsk (NLT 2100Z). The immediate priority has shifted to neutralizing the concurrent deep strike wave targeted at central logistics hubs.

• Deep Battle Axis (Logistics): RF is executing a massive, multi-vector Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) strike just prior to the MLD. UAS groups are confirmed heading from Sumy toward Chernihiv/Poltava, directly threatening the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro logistical bypass points. Launches are confirmed from Primorsko-Akhtarsk, Millerovo, and Kursk.
• Infrastructure Status (CRITICAL FACT): Official confirmation from Ukrenergo indicates that restoration of the damaged energy infrastructure requires weeks, not days. This confirms the strategic success of the RF deep strike campaign and imposes a critical, medium-term constraint on UAF operational mobility and logistical throughput.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The previously assessed severe frost, combined with the confirmed long-term energy disruption, ensures that logistical movement and troop sustainment remain highly constrained across the Southern and Eastern Operational Zones for the foreseeable future.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Maintaining superior multi-domain synchronization. MLD forces (37th GMRB) are in final assembly, masked by the maximum effort kinetic (UAS) and cognitive (IO) attacks. UAF: Tactical defenses at Stepnohorsk remain fixed. Operational control failure (BRAVO-BLOCK reserve) is occurring amidst the highest peak of RF distraction operations.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent remains centered on achieving a tactical breakthrough at Stepnohorsk secured by operational paralysis. The synchronization confirms the following:

1. Kinetic Intent: Neutralize the Poltava/Kremenchuk logistical bypass capacity before the MLD, ensuring no relief or sustainment reaches the Stepnohorsk defenders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2. Cognitive Intent: Achieve absolute paralysis of the National Command Authority (NCA) and strategic reserve command (BRAVO-BLOCK) by weaponizing high-level diplomatic uncertainty (Zelensky/Trump advisors talks) at the moment of the MLD launch. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The immediate, synchronized amplification of the Axios report by RF media and military bloggers, coinciding with the massed Shahed launch, demonstrates the RF's high degree of preparation and capacity to weaponize strategic diplomatic developments for immediate tactical gain.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Tactical readiness at Stepnohorsk remains high, but operational readiness is now CRITICAL-LOW due to the existential, immediate UAS threat to the logistics spine and the maximum pressure on the NCA to commit reserves (BRAVO-BLOCK).

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setbacks:

1. Operational Logistics: Confirmation that energy system recovery will take weeks validates RF strategic interdiction success.
2. C2 Vulnerability: The diplomatic distraction regarding territory and security guarantees severely impacts the C2 environment at the moment of the decisive MLD launch.

Successes:

1. Allied Commitment: The commitment of 250 Stryker APCs to Poland reinforces long-term NATO resolve, providing a future counter-narrative against RF claims of Western abandonment.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT (IMMEDIATE): Urgent, massed deployment of AD/EW assets (Bukovel-AD, S-300, MANPADS) to the Poltava/Kremenchuk area to intercept the confirmed incoming UAS wave. Failure to intercept this wave will directly facilitate the MDCOA.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is leveraging the confirmed diplomatic contacts to push the "Peace Trap" narrative to its peak efficacy.

1. Strategic Surrender: Confirmation of Zelensky discussing "territories and security guarantees" with Trump-linked advisors is immediately framed by RF sources as negotiations for capitulation under pressure, maximizing the sense of doom just before the MLD.
2. Internal Dissension/Western Abandonment: RF continues to amplify diplomatic friction (Musk vs. Sikorski) to suggest Western unity is fractured, reinforcing the urgency for Ukraine to negotiate unfavorable terms.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is under extreme duress due to the confirmed long-term power crisis (weeks) and the high-visibility reports of potential "territory" discussions, potentially fostering distrust in the NCA at the most sensitive moment.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF MLD initiates at 2100Z. The concurrent UAS strike achieves significant kinetic effects on the Poltava/Kremenchuk logistical bypass points (targeting substations and C2 infrastructure). BRAVO-BLOCK remains immobile NLT 2000Z. The strategic logistical environment degrades further, resulting in an assured Class V (Ammo) shortfall for the Stepnohorsk defenders within 48 hours. The diplomatic IO success ensures C2 paralysis persists for H+3 hours post-MLD.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - INCREASED RISK) RF UAS wave successfully evades AD and causes catastrophic damage to the Poltava/Kremenchuk rail junctions or energy infrastructure supporting them, resulting in a 0% heavy armor throughput capability for the next 72 hours. Simultaneously, the 38th GMRB exploits the Huliaipole flank. With no chance of logistical sustainment or reserve commitment, Stepnohorsk defenders are forced to initiate a disorderly immediate withdrawal or face full encirclement by 071200Z DEC 25.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The window for effective preemptive action is now focused entirely on reserve movement and air defense prioritization.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. AIR DEFENSE & LOGISTICS (J6/J3/J4): IMMEDIATE COUNTER-UAS ON CENTRAL AXIS.

   • Action A (AD Execution - EXISTENTIAL): Divert all available mobile AD (MANPADS, Gepard, G-Shielder) and EW assets to the Poltava/Kremenchuk logistical corridor immediately. Prioritize interception of the confirmed UAS vector (Sumy/Chernihiv/Poltava). This is the primary defense against the MDCOA. Execute the planned deep strikes against 37th GMRB concurrently (NLT 1945Z) if AD assets cannot be diverted.
   • Action B (Logistics Planning): Given the confirmed long-term energy disruption ("weeks, not days"), the J4 must immediately authorize the procurement/deployment of substantial military-grade generators to ensure continuity of rail C2 and junction operations along the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro bypass.

2. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER & C2 (J3/J6): FORCE MOVEMENT MANDATORY.

   • Action A (C2 Interjection - IMMEDIATE): Implement the C2 bypass immediately. The window for delegated action is closing due to IO saturation. Confirm BRAVO-BLOCK movement NLT 2000Z. If confirmation is not received, the Chief of the General Staff must issue a direct, overriding command to the lead brigade NLT 2005Z.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7/G2): NEUTRALIZE 'PEACE TRAP' NARRATIVE.

   • Action A (NCA Counter-Narrative - IMMEDIATE): The President (or highest ranking delegated authority) must issue a video statement NLT 2000Z, confirming the discussion with Trump advisors, but framing it explicitly as "routine contingency planning for a post-conflict security framework"—not a concession or negotiation of current territorial status. Emphasize that such discussions are only possible because of Ukrainian defense resolve, which must now be reinforced by reserve commitment.
   • Action B (International IO): Highlight the confirmed long-term nature of RF infrastructure targeting (weeks, not days) as evidence that RF seeks to destroy the nation, not negotiate. Use this to demand immediate delivery of long-range AD systems.

//END OF REPORT//