Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTREP) - RAPID UPDATE TIME: 061915Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: T-1.75H MLD // LOGISTICS PARALYSIS CRITICAL // RF FIXING OPERATION CONFIRMED

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational window has compressed to T-1.75 hours until the confirmed RF Main Land Drive (MLD) initiation at Stepnohorsk (NLT 2100Z). The Center of Operational Gravity (COG) remains the UAF logistical spine, which is now confirmed to be under successful, multi-domain attack.

• Deep Battle Axis: The operational effects of RF kinetic shaping are confirmed regionally. Moldova's urgent request for electricity aid from Romania (18:55Z/19:00Z) validates the success of RF interdiction operations in degrading regional energy grids vital for rail logistics continuity and civilian resilience across the Southern Command AOR.
• New Axis of Pressure: RF "Center" Group claims advances near Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast). This likely constitutes a Fixing and Holding Operation (FHO) designed to preoccupy key UAF assets, such as the confirmed presence of the 25th Separate Airborne Brigade (OPDBr) in the Pokrovsk sector. This expands the RF pressure envelope just prior to the MLD.
• Critical Infrastructure Strikes: Confirmed RF kinetic strike on a major medical logistics warehouse in Dnipro (18:56Z) targeting civilian health sustainment, increasing internal friction and resource strain.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Official statements from Ukrenergo (18:48Z) confirm that anticipated severe frost will intensify rolling blackout schedules. This critical environmental factor severely amplifies the operational effects of RF infrastructure strikes, reducing backup generation capacity and complicating troop movement/rail throughput due to power instability.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Maintaining highly synchronized, multi-domain pressure across the kinetic, logistical, and cognitive domains. The Myrnohrad FHO is synchronized with the Stepnohorsk MLD launch and maximized IO saturation. UAF: Defenses are prepared tactically, but operational readiness remains constrained. CRITICAL JUDGMENT: The continued paralysis regarding the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve movement (now H+2.25 past the original decision point) suggests that the RF logistical interdiction and fixing operations are achieving their desired operational effect. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is to achieve an irreversible tactical breakthrough at Stepnohorsk by 070600Z, secured by the simultaneous operational paralysis of UAF reserves and logistical sustainment, now reinforced by a kinetic fixation effort in the Myrnohrad sector.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The deployment of the RF "Center" Group in the Dnipropetrovsk direction, coupled with FPV drone targeting successes (91st Regiment, 19:00Z), suggests RF is attempting to fix UAF forces across multiple axes to prevent reinforcement from reaching Zaporizhzhia.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 remains superior, achieving full kinetic-IO-Maneuver synchronization. The critical vulnerability remains UAF operational C2 failure regarding reserve deployment.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Tactical readiness remains high (e.g., 25th OPDBr at Pokrovsk, confirmed successful targeting by Hayabusa drone group). Operational readiness is CRITICALLY LOW due to the existential logistical threat and C2 inertia preventing the commitment of the main reserve.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setbacks:

1. C2 Failure: BRAVO-BLOCK remains delayed.
2. Logistical Impact: Destruction of the Dnipro medical warehouse represents a significant loss of critical Class VIII (Medical Supplies) sustainment for the South/East fronts.

Successes:

1. High-Impact Attrition: Successful FPV strike (Hayabusa, 19:01Z) against personnel, reinforcing the message of high domestic tactical combat effectiveness in line with Armed Forces Day messaging.
2. Force Presence: Confirmation of 25th OPDBr presence near Pokrovsk demonstrates resolve against the RF fixing operation.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, decentralized execution of AD/EW deployment to protect the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro logistical bypass points. CONSTRAINT: The environmental factor (severe frost) combined with power grid instability creates a high-friction environment for the movement and sustainment of the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve, compounding the C2 failure.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is leveraging confirmed kinetic effects to amplify strategic narratives:

1. Logistical Collapse: The Moldovan electricity request is immediately weaponized by RF channels (18:55Z/19:00Z) to frame the deep strikes as achieving regional strategic isolation and confirming UAF vulnerability.
2. Aid Fragmentation: The re-amplification of the Landau quote (18:53Z) aims to erode confidence in sustained EU financial support at the critical hour.
3. Historical Justification: Messaging regarding "demilitarization" of Zaporizhzhia (18:43Z) provides a historical pretext for the MLD and associated atrocities.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale remains robust, anchored by high visibility of successful tactical actions (GUR, FPV strikes). However, the confirmed strike on the Dnipro medical warehouse will strain civilian resolve and trust in defense capacity if not rapidly mitigated.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF initiates "Operation Guardians" (MLD) NLT 2100Z. The 37th GMRB will achieve localized penetration (5-8 km). Due to sustained UAF C2 inertia and the operational effects of the Myrnohrad fixation/logistical strangulation, BRAVO-BLOCK will not be committed effectively NLT 070200Z. RF successfully degrades the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro bypass capacity by 60% due to power instability and point strikes, resulting in a severe Class V (Ammo) shortfall for Stepnohorsk defenders.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Operational Logistical Collapse and Encirclement. RF achieves a catastrophic strike on Poltava or Kremenchuk NLT 2000Z. Simultaneously, the 38th GMRB exploits the Huliaipole flank, meeting minimal resistance due to fixed UAF forces and the immobilized reserve. Logistically starved, the Stepnohorsk defenders are forced into a non-optimal immediate withdrawal or risk operational encirclement by 071200Z DEC 25.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The window for effective preemptive action is now less than 15 minutes.

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER & C2 (J3/J6): FORCE MOVEMENT NOW.

   • Action A (C2 Interjection - IMMEDIATE): Implement the C2 bypass immediately. Send two separate, highly trusted O-6 personnel to the BRAVO-BLOCK staging area via air or high-speed ground transport to personally confirm movement execution NLT 1915Z. The window for decentralized action is closing.
   • Action B (Fires - URGENT): The window for exploiting the Buk-M3 AD gap closes at 1930Z. Immediately divert all available deep-strike assets (HIMARS, Bayraktar) to saturation fire on 37th GMRB final assembly areas. Maximize attrition before 2100Z.

2. AIR DEFENSE & LOGISTICS (J4/J6/J3): SHORAD FOR LOGISTICS AXIS IS PRIMARY DEFENSE.

   • Action A (AD Surge - CRITICAL): If confirmation for Poltava/Kremenchuk AD is not received by 1920Z, authorize the TDF/National Guard mobile MANPADS reserve to establish emergency perimeter defense around critical rail junctions and power substations. Priority target: SW-bound UAS (Chernihiv vector confirms continued threat).
   • Action B (Health Logistics): Activate the emergency medical distribution plan. Reroute Class VIII supplies (medical) from Western depots directly to frontline field hospitals, bypassing Dnipro entirely until infrastructure security is established.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7/G2): MITIGATE LOGISTICAL FEAR AND COUNTER RF FIXATION.

   • Action A (International IO): Coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to immediately frame the Moldovan power crisis as evidence of RF strategic targeting of regional stability, not just Ukraine, to reinforce the necessity of allied AD deployment.
   • Action B (Domestic IO): Use the confirmed presence of the 25th OPDBr in the Pokrovsk sector to reassure the public that high-value UAF units are in position to counter the RF Myrnohrad fixation effort, proving the RF effort is failing to achieve a critical surprise.

//END OF REPORT//