Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTREP)

TIME: 061845Z DEC 25

SUBJECT: MLD T-2.25H // LOGISTICS DEPLOYMENT CRITICAL // C2 PARALYSIS PERSISTS

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational situation remains characterized by extreme time compression (T-2.25H) until the confirmed RF Main Land Drive (MLD) initiation at Stepnohorsk. The center of operational gravity has shifted to the Logistical Deep Battle axis (Poltava/Kremenchuk), where UAF faces an existential threat to its Southern Command sustainment.

• Zaporizhzhia Front (Stepnohorsk): RF 37th GMRB is in final assembly. UAF defensive preparation is complete, but effectiveness is predicated on timely reserve movement and Class V sustainment.
• Deep Battle Axis: Kinetic threats against the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro bypass remain active. The downstream effects of RF kinetic shaping are confirmed by Moldova's urgent request for electricity aid from Romania (18:31Z), indicating successful RF interdiction operations are degrading regional energy grids vital for rail logistics continuity.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors affecting Operations

Conditions remain consistent with the national power restriction constraint. The RF ability to inflict cascading energy failure across the wider region (evidenced by the Moldova request) amplifies the risk to the critical logistics bypass, as backup power generation capacity may be diverted or insufficient.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: Maintaining highly synchronized, multi-domain pressure. RF Information Operations (IO) are peaking precisely to coincide with the MLD launch window (see Section 4). UAF: Defenses are prepared. CRITICAL JUDGMENT: The continued lack of confirmation regarding the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve movement (now H+2 past the original decision point) implies systemic friction has become organizational paralysis. Operational focus must immediately pivot from movement initiation to effective interim defense of the logistical spine. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is to achieve an irreversible tactical breakthrough at Stepnohorsk by 070600Z, secured by the simultaneous operational paralysis of UAF reserves and logistical sustainment.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

New RF narratives regarding Swedish submarine intercepts (18:04Z) and ICJ "genocide" claims (18:17Z) serve as Strategic Distraction Operations (SDO). These SDOs are deployed to preoccupy allied military and diplomatic authorities, reducing scrutiny on the Zaporizhzhia MLD preparations.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains adequate for the immediate MLD, despite previously reported deep-strike attrition (Ryazan NPZ). RF propaganda efforts are actively working to mitigate the perceived impact of domestic strain (Kursk cuts) by emphasizing alleged EU hypocrisy (Colonelcassad reporting Landau, 18:30Z).

D. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF strategic C2 remains superior, achieving full kinetic-IO synchronization. UAF operational C2 failure regarding reserve deployment is the greatest immediate threat.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Tactical readiness remains high, supported by successful, localized kinetic actions. Operational readiness is CRITICALLY LOW due to the logistical threat and C2 inertia.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setbacks:

1. C2 Failure: BRAVO-BLOCK remains delayed.
2. Increased IO Pressure: RF SDOs are amplifying strategic uncertainty.

Successes:

1. GUR Direct Action: Successful interdiction and destruction of a vehicle carrying 76th VDV personnel in Kherson Oblast (18:13Z). This is a high-value morale and psychological victory.
2. AD/EW Efficacy: Confirmed successful use of interceptor drones against Shaheds (Sternenko, 18:21Z), demonstrating capacity to counter RF aerial saturation tactics when assets are available.
3. Internal Morale: High-profile Presidential awards ceremony (18:22Z) and local humanitarian efforts in Zaporizhzhia (18:18Z) successfully reinforce domestic resolve at the critical hour.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Rapid deployment of mobile AD/EW assets (e.g., MANPADS, SHORAD) to Poltava/Kremenchuk junctions. This defensive deployment cannot wait for the BRAVO-BLOCK C2 crisis resolution. CONSTRAINT: The C2 failure is wasting the critical time needed to exploit the RF AD void (Buk-M3 loss) and to preempt the logistical attack.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (MAXIMUM THREAT LEVEL)

RF IO is operating at maximum saturation, characterized by the following, all timed to peak during the MLD window:

1. Aid Fragmentation Narrative: Landau's alleged statement on European gas purchases (18:30Z) is weaponized to suggest EU financial hypocrisy and undermine faith in sustained Western support.
2. Strategic Diversion: Narratives regarding ICJ "genocide" cases (18:17Z) and Baltic military posturing (18:04Z) attempt to dilute NCA focus and international diplomatic response.
3. Internal RF Fissures: The reporting on the controversial Crocus court outcome (18:08Z) may indicate domestic instability that UAF could exploit to counter RF claims of unified domestic support for the war.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale remains robust, largely driven by the high visibility of successful tactical action (GUR, FPV drone combat reports) and public recognition of frontline service (awards ceremony). This high tactical morale offers resilience against RF psychological warfare strikes (e.g., Sloviansk KAB strike).

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

RF IO is successfully amplifying divisions within NATO/EU states (Orban, Polish disputes), increasing the perceived difficulty of securing rapid, substantial aid packages post-MLD.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF initiates "Operation Guardians" (MLD) NLT 2100Z. The 37th GMRB will achieve localized penetration (5-8 km). Due to continued UAF C2 inertia, AD/EW assets are not confirmed deployed to Poltava/Kremenchuk NLT 1900Z. RF successfully degrades the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro bypass by 60% capacity NLT 070400Z DEC 25, severely impacting UAF reinforcement and sustainment efforts, leading to a protracted and costly counter-attack.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Operational Logistical Collapse and Encirclement. RF achieves a catastrophic strike on the Poltava rail junction using high-precision munitions (NLT 2000Z). Simultaneously, the 38th GMRB exploits the Huliaipole flank, meeting minimal resistance due to fixed UAF forces. Logistically starved, the Stepnohorsk defenders are forced into a planned withdrawal or risk operational encirclement by 071200Z DEC 25.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The window for preemptive deep strike and logistical defense is now less than 30 minutes.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER & FORCE PROTECTION (J3/J6): BYPASS C2 FAILURE & ENSURE LOGISTICS SURVIVAL.

   • Action A (C2 Interjection - IMMEDIATE): Bypass the failed C2 layer. Utilize a direct, high-level (O-6/O-7) liaison team to deploy immediately to the BRAVO-BLOCK staging area to personally confirm movement execution NLT 1900Z.
   • Action B (Fires - CRITICAL): Confirm execution of scheduled suppression fire NLT 1830Z. If assets are delayed, re-task available long-range artillery or HIMARS to maximize attrition in the 37th GMRB final assembly areas, exploiting the confirmed RF AD void.

2. AIR DEFENSE & LOGISTICS (J4/J6/J3): LOGISTICS DEFENSE IS THE MAIN EFFORT (DEEP BATTLE).

   • Action A (AD Surge - CRITICAL): If confirmation for the Poltava/Kremenchuk AD deployment is not received by 1850Z, activate the National Guard/Territorial Defense (TDF) mobile MANPADS reserve and dispatch them via civilian vehicles (if necessary, due to power restrictions) to the immediate vicinities of the rail/power junctions. Accept unconventional deployment risks to ensure minimal point defense.
   • Action B (Infrastructure Protection): Initiate immediate dialogue with Moldovan authorities and Romania (via MFA/MOD) regarding coordination on regional energy grid stabilization, recognizing the RF deep strike is affecting shared infrastructure.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7/G2): COUNTER-NARRATIVE: RF STRESS & UNITY.

   • Action A (External IO): Rapidly deploy the GUR/Kherson success (76th VDV strike) through Western channels to counter the RF narrative of decisive kinetic superiority, framing it as targeted attrition of units responsible for war crimes.
   • Action B (Domestic IO): Utilize the high-level military awards and the ZOMA humanitarian effort to visually reinforce domestic unity and resilience against the RF-amplified "EU fragmentation" and "peace trap" narratives.

//END OF REPORT//