Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/083

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TIME: 051730Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD IMMINENT (NLT 2100Z). URGENT CONFIRMATION REQUIRED FOR POKROVSK SETBACK AND RMAO THREAT MITIGATION. RF IO INTENSIFIES DOMESTIC DIVISION NARRATIVES (TCC VIOLENCE). PRIORITY: P1 Neutralize RMAO Threat (IMMEDIATE); P8 Confirm/Contain Pokrovsk Situation (CRITICAL); P4 Defend Zolotonosha (CRITICAL).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

The operational focus remains the Zaporizhzhia-Stepnohorsk axis where the RF Main Land Drive (MLD) is postured.

• Zaporizhzhia Direction (MLD Axis): The air alert in Zaporizhzhia Oblast terminated (16:44Z), indicating the initial wave of КАБ/UAV pre-assault fires has concluded. This termination may precede the ground phase.
• Donetsk Direction (Krasnolimansky): Confirmed tactical reports indicate RF mechanized elements are advancing and destroying UAF materiel in the Krasnolimansky (Lyman) direction (16:58Z). JUDGMENT: This activity may be a secondary shaping operation designed to fix UAF reserves or exploit vulnerability on the northern Donetsk flank, leveraging the uncertainty surrounding Pokrovsk.
• Northern Fixation: UAV activity is reported southwest of Chernihiv (16:51Z, 16:53Z), confirming continued RF efforts to draw UAF Air Defense (AD) assets northward, away from the critical Zolotonosha logistical hub.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Clear conditions persist, favoring RF UAV/RMAO deployment and fixed-wing КАБ strikes.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi has reiterated the strategic assessment of over 710,000 RF personnel along the Line of Contact (16:58Z). UAF defensive posture is concentrated at Stepnohorsk, but resources are being stressed by multi-vector threats (RMAO, Zolotonosha, and unconfirmed Pokrovsk setback).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Overall Intent: Achieve a breach at Stepnohorsk NLT 2100Z, utilizing technological superiority (RMAO, precision fires) and cognitive manipulation (IO) to prevent UAF reserve commitment.

• Multi-Domain Synchronization: RF is effectively synchronizing kinetic action with IO narratives. The MoD is promoting the effectiveness of its Unmanned Systems Forces (16:44Z) just as "Mangas" RMAO platforms pose a critical threat to UAF reserve corridors (BRAVO-BLOCK).
• Political Maneuver/Deterrence: Aggressive statements by RF officials (Medvedev, 16:58Z) targeting France are intended to amplify disunity within NATO, indirectly degrading confidence in sustained Western support for Ukraine during the MLD.
• Deep Battle Justification: The FSB claim of interdicting a "terrorist" plot targeting the Black Sea Fleet (16:47Z) provides a pre-emptive justification for intensified RF deep strikes (e.g., further КАБ use) or potential kinetic escalation against UAF cities.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

1. Shift to Dual Flank Pressure: The ground activity in the Krasnolimansky direction suggests an attempt to create a second, geographically distinct crisis to overstretch UAF reserves already committed to the Stepnohorsk defense and the Pokrovsk uncertainty.
2. Focus on Recruitment Narrative: RF IO (Colonelcassad) has rapidly weaponized the Odesa TCC violence, shifting the narrative from corruption (Skorod) to forced, violent mobilization (16:35Z). This aims to destabilize UAF internal security and reduce future mobilization effectiveness.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

The long-term Western geopolitical threat (EU/G7 discussions on complete prohibition of Russian maritime oil transport, 16:36Z, 17:03Z) reinforces the urgency for the RF Southern Group of Forces (SGF) to achieve immediate operational success before the confirmed Temryuk fuel crisis (T+48-72 hours) critically degrades their operational tempo. RF still relies on civilian volunteer logistics (17:01Z).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

RF C2 maintains a high operational tempo and successfully manages cross-domain synchronization, specifically the link between kinetic (RMAO, MLD) and cognitive (NSS, TCC violence) effects.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

The National Command Authority (NCA) remains unified in its stated goal of rejecting territorial concessions (Syrskyi, 16:35Z, 16:46Z). This resolve is necessary to maintain national integrity but is simultaneously exploited by RF IO to frame Ukraine as obstructing peace.

• Vulnerability (Kinetic): The Krasnolimansky advance, coupled with the unconfirmed Pokrovsk status, risks diverting resources or attention from the main Stepnohorsk defense effort.
• Vulnerability (Cognitive): The coordinated IO attack on mobilization practices (TCC) is acutely damaging to domestic trust and operational readiness during a critical defensive phase.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

• SUCCESS (AD/Maneuver): Termination of the Zaporizhzhia air alert without reported catastrophic damage may indicate effective UAF air defense or successful hardening of fixed positions.
• SETBACK (Information): Failure to contain the Odesa TCC mobilization narrative rapidly has allowed RF IO to seize control of the domestic morale narrative.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CRITICAL)

The window for safely deploying the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve is closing. Immediate commitment of Mine Clearing Line Charges (MCLC) and Electronic Warfare (EW) assets is required to neutralize the RMAO threat before the 2100Z MLD launch. AD resources must remain rigidly prioritized at Zolotonosha, ignoring fixation efforts in Chernihiv.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

The environment is characterized by intense, focused RF disinformation targeting internal UAF friction points, timed precisely to coincide with the kinetic MLD preparation.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

RF will adhere to the compressed MLD timeline, supplemented by increased flank pressure and cognitive attacks:

1. MLD Launch and RMAO Exploitation (NLT 052100Z): 37th GMRB initiates the mechanized assault, relying on RMAO to delay and fragment the UAF BRAVO-BLOCK reserve commitment.
2. Zolotonosha Strike (Pre-MLD): RF executes a successful, albeit partial, strike on the Zolotonosha rail junction (P4), disrupting Class V flow for 12 hours, forcing UAF to rely on existing stockpiles during the initial breach.
3. Krasnolimansky Shaping: RF continues local advances in the Lyman sector, forcing UAF J3 to hold reserves in the eastern sector, further constraining the resources available for Stepnohorsk.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

RF achieves a decisive breakthrough coupled with strategic paralysis:

1. Pokrovsk Collapse Confirmed: Confirmation of Pokrovsk loss triggers a requirement to redirect strategic reserves to stabilize the Donetsk front immediately.
2. RMAO Success: The "Mangas" UAS successfully mines the primary AoAs for the BRAVO-BLOCK, forcing a complete operational halt or leading to severe attrition of UAF mechanized columns.
3. Simultaneous Penetration: The 37th GMRB achieves a deep penetration (10km+), leveraging the lack of rapid UAF counter-attack and the isolation caused by the Zolotonosha logistical failure. This leads to the establishment of RF forward firebases threatening the flank of the main UAF grouping.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver and Fires (J3 / G2)

ACTION: PRIORITIZE STEPNOHORSK COUNTER-ATTACK READINESS ABOVE ALL ELSE.

1. MCLC Lead Confirmed (IMMEDIATE): J3 must confirm that Mine Clearing Line Charges (MCLC) and Mine Rollers constitute the immediate leading element of the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve formation. The risk from "Mangas" is confirmed and must dictate tactical movement protocols.
2. Resource Non-Diversion (Pokrovsk/Lyman): Even if Pokrovsk is confirmed lost, J3 must define minimum stabilizing forces for the Donetsk direction. Under NO circumstances should the main armored/mechanized elements of the BRAVO-BLOCK be diverted from the Stepnohorsk axis prior to the MLD launch.
3. Counter-UAV/RMAO Tasking: Task dedicated high-power EW systems (e.g., electronic warfare vehicles) to blanket the primary AoAs for the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve movement to disrupt "Mangas" C2.

7.2. Air Defense Allocation (J3 / AD Command)

ACTION: CONSOLIDATE AD AT ZOLOTONOSHA.

1. Ignore Northern Vectors: Maintain the directive to ignore UAV fixation efforts targeting Chernihiv, Kyiv, or other non-critical population centers.
2. Maximum Alert Status: Maintain all SHORAD crews at Zolotonosha (rail/POL junction) at Weapons Release Status 1 until the P4 strike window (NLT 1830Z) is closed.

7.3. Strategic Communications (STRATCOM / NCA)

ACTION: NEUTRALIZE TCC VIOLENCE NARRATIVE WITH ACCOUNTABILITY AND NECESSITY FRAMEWORK.

1. TCC Counter-Narrative (URGENT): Address the Odesa TCC violence immediately. Narrative Anchor: "Violent misconduct by recruitment officers is unacceptable. Investigation and prosecution of the TCC officials responsible is underway. Mobilization must continue with accountability and integrity, because the alternative is Russian subjugation, as evidenced by Syrskyi's confirmation of the massive RF threat (710k troops)."
2. Weaponize International Lawfare: Coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to maximize amplification of the Siverskyi war crime investigation alongside condemnation of the Russian FSB 'terrorist' narratives, forcing the RF to defend its actions on the international stage.

//END OF MISREP//