Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/082

---

TIME: 051700Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD IMMINENT: KINETIC ESCALATION (КАБ STRIKES) AND CRITICAL POTENTIAL SETBACK AT POKROVSK THREATEN RESERVE COMMITMENT. P7 DOMESTIC IO FOCUSES ON CORRUPTION AMPLIFICATION. PRIORITY: P1 Neutralize RMAO Threat (IMMEDIATE); P4 Defend Zolotonosha (CRITICAL); P8 Confirm/Contain Pokrovsk Situation (CRITICAL).

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

The operational center of gravity remains the Stepnohorsk axis, where the RF 37th GMRB is postured for mechanized assault (NLT 2100Z). New kinetic activity confirms the pre-assault fire phase has begun in the sector.

• Zaporizhzhia Direction (MLD Axis): RF forces are executing launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (КАБ) targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast. JUDGMENT: This confirms the transition to the high-intensity preparation phase for the MLD, aiming to suppress UAF fixed defenses and deny rapid reinforcement routes for the BRAVO-BLOCK prior to the mechanized breach.
• Donetsk Direction (Pokrovsk): Unconfirmed reports suggest the loss of Pokrovsk. FACT/JUDGMENT: If confirmed, this constitutes a significant tactical/operational setback, potentially requiring immediate resource redirection and severely impacting morale and strategic planning continuity across the Southern and Eastern fronts.
• Deep Strike Fixation: UAV activity continues towards Sumy/Poltava/Kharkiv (Shevchenkivskyi District hit), confirming the RF strategy of fixing UAF Air Defense (AD) assets away from the critical Zolotonosha logistical hub (P4).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Conditions remain clear, favoring RF precision fires (КАБ) and the continued deployment of "Mangas" RMAO platforms.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

UAF remains defensively focused, prioritizing counter-mobility against RMAO and logistics protection at Zolotonosha. Commander-in-Chief Syrskyi confirms RF disposition of over 710,000 personnel along the line of contact, underscoring the requirement for effective attrition and calculated defense.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Overall Intent: Exploit tactical/logistical pressure (RMAO/Zolotonosha) and strategic cognitive paralysis (Skorod/NSS) to achieve rapid operational success at Stepnohorsk before the Temryuk fuel crisis manifests (T+48-72 hours).

• Tactical Execution (New): The shift to heavy, stand-off fires (КАБ) in the Zaporizhzhia direction is a critical indicator that the 37th GMRB MLD is entering the final preparatory window (less than 4 hours to launch).
• Information Warfare Synchronization: RF military sources are amplifying internal UAF corruption narratives (MP Skorod video/transcript) and attempting to counter UAF deep strikes (Sevastopol FSB "terror plot" interdiction narrative). This simultaneous pressure aims to erode UAF popular support and justify future RF kinetic actions.
• Adaptation (UAF Deep Strikes): RF domestic IO is already framing UAF deep strike capability (e.g., confirmed use of reactive drones in Southern Russia attacks) as "terrorism," reinforcing the narrative of existential threat to the Russian homeland.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1. Shift to КАБ Pre-Assault Fires: Utilizing guided aerial bombs to suppress UAF defenses and potentially targeting staging areas for the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve.
2. Focus on Internal UAF Corruption: RF IO is no longer just reporting the corruption; they are framing the exposure (i.e., the arrest/video leak) as an SBU conspiracy, attempting to generate distrust in all UAF institutions, including those meant to enforce accountability.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Confirmed visual evidence of the Temryuk fuel storage strike reinforces the operational timeline compression for the RF Southern Group of Forces (SGF). The successful use of reactive drones in deep strikes indicates UAF is effectively targeting high-value logistics nodes, increasing RF desperation for a quick victory.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating multi-domain assaults: high-tempo IO synchronization, precision kinetic fires (КАБ), and localized mechanized assault preparation (37th GMRB).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

UAF strategic communication (Syrskyi) maintains a strong, clear line against territorial concessions and defines the scale of the RF threat (710,000 personnel).

• Vulnerability (Operational): The dual threat of RMAO compromising the BRAVO-BLOCK AoAs and the requirement to respond to КАБ strikes introduces a high risk of mission paralysis or delayed response at Stepnohorsk.
• Vulnerability (Kinetic/Setback): The unconfirmed loss of Pokrovsk (15:52Z) could fracture the UAF defensive posture in Donetsk and divert resources required for the decisive fight at Stepnohorsk.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

• SUCCESS (Strategic Fires): Confirmed large-scale damage at Temryuk fuel depot, validated by visual footage (ЦАПЛІЄНКО).
• SETBACK (Kinetic/Perceived): Unconfirmed report of Pokrovsk loss. (CRITICAL IMPACT - MUST BE ADDRESSED IMMEDIATELY).
• SETBACK (Information): Increased RF amplification of the Skorod corruption case severely undermines morale and NCA cohesion during the MLD preparation phase.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CRITICAL)

The immediate need is the secure and rapid deployment of MCLC/EW assets to neutralize RMAO along the BRAVO-BLOCK routes, coupled with urgent ISR to confirm the status of Pokrovsk and determine the threat posed by incoming КАБ/UAV strikes.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

The environment is unstable, characterized by concentrated RF efforts to erode internal UAF legitimacy and distract from tactical successes.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

RF proceeds with the compressed MLD timeline, accepting higher attrition risks due to fuel constraints, relying on RMAO and IO to paralyze UAF response:

1. Zolotonosha Strike Success (NLT 1800Z): P4 UAV strike achieves significant damage, disrupting Class V flow for 12-24 hours.
2. MLD Launch (052100Z +/- 3 hours): 37th GMRB breaches Stepnohorsk defenses under cover of continued КАБ and artillery fire.
3. IO Sustainment: RF IO successfully keeps NCA focus split between the Pokrovsk setback, the Skorod scandal, and Zolotonosha repairs, delaying the decisive commitment of the BRAVO-BLOCK by 3-5 hours.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

RF achieves rapid collapse in two sectors simultaneously:

1. Kinetic Synchronization: Successful P4 strike and successful 37th GMRB breach exploitation (aided by RMAO).
2. Operational Collapse: The unconfirmed loss of Pokrovsk is real and triggers a defensive cascade in the Donetsk region, forcing the withdrawal or immediate redirection of critical strategic reserves (including elements that might have reinforced the Southern Front).
3. Strategic Paralysis: Combined Pokrovsk shock and amplified Skorod corruption campaign prevents the NCA from authorizing the BRAVO-BLOCK counter-attack effectively, leading to a RF deep penetration (8-10km) and establishment of forward firebases inside the UAF operational area.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver and Fires (J3 / G2)

ACTION: MITIGATE POKROVSK DISTRACTION WHILE MAINTAINING STEPNOHORSK FOCUS.

1. Pokrovsk Confirmation (IMMEDIATE): G2 must issue a "FLASH" report on the confirmed status of Pokrovsk NLT 051730Z. If loss is confirmed, J3 must immediately define minimum force requirements for stabilizing the Donetsk flank and ensure no strategic reserve (BRAVO-BLOCK) elements are diverted.
2. RMAO Mitigation & Reserve Movement: The BRAVO-BLOCK deployment must proceed immediately under the protection of MCLC/Mine Rollers, regardless of Pokrovsk status, as Stepnohorsk remains the RF Main Effort. The risk of delayed commitment outweighs the risk of RMAO attrition.
3. Counter-КАБ Targeting: Task Long-Range Fires (LRSF) to interdict identified or suspected RF airfields/launch positions identified under P5 collection requirements. Deny the enemy the ability to utilize high-payload precision fires to degrade UAF defenses prior to the MLD.

7.2. Air Defense Allocation (J3 / AD Command)

ACTION: RUTHLESS CONCENTRATION ON ZOLOTONOSHA (P4).

1. Ignore Fixation Vectors: Maintain the directive to prioritize Zolotonosha (rail/POL) defense. Accept attrition risks in Kyiv/Kharkiv fixation zones, recognizing these strikes are secondary to the impending MLD logistics interdiction.
2. Maximize Short-Range Defense: Due to the incoming threat window (NLT 1830Z), all SHORAD crews at Zolotonosha must be placed at Weapons Release Status 1 (Immediate Engagement).

7.3. Strategic Communications (STRATCOM / NCA)

ACTION: COUNTER DOMESTIC CORRUPTION NARRATIVE BY REINFORCING ACCOUNTABILITY AND STRENGTH.

1. Weaponize Accountability (IMMEDIATE): Counter the RF framing of the Skorod video as "SBU infighting." Narrative Anchor: "The swift arrest and public exposure of corruption, even during wartime, proves that Ukrainian leadership is resilient and committed to cleaning house. We fight external enemies and internal malfeasance with equal resolve."
2. International Lawfare: Maximize dissemination of the alleged war crime (Siverskyi execution) through international media channels and legal bodies to force RF attention onto external moral pressure, potentially drawing resources away from IO campaigns focused on UAF domestic issues.

//END OF MISREP//