Sitrep 2025-12-05 11:34:32

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/055

TIME: 051134Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD: UAF DEEP STRIKE INTERDICTS LOGISTICS; STRATEGIC COGNITIVE CRISIS INTENSIFIES WITH TERRITORIAL CONCESSION NARRATIVE. PRIORITY: P1 Multi-Domain Damage Control (IO/Finance/Diplomacy) NLT 051300Z. P2 Confirm RF Intent in Northern Axis and Exploit Logistical Damage.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

RF is successfully maintaining multi-axis kinetic pressure (Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, Kharkiv) aimed at reserve fixation. The primary development is the confirmed execution of deep fires by UAF targeting critical Russian logistics infrastructure.

Deep Fires (SUCCESS CONFIRMED): UAF General Staff (051114Z) confirmed successful strikes against the Syzran Oil Refinery (NPZ) and a maritime port in Krasnodar Krai (likely Temryuk). This represents a vital kinetic interdiction against RF fuel and naval resupply streams, directly impacting the medium-term sustainment of the Stepnohorsk MLD.
Northern Axes (ISR Activity): RF reconnaissance UAVs detected entering Ukrainian airspace near the Poltava/Kharkiv border (051129Z) and in Sumy Oblast toward Bilopillya/Vorozhba (051131Z). This suggests continued deep ISR or preparation for shaping fires/attacks in the Northern Operational Zone, reinforcing the requirement for UAF J3 to maintain reserve readiness in the North.
Local Defense (POKROVSK): UAF 425th Regiment reports sustained, successful defense of a key position in the Pokrovsk area (051131Z), indicating tactical stability in that sector despite broad RF fixation efforts.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

RF Information Environment: RF state media (TASS) continues to perform damage control regarding domestic political/celebrity issues, demonstrating the consistent allocation of state resources to maintain the sanitized domestic information space.
Digital Domain: Increased advertising for VPN services (ASTRA VPN, 051105Z) suggests ongoing or anticipated internet censorship in relevant domains, consistent with RF attempts to control the information ecosystem.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

UAF remains defensively committed to Phase Line BRAVO (Stepnohorsk). The successful deep strike operation on RF logistics is a significant tactical advantage that must be exploited immediately through subsequent fires and IO messaging. UAF reserve allocation remains the critical decision point (P2), especially considering the confirmed Vovchansk advance (Previous report) and new ISR activity in Poltava/Sumy.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Intent: Achieve kinetic success in Stepnohorsk by utilizing multi-axis pressure to induce UAF reserve dispersal, while simultaneously accelerating cognitive paralysis in Kyiv by escalating narratives of Western abandonment and internal collapse.

Kinetic: RF continues MLD preparation and fixation. The operational reliance on ground forces (37th GMRB) is now challenged by the UAF deep strikes on the Syzran NPZ and port facilities. This will place high pressure on RF operational planners to accelerate the MLD before fuel shortages fully manifest.
Cognitive Escalation: RF IO channels are maximizing friction points:
- TCC Murder Exploitation (051125Z): Adversarial channels immediately broadcast the suspect's claim of TCC abuse, seeking to delegitimize the entire Ukrainian conscription/recruitment system and degrade troop morale.
- Strategic NATO Rift (051128Z): TASS reports US potentially pausing NATO participation, feeding the critical US-Europe friction narrative established in the previous report.

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

The successful deep strike on the Syzran NPZ and the Krasnodar port facility represents a crucial blow to RF fuel and logistical throughput, complementing the earlier successes against rail depots.

ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT: While the GRAU Arsenal Score 26.12 indicates high ammunition sustainment for the immediate assault (48 hours), the degradation of fuel supply (NPZ strike) will constrain the operational depth and duration of the Stepnohorsk mechanized drive. IMPACT: HIGH.

2.3. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

The appearance of extensive RF ISR activity along the Poltava/Sumy axis suggests two possible tactical changes: 1) Preparation for long-range missile strikes targeting reserves or logistics deeper into Ukraine, or 2) Preparation for renewed limited offensive action in the Northeast to further pin UAF forces already concerned by Vovchansk.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

UAF readiness is characterized by continued tactical resilience (Pokrovsk defense, 051131Z) and effective deep targeting (Syzran NPZ, 051114Z). However, this kinetic momentum is threatened by severe and compounding strategic vulnerabilities in the cognitive domain.

3.2. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CRITICAL - IO/DIPLOMATIC)

The previous report's assessment of critical IO/Financial constraints is intensified by new information:

Constraint 3 (Territorial Concessions): The El País report (051117Z) confirms that the narrative of Western pressure for territorial concessions is now circulating in key European media, demanding immediate, high-level diplomatic counter-messaging. This undermines Ukraine's long-term war aims and solidifies RF strategic IO success.
Aid Status (Positive but Limited): Slovenia’s commitment to procure air defense systems (051110Z) is a minor positive development that aids tactical air defense but does not mitigate the strategic financial shortfall caused by the Euroclear statement.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

The Information Environment is in a state of rapid degradation, marked by the simultaneous validation of three separate RF strategic narratives.

Domain	Finding (FACT/Judgment)	Confidence	Operational Impact
Territorial Integrity	European media (El País) reports sentiment shifting towards requiring Kyiv to make territorial concessions for peace (051117Z).	HIGH (Fact/Judgment)	P1 STRATEGIC CRISIS. Directly challenges the core UAF war aim (1991 borders), compounding the paralysis resulting from the financial (Euroclear) failure. RF intent to fracture Western cohesion is achieving critical mass.
NATO Cohesion	TASS reports potential US withdrawal from NATO mechanisms due to European defense spending shortfalls (051128Z).	MEDIUM (Fact/Gap)	Reinforces the 'Western Abandonment' narrative and the US-EU rift theme, distracting from operational aid packages (Patriot, Slovenia AD).
Internal Cohesion	RF channels aggressively link TCC murder suspect’s claims of TCC abuse to systemic failures (051125Z).	HIGH (Fact)	Directly targets UAF recruitment and internal security, further amplifying the morale crisis identified in the previous report.
Counter-Logistics IO	UAF General Staff and media widely report Syzran NPZ/Krasnodar Port strikes (051114Z, 051121Z).	HIGH (Fact)	POSITIVE COUNTER-NARRATIVE. Necessary messaging to maintain domestic morale and project UAF operational reach and offensive capabilities against RF deep logistics.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

RF will execute a high-tempo, synchronized operational/informational assault over the next 24-48 hours:

MLD Acceleration (Stepnohorsk): RF commanders will likely accelerate the 37th GMRB MLD to capitalize on the current psychological pressure and mitigate the future logistical constraints imposed by the Syzran NPZ strike. They will seek kinetic success before the fuel supply degradation manifests (estimated 72 hours).
Northern Fixation: RF will utilize the detected UAV activity to target UAF C2 or logistics via deep strikes (missiles/FPVs) in Poltava/Sumy, increasing operational friction and preventing UAF J3 from relocating reserves to the Stepnohorsk MLD.
Maximum Cognitive Saturation: RF IO will merge the Territorial Concession, Financial Failure, and TCC Abuse narratives into a single, overwhelming message designed to force a high-level political crisis in Kyiv.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

RF achieves a coordinated tactical success in the North (Vovchansk breakthrough) and South (Stepnohorsk Phase Line CHARLIE penetration) simultaneous with a critical political collapse in Kyiv, driven by the compounded cognitive pressure. Western allies issue ambiguous statements regarding future territorial support, leading to domestic unrest and widespread demoralization among non-combat units, forcing an operational freeze in reserve movement.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)

Event	Estimated Time Frame	Decision Point	Status
P1: STRATCOM Counter-Narrative Launch	NLT 051300Z	STRATCOM, MoD, and Executive Office must publicly address the Territorial Concessions narrative and aggressively refute the TCC abuse claims.	CRITICAL IO (P1)
P2: Vovchansk/Northern Reserve Assessment	NLT 051500Z	J3 must determine if Northern ISR activity and the Vovchansk advance require the commitment of reserve forces, or if the risk of RF kinetic acceleration at Stepnohorsk necessitates retention of the full reserve pool.	CRITICAL MANEUVER (P2)
P3: Exploitation of Logistical Damage	NLT 051600Z	J2/J3 must identify secondary RF fuel/logistics targets (rail movement/storage) to amplify the impact of the Syzran NPZ strike before RF implements redundancy measures.	CRITICAL FIRES (P2)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Required Action	Confidence Impact
P1 (CRITICAL - IO/DIPLOMATIC)	*Source and full context of the El País* reporting on territorial concessions.** Is this reflecting official diplomatic sentiment or speculation?	DIPLOMATIC/OSINT Tasking: Urgent liaison with EU/Spanish diplomats to gauge official policy shift and counter the narrative source.	CRITICAL
P2 (CRITICAL - MANEUVER/FIRES)	Assessment of damage and recovery time for the Syzran NPZ and Krasnodar Port.	IMMEDIATE ISR Tasking: Focus SAR/IMINT on target locations (Syzran, Krasnodar Port) to confirm the scope of damage and disruption level.	CRITICAL
P3 (CRITICAL - MANEUVER)	Intent and target associated with RF UAV activity in Poltava/Sumy regions. Is this preparation for deep strike or diversionary attack?	IMMEDIATE AD Tasking / SIGINT: Enhanced tracking of UAV flight paths and associated radio frequency chatter to determine target type (C2, logistics, or infrastructure).	CRITICAL

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Strategic Communications and Diplomatic Counter-Offensive (STRATCOM / MFA)

ACTION: P1 DIPLOMATIC AND IO COUNTER-OFFENSIVE. Neutralize the Territorial Concession Narrative.

Deny and Reaffirm (NLT 051300Z): The President/MFA must issue an immediate, joint, high-profile statement with key European allies (e.g., Poland, Baltics) unequivocally reaffirming Ukraine's commitment to the 1991 borders and rejecting any negotiation based on territorial concessions. Frame the El País report as RF-induced pressure leveraging financial friction.
Counter TCC Narrative: Implement the previous recommendation (swift justice for the TCC murderer) but add a public commitment to internal review of TCC protocols to eliminate abusive practices. This mitigates the RF narrative of systemic failure while demonstrating accountability.
Amplify Success: Ensure maximum domestic and international coverage of the Syzran NPZ and Krasnodar Port strikes, framing them as essential operational responses that degrade RF ability to sustain aggression.

7.2. Operational Maneuver and Fires (J3 / J2)

ACTION: EXECUTE P3 LOGISTICAL EXPLOITATION AND NORTHERN ISR CHECK.

Logistics Exploitation (P3): Prioritize deep strikes on secondary RF fuel transmission points. Assuming the NPZ is temporarily disabled, RF must rely on rail or road transport. J2 must immediately identify and target the rolling stock or temporary staging areas feeding the Stepnohorsk axis.
Northern Check (P2): Commit minimal high-speed reconnaissance assets (UAV/EW) to the Poltava/Sumy axes to rapidly assess RF intent, satisfying the P3 Collection Requirement. Maintain the central operational reserve pool until the RF intent at Vovchansk/Northern Axis is confirmed.
Air Defense Prioritization: Given the threat posed by RF UAVs in Poltava/Sumy, shift local air defense assets to defensive positions optimized for countering long-range drones, protecting key logistical hubs that feed the Eastern Front.

Situation Report