MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/052
TIME: 051030Z DEC 2025
SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD: VDV COMMITMENT CONTINUES. CRITICAL THREAT FROM RF STRATEGIC IO LEVERAGING US NSS AND IMF FRICTION.
PRIORITY: P1 Strategic Communication Counter-Offensive (NLT 051200Z). P2 Urban C2 Node Targeting.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
The operational environment remains defined by the RF Main Land Drive (MLD) focus on Stepnohorsk (Zaporizhzhia Axis) and synchronized fixing efforts in the East.
- Stepnohorsk MLD (CRITICAL): High-intensity Close Quarters Battle (CQB) continues, confirming the 7th VDV's commitment to holding its urban foothold. VDV assault forces are attempting to consolidate, likely preparing for follow-on exploitation NLT 051300Z.
- Donetsk Axis (Fixing): RF forces are escalating claims and kinetic activity aimed at fixing UAF reserves.
- Confirmed claims of seizing Bezymyannoye, DNR (09:38Z, 09:49Z). This is a localized tactical gain intended to project momentum. BDA required to assess actual UAF defensive line impact.
- RF Sparta Battalion claims to be interdicting supply routes to an "encircled Dimitrov" (09:59Z). While encirclement is highly unlikely, this confirms continued high-pressure operations against UAF logistics and C2 integrity in the broader Pokrovsk/Dimitrov area.
- Kharkiv/Izium Axis: UAF Air Force reports persistent enemy UAV reconnaissance activity east of Izium (09:39Z). This suggests continued intelligence preparation for sustained KAB/artillery strikes or potential renewed ground pressure in the Northeast.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
No significant meteorological changes affecting immediate kinetic operations. The previous dual threat (infrastructure strikes + commercial network outage) remains the primary C2 constraint.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- UAF: Forward defense elements (BRAVO-BLOCK) are effectively containing the 7th VDV penetration to the immediate urban periphery of Stepnohorsk. C2 is centralized and utilizing redundancy protocols established in the previous reporting period.
- RF: Dispositions confirm VDV (light/medium mechanized) committed to the urban fight, supported by heavy fires and guided munitions (KAB) focusing on UAF C2/logistics nodes in the rear (Huliaipole).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Intent: RF seeks immediate tactical success in Stepnohorsk while achieving strategic success in the Information Environment (IO) by leveraging perceived Western division.
- Tactical Focus (VDV Adaptation): Russian internal discussions (09:53Z) highlight the growing importance of neutralizing Ukrainian UAV crews ("Чистое небо" - "Clean Sky" project).
- Judgment: This validates the effectiveness of UAF low-cost drone warfare and indicates future RF tactical adaptation will prioritize counter-UAV measures (EW, kinetic strike on crews/nodes).
- Strategic Focus (IO Synchronicity): RF utilizes official MOD briefings (09:34Z, 09:47Z) to justify current massive strikes as "retaliation," preemptively neutralizing international condemnation while simultaneously amplifying strategic IO that exploits US/EU financial disagreement (see Section 4).
- Logistics & Sustainment: VDV commitment in Stepnohorsk (Zaporizhzhia Direction, 09:53Z, 09:55Z) suggests immediate tactical supply lines are functional, despite previously reported non-lethal logistical friction.
2.2. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
RF strategic C2 remains effective in synchronizing multi-domain pressure. Tactical C2 shows high centralization (forcing high-risk orders, per 09:09Z), leading to unsustainable attrition rates but ensuring compliance with political objectives (seizing Stepnohorsk).
2.3. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
The aggressive projection of power in Donetsk (Bezymyannoye, Dimitrov fixation claims) serves to stretch UAF defensive allocation.
- Assessment: These operations are designed to keep the UAF General Staff off-balance, preventing lateral movement of reserves from Donetsk to the decisive Zaporizhzhia axis. This is a classic Soviet-era maneuver doctrine being applied through modern IO and localized kinetic pressure.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
UAF forces are maintaining cohesion under severe kinetic and cognitive pressure.
- Counter-IO Success: General Syrsky’s direct refutation of the Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk) capture claims (10:01Z) demonstrates proactive engagement in the information domain.
- Internal Security: The apprehension of the Kharkiv City Council deputy (10:00Z) confirms UAF counter-intelligence capability but underscores the continuous need for rigorous security screening and deep C2 integrity checks.
3.2. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CRITICAL)
The strategic financial uncertainty is worsening due to synchronized RF IO efforts.
- Constraint (Financial Conditionality): IMF statements link the critical $8.2 billion financing directly to the passage of specific domestic legislation (Budget 2026, tax laws) (09:38Z).
- Impact: This creates a vulnerability where internal political friction (passing difficult financial laws) can be weaponized by RF IO as a failure of governance, coinciding with the external pressure (US NSS leverage).
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
| Domain | Finding (FACT/Judgment) | Confidence | Operational Impact |
|---|
| US NSS Narrative (CRITICAL) | RF IO sources (09:35Z, 09:59Z) amplify a manufactured US National Security Strategy (NSS) excerpt claiming the priority is "rapid cessation of hostilities" and restoring "strategic stability with Russia." | HIGH (Judgment: Disinformation based on US policy) | Weaponizes diplomacy. This directly undermines UAF resolve and creates the perception of US pressure for a sub-optimal peace settlement. |
| IMF Financial Lawfare | IMF confirms major tranche ($8.2B) is strictly contingent on UAF passing specific internal financial laws (09:38Z). | HIGH (Fact) | Internal Political Friction. Provides RF with a dual leverage point: if the money is delayed, it's framed as Western abandonment; if laws are passed, it creates internal policy debates. |
| RF Internal Paranoia | Sentencing of a Russian pensioner who assaulted a schoolgirl, mistaking her for a "Ukrainian saboteur" (10:02Z). | HIGH (Fact/Behavioral Observation) | Internal Cohesion. Demonstrates successful high-intensity internal RF propaganda, increasing public mobilization (willingness to serve/support) through fear and paranoia. |
| RF Global Positioning | TASS highlights warm diplomatic relations between Putin and Modi (09:49Z, 10:03Z). | HIGH (Fact) | International Legitimacy. Counters Western isolation efforts and projects an image of global stability for the RF leadership during the Stepnohorsk assault. |
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)
RF forces will continue the high-attrition, VDV-led urban assault in Stepnohorsk for the next 24 hours, seeking to expand the beachhead beyond Phase Line BRAVO (37th GMRB objective). This kinetic effort will be supported by:
- Sustained fixing operations in Donetsk (focusing on Dimitrov/Pokrovsk supply lines) to ensure UAF reserves remain static.
- Maximum saturation of the Information Environment using the US NSS "cessation of hostilities" narrative to pressure UAF political leadership and reduce international diplomatic support leading up to the weekend.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)
RF successfully achieves tactical consolidation in Stepnohorsk (VDV securing a Battalion-sized C2 hub within the city). Simultaneously, the targeted IO campaign causes internal policy paralysis (e.g., failure to pass Budget 2026 due to political infighting amplified by RF IO), delaying crucial IMF funding and creating a national financial crisis narrative precisely as UAF forces require urgent resupply following the VDV engagement. Kinetic success + Cognitive paralysis = Strategic momentum.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)
| Event | Estimated Time Frame | Decision Point | Status |
|---|
| Strategic IO Counter-Offensive Launch | NLT 051200Z | STRATCOM MUST launch a high-level, globally synchronized counter-narrative addressing the US NSS claim. | CRITICAL IO (P1) |
| VDV Urban C2 Targeting (Stepnohorsk) | NLT 051400Z | J3/J2 must identify the location of the 7th VDV C2 node (likely utilizing pre-positioned structures) and authorize immediate priority fires/Group 3 UAV strike. | CRITICAL MANEUVER (P2) |
| UAV Crew/Node Targeting Assessment | NLT 051600Z | J2/J7 must analyze RF "Clean Sky" doctrine and anticipate where RF will place priority on eliminating UAF UAV crews. Implement defensive measures/relocation protocols for all forward UAV operational centers. | CRITICAL FORCE PROTECTION |
| IMF Legislation Guidance | NLT 051800Z | Executive Office must provide unified guidance to the Rada leadership regarding the IMF conditional legislation to prevent political infighting from being weaponized. | CRITICAL GOVERNANCE |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap Description | Required Action | Confidence Impact |
|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL - IO) | Authentic text and context of the US NSS (Nov 2025 version). | DIPLOMATIC/OSINT Tasking: Urgent diplomatic verification through US/NATO channels to obtain the definitive text to structure the STRATCOM counter-narrative. | CRITICAL |
| P2 (CRITICAL - MANEUVER) | Precise location and command identity of the 7th VDV C2 Node in Stepnohorsk. | IMMEDIATE ISR Tasking: Focus SIGINT/ELINT on Stepnohorsk urban area for burst transmission patterns and relay points (assume high mobility). | CRITICAL |
| P6 (NEW - TARGETING) | Identification of specific RF assets/units dedicated to Counter-UAV crew hunting in the Zaporizhzhia axis. | HUMINT/OSINT: Correlate "Clean Sky" project details with confirmed VDV/Spetsnaz activity footprints. | MEDIUM |
| P7 (MANEUVER) | BDA confirmation of tactical gains (Bezymyannoye) and actual status of Dimitrov supply routes. | IMMEDIATE ISR Tasking: High-resolution IMINT over the claimed areas to assess if RF claims are positional gains or IO exaggeration. | HIGH |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1. Strategic Communications and Diplomatic Counter-Offensive (STRATCOM / MFA)
ACTION: NEUTRALIZE THE US NSS IO WEAPON.
- Immediate Refutation: The Presidential Office and MFA must issue a coordinated statement NLT 051200Z that acknowledges the complex global challenges mentioned in the US NSS (e.g., China, internal US challenges) but firmly refutes the interpretation that US policy prioritizes "cessation of hostilities" over Ukrainian victory and territorial integrity.
- Highlight Financial Stability: Use the IMF conditional announcement (09:38Z) to show the path to financial support is clear, demanding UAF leadership demonstrate strong governance (passing the required laws). Frame the IMF process as a necessary step for long-term Western commitment, countering the RF narrative of abandonment.
- Targeted VDV PSYOPS: Utilize evidence of RF internal paranoia (Buryatia case) to show RF internal instability. Pair this with VDV attrition rates and logistics shortages (09:03Z) to target VDV families with messages questioning the competence of RF commanders.
7.2. Operational Maneuver and Fires (J3 / J2)
ACTION: DEGRADE VDV C2 AND COUNTER FIXING EFFORTS.
- Priority Targeting (VDV C2): Utilize the most accurate long-range kinetic assets (e.g., UAV-guided precision artillery) immediately upon confirmation of the 7th VDV C2 node location within Stepnohorsk. Decapitation of the forward command element will rapidly disrupt the urban assault momentum.
- Exploit RF UAV Concerns: Design deception operations (e.g., false signal chatter, dummy operational sites) to bait RF counter-UAV hunting units (P6 gap). Prepare ambushes utilizing specialized counter-reconnaissance fire teams against potential RF assets seeking to target UAV crews.
- Huliaipole Defense: Maintain the anti-FAB doctrine. Shift Battalion C2/PVDs to highly redundant, buried locations, utilizing short-burst digital communication to evade detection from RF surveillance assets guiding KAB/FAB strikes.
