MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/050
TIME: 051000Z DEC 2025
SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD: CONTINUED KINETIC SATURATION. NORTHEAST C2 VULNERABILITY CRITICAL. RF LOGISTICAL STRAIN INDICATORS.
PRIORITY: P13 BDA RESOLUTION and Immediate C2 Protection Implementation.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
The enemy's decisive effort remains the Stepnohorsk corridor (Zaporizhzhia Axis), supported by sustained Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) strikes targeting Zaporizhzhia and Kharkiv Oblasts (08:49Z).
- Northeast Axis (Vovchansk): Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD RF) claims the complete "liberation" and subsequent clearance operations by the 128th Separate Motorised Rifle Brigade (SMRB) in Vovchansk (08:53Z, 09:01Z). While exaggerated, this indicates consolidation and conversion of the Vovchansk front from offensive maneuver to holding/fixing operations.
- Huliaipole Flank: Confirmed active combat operations (08:40Z), likely the sustained fixing effort by the 38th GMRB intended to prevent UAF lateral reinforcement of Stepnohorsk.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
The primary environmental factor is the confirmed degradation of Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Emergency power outages have been introduced across multiple oblasts (08:59Z), directly impacting C2 redundancy and civilian life. This outcome validates the enemy's intention to utilize deep strikes to achieve operational paralysis.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
- Stepnohorsk: UAF BRAVO-BLOCK reserve remains engaged. The critical control measure outstanding is the deployment of mobile SHORAD assets to the Northeast, necessitated by the confirmed energy infrastructure loss.
- C2 Vulnerability: Current force disposition is highly exposed to C2 disruption due to power outages, demanding immediate implementation of communication contingency protocols.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Intention (Validated and Escalated): Execute a multi-domain offensive aimed at operational paralysis and kinetic breakthrough.
- Kinetic Decisive Action: Achieve breach/breakthrough at Stepnohorsk utilizing KAB saturation and Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs).
- Systemic Paralysis: Intensify deep strikes on vulnerable C2/Energy nodes across the Northeast and Central Oblasts (Kharkiv/Dnipro) until C2 redundancy fails.
- IO Projection: Maintain the image of global stability (Putin/Modi talks) and tactical success (Vovchansk clearance) while kinetic operations are underway.
Recent Tactical Changes/Adaptations:
- Vovchansk Status: RF claims suggest the 128th SMRB is transitioning to stability operations, potentially freeing up other elements of the Sever Group of Forces for future, limited offensive operations along the Kharkiv axis, though this is currently contained.
2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
Overall RF strategic logistics remain robust (Alabuga SEZ). However, new intelligence points to localized, tactical logistical friction:
- VDV Logistical Strain (FACT): A prominent pro-VDV Telegram channel reports that a fundraising effort for specific VDV units has "stalled" and explicitly cites the need for funds for successful "assault measures and delivery of provisions" (09:03Z).
- Judgment: This suggests VDV elements are experiencing difficulties obtaining basic, non-lethal supplies (food, water, specific equipment) at the tactical edge, indicating a localized failure of the standard logistical system or poor coordination between military and civilian supply lines. This is a high-value vulnerability.
- Recruitment Strain: Reduced contract payments in Bashkortostan (08:47Z) will likely suppress long-term recruitment effectiveness from that region.
2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
RF strategic C2 is effective in coordinating multi-domain strikes. However, internal political friction persists:
- Occupied Territory Friction (FACT): A Melitopol court overturned the governor's dismissal of the regional election commission chairman (08:51Z).
- Judgment: This signals a growing legal and political rift between appointed military-civil administrators and local judiciary in occupied territories, potentially undermining unified military governance in Zaporizhzhia Oblast as the Stepnohorsk offensive progresses.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
The posture is defensively stable but critically vulnerable to the compounded effects of KAB attrition and C2 disruption caused by power outages.
- C2 Vulnerability: The confirmed emergency power outages (08:59Z) place the entire operational synchronization under severe stress. Immediate implementation of contingency protocols is critical to maintaining readiness.
- Political Resilience: European leaders have advised President Zelensky against accepting a peace agreement without US security guarantees (08:48Z), stabilizing the political dimension during the kinetic crisis.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Setback (CRITICAL): The successful RF deep strike campaign resulting in widespread emergency power outages (08:59Z) is the primary setback, directly validating RF targeting priorities.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Constraint: C2 hardening and SHORAD reallocation to protect remaining infrastructure in the Northeast are now mandatory actions, not optional decision points. The lack of immediate C2 redundancy will be exploited by RF in the next 24 hours.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
| Domain | Finding (FACT/Judgment) | Confidence | Operational Impact |
|---|
| UAF Resilience/Lawfare | Ukrainian leadership publishes unified messages celebrating Volunteer Day (08:58Z - 09:01Z). Legal bodies confirm life sentences for collaborators. | HIGH (Fact) | Strong civil-military cohesion counter-narrative; reinforces institutional legitimacy. |
| RF Strategic IO | Putin/Modi press statements emphasize strategic partnership (08:43Z, 08:59Z). | HIGH (Fact) | Counters Western narrative of Russian isolation; projects confidence during the offensive. |
| RF Tactical Morale/Logistics | VDV fundraising appeals admit collections are "stalled" and request funds for "provisions" (09:03Z). | HIGH (Fact) | CRITICAL IO ASSET. Provides tangible proof of tactical logistical failures despite strategic resource claims. |
| Western Financial Lawfare | US reported to be blocking EU plans for full expropriation of Russian assets (08:53Z). | MEDIUM (Fact) | If true, complicates UAF long-term financing strategy derived from frozen assets. |
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)
RF will launch the full-scale mechanized assault at Stepnohorsk NLT 051200Z, led by UGVs to mitigate anti-mobility layers under continued KAB saturation. Simultaneously, RF will utilize the confirmed power outages to launch follow-up deep strikes designed to achieve total C2 disruption in one key regional hub (e.g., Kharkiv or Dnipro). This synchronized kinetic and systemic attack is designed to prevent UAF command from coordinating an effective operational counter-attack or reserve commitment.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)
RF achieves tactical penetration of Phase Line BRAVO at Stepnohorsk AND achieves a localized C2 blackout in a critical area (e.g., where UAF operational reserves are staging). RF elements, potentially VDV (despite current logistical friction), rapidly bypass the main defensive belts and target a key logistical node behind the Stepnohorsk axis, severing the defensive line and isolating forward UAF units from rear area resupply and communication.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)
| Event | Estimated Time Frame | Decision Point | Status |
|---|
| Immediate MCLC BDA Confirmation (P13) | NLT 050945Z | J3/J2 MUST confirm status of the lead MCLC elements (incl. Kuryer) and their effect on the anti-mobility layer. | CRITICAL MANEUVER |
| Kharkiv AD Reallocation Implementation | NLT 051100Z | J3/J7 must confirm movement of the selected mobile SHORAD battery to Kharkiv C2/Energy node protection. The C2 threat is now realized. | CRITICAL C2 DEFENSE (IMPLEMENTATION) |
| Myrnohrad Stabilization Commitment (P1) | NLT 051030Z | J3 must commit the small stabilizing force to prevent the flanks from collapsing, thereby conserving the operational reserve for Stepnohorsk. | CRITICAL C2 DIVERGENCE |
| Stepnohorsk MLD Breakthrough | NLT 051200Z - 051600Z | If P13 BDA is negative and RF armored elements penetrate Phase Line BRAVO, UAF High Command must execute counter-attack doctrine. | DECISIVE KINETIC MOMENT |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap Description | Required Action | Confidence Impact |
|---|
| P13 (CRITICAL - MANEUVER) | Confirmed status/attrition of lead BRAVO-BLOCK elements and MCLC breach success. | IMMEDIATE ISR Tasking: Re-task all Group 1/2 UAVs for live-feed FMV of the Stepnohorsk breach zone. | CRITICAL |
| P2 (CRITICAL - NEW EW THREAT) | "Kuryer" UGV Control Frequencies and C2 Protocol. (Unchanged) | IMMEDIATE SIGINT/EW Tasking: Focus all available EW assets on the Stepnohorsk MLD corridor to find C2 links for the robotic systems. | CRITICAL |
| P5 (NEW - RF VDV LOGISTICS) | Quantify the nature and extent of VDV unit logistical shortages (provisions, non-lethal). | OSINT/HUMINT: Monitor RF VDV social media/fundraising appeals for specific unit names and locations correlating to logistical strain complaints (09:03Z). Exploit POW testimony for validation. | MEDIUM |
| P6 (NEW - C2 OUTAGE ASSESSMENT) | Precise geographic and functional scope of emergency power outages (military vs. civilian impact). | J6/J2 Tasking: Immediate collation of J6 reports on communication link failures and cross-reference with energy operator reports (Ukrenergo) to map critical military C2 degradation. | HIGH |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1. Operational Maneuver and Force Protection (J3 / J7)
ACTION: EXECUTE C2 REDUNDANCY PROTOCOLS AND SHORAD DEPLOYMENT.
- C2 Redundancy (CRITICAL): J6/J7 must immediately verify and enforce the activation of independent power sources (generators/satellite links) for all military communication nodes in Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts. Assume the grid is down.
- SHORAD Reallocation (CRITICAL): Confirm the physical movement and operational status of the one (1) mobile SHORAD battery being diverted to protect the primary C2/Energy hub in Kharkiv Oblast NLT 051100Z. This is no longer a decision point, but an execution requirement.
- UGV Counter-Defense: Engage "Kuryer" UGVs immediately upon detection using high rate-of-fire, low-cost assets (HMG, AGL, FPV drones). The priority is preventing the breach, not conserving expensive anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs).
7.2. Fires and Targeting (J2 / J3)
ACTION: TARGET FORWARD AVIATION AND EXPLOIT VDV LOGISTICS FRACTURE.
- VDV Logistic Interdiction (HIGH VALUE): Based on P5 collection, identify known or suspected VDV staging areas and execute interdiction fires (artillery, deep strikes) against local supply routes (truck convoys, temporary storage points) handling provisions and non-lethal goods. Exploit the confirmed logistical fragility at the tactical edge.
- Counter-Air Platform Targeting: Maintain fire missions against identified forward operating bases or temporary landing zones responsible for the KAB launches against Kharkiv (P4 Gap focus). Continue to exploit the temporary AD gap provided by the Kacha strike.
7.3. Strategic Communications and Lawfare (STRATCOM / J7 / Legal)
ACTION: MAXIMIZE EXPLOITATION OF RF INTERNAL WEAKNESS.
- VDV Logistical Collapse PSYOPS (IMMEDIATE): Launch an intensive PSYOPS campaign targeting RF VDV families and mobilization groups with messages and evidence (09:03Z) demonstrating the Kremlin's failure to supply its elite troops with basic needs (food/provisions). Frame the situation as a betrayal of the frontline fighter.
- Lawfare Amplification: Publicize the internal administrative friction and legal conflict in occupied Melitopol (08:51Z) to demonstrate that RF control over occupied territories is characterized by instability and internal power struggles, undermining the RF claim of establishing functional governance.
