MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/048
TIME: 050930Z DEC 2025
SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD: DUAL-AXIS PRESSURE SUSTAINED. MYRNOHRAD FLANK CRITICALITY. INFRASTRUCTURE ATTRITION INTENSIFIES.
PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE P1/P13 GAP RESOLUTION AND C2 COUNTER-ATTRITION MEASURES.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
The enemy MLD remains focused on the Stepnohorsk corridor (Zaporizhzhia Axis). GSZSU reports confirm continued RF air strikes (KAB/Aviation) directly targeting Stepnohirsk, Huliaipole, and Staroukrayinka, indicating the kinetic phase is fully engaged.
- Flank Criticality: Clashes are confirmed by GSZSU reports at Myrnohrad (Pokrovsk direction), validating the threat of the secondary fixing effort.
- New Attrition Zone: Active fighting and confirmed war crime allegations (POW execution) at Svyato-Pokrovske (Siversk axis) confirm the operational need to stabilize multiple distinct fronts simultaneously, exacerbating UAF resource distribution challenges.
- Deep Strike Domain: High-volume UAV strikes have successfully caused emergency power outages in Sumy, Poltava, and two other oblasts, confirming RF intent to degrade national infrastructure concurrent with the MLD.
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Clear conditions persist across key operational sectors. Favorable for continued RF ISR collection and aviation sorties. The ongoing degradation of energy infrastructure is raising the operational risk profile for all C2 and communication relays dependent on local power grids.
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
- Stepnohorsk: UAF BRAVO-BLOCK reserve is engaged. The primary Intelligence Gap (P13 BDA) persists, creating unacceptable risk regarding the efficacy of the MCLC breach attempt.
- Myrnohrad: UAF forces are engaged in defensive action (confirmed clashes). The judgment remains that RF forces are forcing a controlled withdrawal or collapse to split UAF operational reserves.
- Air Defense: UAF is expending high-value interceptors to counter RF’s saturated aerial attacks. Mobile SHORAD assets are likely stretched thin protecting forward logistics/C2 nodes against persistent KAB/UAV threats.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Intention (Updated): Execute a synchronized multi-domain assault:
- Kinetic Decisive Action: Achieve breakthrough at Stepnohorsk (Zaporizhzhia MLD).
- Kinetic Fixing Action: Force structural UAF resource diversion via collapse/withdrawal at Myrnohrad (Donetsk Flank).
- Strategic Attrition: Degrade UAF national stability and war-fighting sustainment via continuous, high-volume strikes on the energy grid (Dnipro, Sumy, Poltava).
Recent Tactical Changes/Adaptations:
- Infrastructure Prioritization: The shift to immediate infrastructure targeting (emergency power outages confirmed) indicates an intent to paralyze rear echelon C2 and mobilization capabilities early in the MLD.
- Siversk Attrition: Renewed, costly ground assaults on the Siversk axis (confirmed by POW execution report) suggest RF is willing to incur high losses to fix UAF units in the north-east and prevent their potential use as operational reserve forces.
2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
RF capability to sustain massed aerial and ground assaults is confirmed for the short term.
- Internal RF Financial Maneuver (NEW): Russia’s decision to lift restrictions on cross-border fund transfers starting Dec 8th (TASS, Alex Parker) is a significant economic policy shift.
- Judgment: While presented as liberalization, this measure may facilitate capital outflow mitigation, enable shadow economic activity necessary to sustain the war economy, or preemptively secure capital for elites anticipating economic instability. It suggests ongoing adaptation to international sanctions pressure.
2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
RF C2 remains highly effective, coordinating deep kinetic strikes, flank pressure, and simultaneous IO campaigns (amplifying UAF corruption). A marginal degradation of internal security is noted following the drone attack on Grozny-City.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
Force posture is stable but stressed. AD crews are operating at high tempo. Field units are actively innovating (Ratel-S UGV).
- Internal Operations: The NABU/SAP anti-corruption operation targeting MP Skorokhod confirms UAF commitment to institutional integrity, despite RF attempts to exploit the incident. This is a crucial strategic resilience factor.
- Education/Demographics: Deputy Minister's visit to Zaporizhzhia focusing on 'dual education' (08:03Z) signals UAF High Command's continued focus on long-term national recovery and talent retention, even under direct kinetic threat.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
- Setback: Confirmed failure to protect energy infrastructure from deep strikes in four oblasts, resulting in widespread power outages.
- Success: Confirmed continuation of defensive actions along the Pokrovsk, Huliaipole, and Orikhiv directions, denying the 38th GMRB a rapid breakout or encirclement.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Power Generation/Distribution: The immediate constraint is energy stability. Emergency protocols must be enforced to ensure military communication and maintenance hubs retain power priority over non-essential civilian load shedding.
- Legal Documentation: Immediate requirement to collect forensic evidence and witness testimony regarding the alleged POW execution near Siversk for submission to the International Criminal Court (ICC).
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
| Domain | Finding (FACT/Judgment) | Confidence | Operational Impact |
|---|
| IO Exploitation (RF) | RF State Media/War correspondents immediately amplified the UAF MP corruption raid, framing it as "political pressure" and institutional failure. | HIGH (Fact) | Directly targets domestic morale and Western confidence (IMF/Aid debates) at the most critical kinetic phase. |
| Counter-Narrative (UAF) | UK announces £8bn proposal from frozen RF assets. (The Times, 07:59Z) | MEDIUM (Signal) | Positive IO signal against the "Western Abandonment" narrative, but requires rapid confirmation and amplification to be effective. |
| RF Internal Security | Drone strike/fire reported in Grozny-City, Chechnya. (07:34Z) | HIGH (Fact) | Significant vulnerability indicator. Can be exploited by UAF StratCom to promote internal RF instability and distract from kinetic gains. |
| War Crimes/Atrocity | Alleged execution of POW near Siversk confirmed by DeepState. (07:33Z) | HIGH (Fact) | Immediate and critical requirement for documentation to reinforce international diplomatic pressure and war crime legal proceedings. |
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)
RF forces will maximize the current high operational tempo for the next 48 hours, believing the UAF is near a tipping point. They will sustain KAB/UAV saturation to attrit AD/Infrastructure (especially energy targets in the central/eastern oblasts). The 37th GMRB will attempt a massed assault utilizing the "Kuryer" UGV for breach NLT 051200Z. The 38th GMRB will convert fixing maneuvers at Myrnohrad into an overt flanking exploitation once UAF reserves are committed or withdrawn.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)
RF combines a successful Stepnohorsk MLD breach with a decisive tactical success at Myrnohrad (disorderly UAF retreat, leading to loss of equipment and personnel). RF deep strikes simultaneously paralyze the power grid in key operational rear areas (Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia cities), impeding emergency logistics movement and communication, rendering the commitment of UAF Tertiary Reserve (if required) disorganized and late.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)
| Event | Estimated Time Frame | Decision Point | Status |
|---|
| Immediate MCLC BDA Confirmation (P13) | NLT 050945Z | J3/J2 MUST confirm status of the lead MCLC elements and their effect on the anti-mobility layer. | CRITICAL MANEUVER |
| Myrnohrad Flank Stabilization Decision (P1) | NLT 051030Z | J3 must commit the required minimal stabilizing force (as per MISREP 047) to manage the withdrawal/defense or commit additional tactical reserve NLT 1100Z. | CRITICAL C2 DIVERGENCE |
| Stepnohorsk MLD Breakthrough | NLT 051200Z - 051600Z | If P13 BDA is negative and RF armored elements penetrate Phase Line BRAVO, UAF High Command must decide on counter-attack doctrine execution. | DECISIVE KINETIC MOMENT |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
| Priority | Gap Description | Required Action | Confidence Impact |
|---|
| P13 (CRITICAL - MANEUVER) | Confirmed status/attrition of lead BRAVO-BLOCK elements and MCLC breach success. | IMMEDIATE ISR Tasking: Re-task all Group 1/2 UAVs for live-feed FMV of the Stepnohorsk breach zone. Request dedicated high-altitude ISR (if available) for broad area surveillance. | CRITICAL |
| P1 (CRITICAL - FLANK) | Validated status of Myrnohrad UAF posture and confirmed vector/consolidation status of the 38th GMRB. | HUMINT/EW/IMINT: Prioritize confirmation of UAF unit locations and establish whether 38th GMRB is committing main combat elements or utilizing reconnaissance-in-force. | HIGH |
| P2 (CRITICAL - NEW EW THREAT) | "Kuryer" UGV Control Frequencies and C2 Protocol. (Unchanged) | IMMEDIATE SIGINT/EW Tasking: Focus all available EW assets on the Stepnohorsk MLD corridor to find C2 links for the robotic systems. | CRITICAL |
| P4 (NEW - ENERGY TARGETING) | Identification of UAV/Missile Launch/Guidance Teams responsible for the high-volume deep strikes on energy infrastructure (Sumy, Poltava, Dnipropetrovsk). | IMINT/HUMINT: Investigate potential forward observation posts or C2 relay sites being utilized to guide the high-volume strikes. | MEDIUM |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
7.1. Operational Maneuver and Force Protection (J3 / J7)
ACTION: MINIMIZE RESOURCE SPLIT AND DEFEND C2/INFRASTRUCTURE.
- Myrnohrad Risk Mitigation (CRITICAL): Execute the commitment of the small, highly mobile Tactical Reserve element (as per MISREP 047) to the Myrnohrad area NLT 1000Z to stabilize the position and prevent disorderly collapse, thereby protecting the main operational reserve designated for Stepnohorsk.
- C2 Hardening: Mandate immediate implementation of pre-planned energy contingency measures (generator use, hardened communications lines) for all operational HQs (Battalion level and above) within 100km of the front line, especially in light of confirmed power outages in Sumy/Poltava.
- Siversk Containment: Utilize indirect fire and low-cost UGV/UAV assets to increase attrition on RF forces near Siversk, explicitly denying them rapid consolidation of any local gains implied by the POW execution reports, without committing high-value reserves.
7.2. Fires and Targeting (J2 / J3)
ACTION: INTERDICT FLANK EXPLOITATION AND ENERGY STRIKE PLATFORMS.
- Interdiction Fires (P1 Target Boxes): Sustain high-volume, precision interdiction fires against confirmed and suspected staging areas of the 38th GMRB (P1 Gap focus) to disrupt their ability to transition from fixing to exploitation.
- Counter-Air Attrition: Prioritize targeting of known or suspected mobile launch platforms (e.g., UAV launch trailers, cruise missile loading points) identified in the P4 collection efforts, leveraging the temporary window of degraded RF AD coverage (Kacha strike).
7.3. Strategic Communications and Lawfare (STRATCOM / J7 / Legal)
ACTION: MAXIMIZE ATROCITY AND INTEGRITY NARRATIVES.
- Atrocity Documentation: Immediately launch a comprehensive documentation campaign regarding the alleged POW execution at Svyato-Pokrovske. Distribute findings to the UN Human Rights Council and the ICC for urgent action.
- Exploit Internal RF Weakness: Initiate a targeted PSYOPS campaign highlighting the Grozny-City drone strike/fire within RF-occupied territories (via SMS/Telegram drops), contrasting RF claims of internal stability with confirmed domestic security failures.
- Amplify Integrity: Maintain high visibility for the NABU/MP Skorokhod anti-corruption action, framing it as proof of democratic resilience and commitment to Western standards, directly countering RF IO narratives.
