Sitrep 2025-12-05 07:34:34

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/047

TIME: 050800Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD: TACTICAL DECISION POINT IMMINENT. MYRNOHRAD WITHDRAWAL INDICATORS CONFIRM RF ATTEMPT TO FORCE RESOURCE SPLIT. PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE C2 RESPONSE TO MYRNOHRAD AXIS AND MCLC BDA RESOLUTION.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

The operational focus remains the Stepnohorsk breach corridor (Zaporizhzhia Axis), where the MLD (Main Effort Land Drive) of the 37th GMRB is underway.

New Tactical Indicator: RF sources and D-S analysis (57% combined belief) indicate potential UAF withdrawal/retreat from Myrnohrad (Donetsk Oblast).
- Judgment: This indicates RF forces are successfully executing a fixing maneuver along the central Donetsk axis to create a tactical crisis that forces UAF C2 to divert operational attention and reserves away from the Stepnohorsk decisive point. This is the primary flanking exploitation now in progress.
Kinetic Pressure: RF initiated a massive, high-volume aerial assault (137 total UAVs launched) across multiple regions overnight (04/05 DEC). This suggests RF is attempting to attrit UAF Air Defense resources or execute deep strikes concurrent with the MLD.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

No significant change. Clear conditions favor RF ISR and sustained air operations. Minor snow observed in some northern sectors (Mash).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Stepnohorsk: UAF BRAVO-BLOCK reserve is engaged (P13 BDA still overdue, forcing doctrinal risk).
Air Defense: UAF forces successfully engaged/suppressed 80 of 137 RF UAVs. This is an effective rate (58%) but confirms the high expenditure of interceptors. Civilian casualties confirmed in Dnipropetrovsk region following the strikes (1x 12 YOA KIA).
Naval Domain: RF claims destruction of USVs in the Black Sea (unconfirmed BDA, assessed as routine defense).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Intention (Operational): Force UAF High Command into a resource allocation dilemma by sustaining CRITICAL pressure at Stepnohorsk while simultaneously forcing a collapse or major maneuver in the Myrnohrad/Donetsk sector.

Recent Tactical Changes/Adaptations:

High-Volume Aerial Strategy: The 137 UAV strike is the largest recorded in the past 72 hours, designed to saturate UAF AD/C2, masking the ongoing kinetic breach at Stepnohorsk.
Shaping the Flank (Myrnohrad): The focus on Myrnohrad (Mirnohrad) is likely a precursor to exploiting the anticipated UAF resource split. Judgment: If the 38th GMRB (P1 Gap) is utilizing this movement, it validates the MDCOA threat of flank collapse.

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

Sustained ability to launch 137 UAVs confirms sufficient logistical throughput for disposable systems. RF internal messaging (pensions, cybercrime arrests) remains focused on projecting competence and stability to offset acknowledged economic and internal security pressures (e.g., Chechnya high-rise fire, Grozny-City).

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

RF C2 remains highly effective in synchronizing the MLD, massive aerial operations, and continuous strategic IO targeting UAF stability and Western resolve.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Readiness remains high, demonstrated by successful AD performance and rapid technological adaptation.

Tactical Adaptation (CRITICAL): UAF forces confirmed the integration of repurposed Geran-2 (Shahed-136) warheads onto the Ratel-S UGV platform.
- Judgment: This is a significant local adaptation, demonstrating UAF capacity to rapidly field specialized, cheap, and effective remote-controlled attack systems, potentially offsetting the "Kuryer" UGV threat with indigenous technology.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

Setback: The unconfirmed necessity of withdrawal from Myrnohrad is a functional setback, indicating loss of local control or unacceptable attrition rates in that sector.

Success: Excellent AD engagement performance (80 targets) and successful repurposing of enemy material into novel combat systems.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

AD Resources: High operational tempo of AD systems mandates immediate prioritization of interceptor resupply and maintenance/rest cycling for AD crews.
Internal C2 Integrity: UAF successfully executed a high-profile anti-corruption operation (NABU/SAP targeting a sitting MP). Judgment: While politically disruptive, this action reinforces the State's integrity and judicial function, serving as a powerful counter-narrative to RF corruption claims.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

Domain	Finding (FACT/Judgment)	Confidence	Operational Impact
RF Diplomatic Leverage	Putin/Modi diplomatic engagement amplified, including a satirical Indian cartoon framing Russia as the preferred energy partner over the US.	HIGH (Fact/Signal)	Reinforces the strategic IO goal: demonstrating global alignment with the RF narrative, undermining Western sanction efficacy, and targeting US resolve during the kinetic phase.
Myrnohrad Exploitation	RF propaganda claims UAF forces authorized to leave Myrnohrad. (D-S belief 57%).	MEDIUM (Judgment)	RF is actively using IO to amplify tactical pressure points, forcing UAF C2 to react to the potential collapse of the Donetsk center/flank, diverting attention from Stepnohorsk.
UAF Internal Integrity	NABU/SAP expose major corruption ring led by an MP.	HIGH (Fact)	POSITIVE IO. This proactive demonstration of domestic rule of law provides a strong counter-narrative to RF claims of a failing, corrupt Ukrainian state, crucial during periods of high kinetic stress and financial strain (IMF).
Technological IO	UAF openly reports Ratel-S/Geran warhead adaptation.	HIGH (Fact)	POSITIVE IO. Projects competence, resilience, and rapid innovation to domestic and international partners, directly counteracting RF technological claims (e.g., "Kuryer" UGV).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

RF forces will sustain the MLD at Stepnohorsk, utilizing the Kuryer UGV and exploiting the P13 BDA delay. Concurrently, the 38th GMRB elements will increase pressure against the Myrnohrad/Donetsk axis, attempting to accelerate the UAF withdrawal into a disorderly retreat. RF StratCom will pivot the diplomatic narrative (Vance/IMF) to include specific local military "victories" (Myrnohrad claims) to demoralize forward UAF units.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

Failure to confirm positive BDA (P13) on the MCLC effort forces the secondary BRAVO-BLOCK wave to commit dismounted, resulting in excessive attrition against the "Kuryer" UGV/anti-mobility layer. Simultaneously, the situation at Myrnohrad becomes untenable, requiring a mandatory, multi-brigade controlled withdrawal that forces the release of the UAF Tertiary Reserve to stabilize the central axis, leaving Stepnohorsk critically exposed to the 37th GMRB breakout.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)

Event	Estimated Time Frame	Decision Point	Status
Immediate MCLC BDA Confirmation (P13)	NLT 050830Z	J3/J2 MUST confirm status. If negative BDA persists, execute the Dismounted Breach Contingency (reiterate from MISREP 046).	CRITICAL MANEUVER
Decision on Myrnohrad Stability	NLT 051000Z	J3 must confirm the veracity of the Myrnohrad claims (P1 update) and decide whether to release local area Tactical Reserve to stabilize the position or execute a planned, coordinated withdrawal.	CRITICAL C2 DIVERGENCE
Ratel-S Counter-UGV Doctrine Dissemination	NLT 051200Z	J7/TECHINT must rapidly disseminate lessons learned and initial operating doctrine for the Ratel-S (Geran warhead) UGV for immediate integration at Stepnohorsk.	URGENT FORCE MULTIPLIER

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Required Action	Confidence Impact
P13 (CRITICAL - MANEUVER)	Confirmed success/failure of MCLC integration and attrition levels of lead BRAVO-BLOCK elements. (Unchanged)	IMMEDIATE ISR Tasking: Re-task all available Group 1/2 UAVs and airborne assets to provide live-feed, full-motion video of the breach zone (ALPHA-BRAVO corridor).	CRITICAL, dictates all immediate fires and maneuver decisions.
P1 (CRITICAL - FLANK)	Validated status of Myrnohrad UAF posture and precise vector/consolidation status of the 38th GMRB.	HUMINT/IMINT/EW: Confirm troop status at Myrnohrad. Priority IMINT on the movement vectors for the 38th GMRB to determine if they are exploiting the potential withdrawal or simply fixing the position.	HIGH, dictates final employment of uncommitted reserve elements.
P2 (CRITICAL - NEW EW THREAT)	"Kuryer" UGV Control Frequencies and C2 Protocol. (Unchanged)	IMMEDIATE SIGINT/EW Tasking: Priority collection around the Stepnohorsk breach zone. Focus on identifying RF C2 radio link emissions immediately preceding and during UGV movement.	CRITICAL, required to save lead armor and personnel from UGV attrition.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver and Force Protection (J3 / J7)

ACTION: MITIGATE MYRNOHRAD RISK WHILE SUSTAINING STEPNOHORSK HOLD.

Reserve Commitment Protocol: Immediately release a small, highly mobile tactical reserve force (e.g., one reinforced mechanized company or territorial defense element) to stabilize the Myrnohrad withdrawal/defense line NLT 1000Z. Rationale: This buys time for the P1 gap resolution without compromising the main Stepnohorsk operational reserve.
Air Defense Prioritization: Shift mobile AD assets (SHORAD) to prioritize the immediate protection of C2 and logistics nodes within 50km of the Stepnohorsk MLD axis for the next 12 hours, accepting higher risk in non-critical deep rear areas, given the volume of the RF aerial assault.
UGV Counter-Strategy: Immediately task the J7 (Research/Doctrine) to develop and disseminate basic operational instructions for the Ratel-S (Geran-Warhead) UGV. Prioritize deployment of prototypes/demonstrators to the Stepnohorsk sector as an immediate counter to the "Kuryer" UGV threat.

7.2. Fires and Targeting (J2 / J3)

ACTION: TARGET FLANKING RESERVE AND ATTRIT AERIAL LAUNCH CAPACITY.

Interdiction Priority: Use long-range precision fires (e.g., HIMARS) to target confirmed 38th GMRB staging areas (P1 Target Boxes) to slow their ability to exploit the Myrnohrad situation.
UAV Launch Sites: Prioritize identification and targeting of secondary/mobile RF UAV launch points within range (e.g., mobile trailers, field staging areas) to degrade the RF capacity for another high-volume aerial assault.

7.3. Strategic Communications (STRATCOM / J7)

ACTION: COUNTER-NARRATIVE ON CORRUPTION AND ADVERSARY ATROCITIES.

Amplify Integrity: Execute a high-impact media campaign detailing the scope and decisive action taken in the NABU/MP anti-corruption case. Frame this as a demonstration of Ukraine’s commitment to internal renewal and readiness for Western partnership, directly addressing IMF constraints and RF propaganda.
Reinforce Resilience: Use the Ratel-S adaptation story as a key pillar in the external communications strategy, illustrating Ukrainian military ingenuity and resourcefulness in overcoming foreign aggression and technological hurdles.
Document Atrocity: Ensure the confirmed death of the 12-year-old in Dnipropetrovsk is immediately packaged and submitted to international legal and humanitarian bodies, reinforcing the narrative of RF war criminality during the kinetic phase.

Situation Report