Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/040

TIME: 050407Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: CRITICAL: STEPNOHORSK MLD INITIATION CONFIRMED. NEW UAS MINE-LAYING THREAT IDENTIFIED (GTV Vostok). PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE RESERVE COMMITMENT AND COUNTER-UAS PROTOCOL ACTIVATION REQUIRED.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

The operational center of gravity remains the Stepnohorsk breach sector (Zaporizhzhia Axis). The Main Land Drive (MLD) by the 37th GMRB is assessed as having initiated kinetic maneuver operations NLT 050345Z, succeeding the intense TOS-1A and KAB preparatory fires.

• Zaporizhzhia MLD: The kinetic phase of the MLD is underway. Intelligence collection in the 03:40Z-04:01Z window shows the RF shifting heavily to informational and technological reinforcement rather than pre-attack kinetic preparation, consistent with an active assault phase.
• New Threat Domain: Confirmed operational deployment of the "Mangas" heavy-lift UAS capable of delivering TM-62 anti-tank mines to forward assault units (GTV Vostok). This system poses an immediate threat to UAF counter-maneuver capabilities, allowing RF to rapidly mine flanks or withdrawal routes.
• Logistics Interdiction: The Temryuk LPG terminal strike (03:29Z) is confirmed damage and is actively forcing RF fuel distribution adjustments.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Clear skies continue to facilitate RF air domain operations, including KAB delivery, ISR, and the newly identified UAS mine-laying threat.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: CRITICAL)

UAF AD continues to manage the threat geometry focused on Dnipro C2 protection. The status of the BRAVO-BLOCK operational reserve commitment remains the single greatest determinant of operational success or failure at Stepnohorsk. The reserve must now engage the breach or conduct a rapid counter-attack against confirmed RF penetration.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Intention: RF intends to achieve rapid operational penetration at Stepnohorsk using robotic spearheads ("Kuryer" UGV) and immediately consolidate gains using the newly deployed UAS-delivered mine barriers ("Mangas" UAS). This combination is designed to neutralize UAF tactical reserves.

New Technological Capability (FACT):

• System: "Mangas" heavy-lift hexacopter.
• Payload: TM-62 anti-tank mines.
• Deployment Target: Assault units of the Vostok Grouping (GTV).
• Impact: This system significantly increases the RF ability to perform rapid, remote anti-mobility operations (RMAO). It enables RF units to secure flanks and rapidly deny counter-attack avenues to UAF armor/mechanized forces after achieving the breach. (Confidence: HIGH)

Tactical Fixation Efforts (Judgment): RF claims of successful engagement near Kostiantynivka (03:58Z) reinforce the ongoing attempt to fix the 103rd and other UAF formations in the Donetsk axis, preventing their shift toward the Stepnohorsk MLD.

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

The Temryuk LPG strike will degrade RF fuel throughput in the Southern Axis within 24 hours. The fielding of the "Mangas" UAS (which will require specialized logistical support, likely private funding networks as suggested by Dempster-Shafer analysis) indicates RF adaptation to maintain technological edge despite strategic logistical hits. The high GRAU arsenal activity (26.12 Score) suggests high ammunition availability for the MLD's initial phases.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of the kinetic MLD, the deep AD fixation effort (Poltava corridor), and the coordinated release of strategic IO (Putin in India) and tactical IO (Zhytomyr mobilization paralysis claim) to support the assault window.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

Friendly forces at the Stepnohorsk contact line are assessed as being engaged in heavy defense against the UGV-led assault. Reserve readiness remains high, but command paralysis continues to prevent timely commitment, escalating the risk exponentially.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Successes: Confirmed successful interdiction of strategic RF logistics at Temryuk. Setbacks: The operational decision point for the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve commitment is critically expired. Immediate BDA is required to determine the scale of the 37th GMRB penetration.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: The immediate allocation of maneuver forces (BRAVO-BLOCK) and dedicated Electronic Warfare (EW) assets to counter the "Kuryer" breaching UGVs and the newly identified "Mangas" mine-laying UAS.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

The 37th GMRB is currently engaged in breaching operations at Stepnohorsk utilizing "Kuryer" UGVs. Immediately upon achieving a shallow penetration (Phase Line BRAVO), RF forces will deploy the "Mangas" UAS to rapidly interdict identified UAF counter-attack routes (likely targeting axes leading the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve) with anti-tank mines. This will force UAF reserves into pre-mined sectors or funnel them into kill zones established by the 38th GMRB's current fixation efforts.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

The Stepnohorsk breach achieves operational depth. UAF reserves are committed but suffer heavy losses due to inadequate EW preparation against "Kuryer" UGVs and being trapped by newly laid, rapidly deployed UAS minefields ("Mangas"). Concurrently, the Poltava UAV track enables a successful strike on the Dnipro C2 node, resulting in widespread C2 degradation across the Southern Axis precisely when UAF maneuver units are trapped and require maximum support.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL - EXPIRED)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver and Force Protection (J3 / J7)

ACTION: IMMEDIATE COUNTER-BREACH AND COUNTER-MOBILITY ACTIVATION

1. Reserve Commitment (IMMEDIATE): The J3 must issue the Counter-Attack Order for the BRAVO-BLOCK operational reserve. Reserves must prioritize rapid, dispersed deployment to avoid centralized targeting by RF fires and to complicate "Mangas" RMAO.
2. Maneuver Corridor Clearance: Mechanized units must be immediately equipped with and instructed to utilize mine-clearing line charges (MCLC) and mine rollers before entering suspected counter-attack corridors, assuming those areas are now contaminated by "Mangas" deployment.
3. UGV Countermeasures: Commanders at Stepnohorsk must employ HMG/AGL assets to aggressively neutralize "Kuryer" platforms that are breaching Phase Line BRAVO.

7.2. Fires and Targeting (J2 / J3)

ACTION: INTERDICTING THE MLD SUSTAINMENT

1. UAS Launch Site Interdiction: Shift counter-battery and HIMARS priority (if TOS-1A target is neutralized) to suspected "Mangas" UAS forward operating locations (FOLs) or assembly areas known to support GTV Vostok logistics, denying RF the ability to mass the new mine-laying capability.
2. Exploit Temryuk: Intensify interdiction fires against RF rail nodes and road choke points leading from occupied Crimea toward the MLD sector, increasing the strain caused by the Temryuk LPG terminal loss.

7.3. Electronic Warfare and Air Defense (J6 / AD Command)

ACTION: CRITICAL EW PRIORITIZATION

1. EW Jamming Boxes (CRITICAL): Establish immediate, high-power EW jamming boxes (hard-kill priority) focused on neutralizing both "Kuryer" and "Mangas" UAS control links within the Stepnohorsk engagement area and along all major UAF counter-attack routes.
2. AD Allocation: Maintain non-negotiable AD priority for the Dnipro C2 node. Utilize highly mobile AD systems (e.g., MANPADS, short-range systems) for point defense against any incoming low-altitude UAS threats in the Stepnohorsk area.

7.4. Strategic Communications (STRATCOM / J7)

ACTION: COUNTER-NARRATIVE DISSEMINATION

1. Immediate Denial of Mobilization Claims: Rapidly disseminate official denials and counter-evidence refuting the TASS claim regarding UAF training center paralysis and deployment halts (P10). Emphasize operational readiness and resilience.
2. Western Aid Focus: Continue aggressive promotion of the recently secured UK aid and Patriot missile procurement as evidence of unwavering Western support, directly contrasting this with RF attempts to distract via the Putin-India narrative.